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And i f  you lend where you expect to be repaid, 
what credit is to you?
Even Sinners lend to each other 
i f  they are to be repaid in full
(Luke 6:34)
To HAW  A, who was born 
when I  was learning.
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ABSTRACT
When the World Bank lends to a developing country, it lends in the form of 
concessional loans, to which are attached conditions, not just conditions of repayment, 
but also conditions that the recipient government must fulfill by changing some of its 
previously chosen policies. This Thesis argues that, quite often, the implementation of 
such conditions has major repercussions on the legal and institutional arrangements of 
the borrowing country.
The core of the argument is that, by making loans, the World Bank adopts a 
certain doctrinaire development approach, that it is insensitive to the individual situation 
of borrowing countries, and that the conditions imposed are ideologically biased in 
favour of the free market, and that it overrides national sovereignty and perpetuates 
dependency.
The Thesis then describes in depth the various types of conditions leading to 
substantial reforms in the developing countries. It goes on to consider the effect of 
such reforms on the legal, economic, political and social structures of the borrowing 
members. Overall, the thesis advocates that for the Bank's objectives in the field of 
development to be fully achieved, it is the institution which has to change its policy, 
and not the borrowers.
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INTRODUCTION
The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), more 
commonly known as the World Bank, (hereinafter the Bank), is a specialised agency of 
the United Nations (U N ).(^  In the world of finance, the Bank is the major public 
international source of funds for economic development, consequently it has a 
significant impact on the national development of the members states, although 
juridically these latter are under no obligation to use the Bank's services.
The Bank was established by a multilateral treaty signed at the UN Monetary and 
Financial Conference, held at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire (USA), in July 1944.
The Articles of Agreement of the Bank were formally accepted by a majority of 
the participants by December 27, 1945. Six months later, in June 1946, the World 
Bank which opened its doors for business, moved from an initial emphasis on the post­
war reconstruction of Western Europe, to a predominant emphasis on the development 
area; and gradually, from an initial policy based on commercial banking standards, to 
programme lending combined with policy changes.
The economic deterioration of many developing countries, which by the end of 
the 1980's began to show multiple signs of distress -namely chronic balance of 
payments problems and heavy external debt- led to an increasing role of the Bank in the 
field of development. The policy changes often "advised" by the Bank included 
changes to the existing laws and institutions in the borrowing countries and their 
replacement by new arrangements generally inspired from western models and patterns 
of economic development.
It is a striking feature in this thesis that exasperation with the World Bank
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members relationship is so thoroughly mutual. On the one hand, the newly independent 
nations of the developing countries maintain that they have turned to the World Bank in 
its capacity as a UN specialised agency, as a means of achieving conditions of 
economic well-being and social stability. They have done so because they consider the 
Bank as an institution of universal character which should recognise the sovereignty of 
each nation regardless of its size or wealth. Moreover, they thought that the help which 
they would receive from the institution would be coming from the international 
community as a whole and as being free of obligations to any one country or group of 
countries. On the other hand, the World Bank staff complain of drift, lack of 
seriousness, inability to maintain commitment, incompetent government, and therefore 
express reluctance to commit funds to those who patently require them most, in the 
classical banker's mode. In the end, the Bank see no option but to tighten 
conditionality.
• Objectives of the Study
There are three main reasons for this study on the impact of the World Bank on 
the Developing countries, presently the largest users of the institution's funds.
The first is to examine the various means by which the Bank has assumed key 
influence in Third World policy making and implementation. The debate is not only on 
the institution's leverage or conditionality, but also touches on the dynamics of policy 
making. That is, how the Bank interacts with its LDC policymakers to translate 
conditions into policy and how the implementation of such a policy affects the legal and 
institutional systems of the borrowing countries.
A second motivation for the study is to destroy the myth that the Bank's 
recommendations are the only solution to the economic problems of the Third World 
borrowers. The issue at stake is that the Bank itself is influenced by a minority of 
members who happen to be its main capital suppliers. Therefore any Bank action in the
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direction of the developing countries is bound to bear the "seal of approval" of the 
western countries which, it must be stressed, by engaging their money, have also 
engaged their ideology and economic model of development.
The third major purpose of this study is to fulfill a deficiency, that legal and 
institutional transplantations are not always conclusive in the process of the economic 
development of the Third world countries. This syncretic approach, i.e the adoption 
without distinction of foreign models, has been in fact a major cause of the rather 
limited success of the Bank's programmes. Official Third World condemnation of 
Bank policy, and the unpopularity of the implementation of such policy in the recipient 
countries, are evidence of the limited effect of the Bank's efforts.
• Scope of the Study.
The present research does not concentrate on any particular period of time. It has 
been placed into a larger time perspective in order to emphasise the evolution of the 
Bank's influence over its borrowing countries. Given the broad scope of the study, no 
particular country or a specific (regional) group of countries is selected. Likewise, no 
particular type of loan agreement (energy, agriculture, infrastructure, industry...), is 
selected for analysis. The study applies to a wide variety of appropriate situations in 
the developing countries. It seeks to obtain valid generalisations on the impact of the 
Bank's influence over its borrowers. It follows that, in order to understand some 
aspects of the Bank's policy, it is sometimes necessary to examine the system itself, of 
which the Bank is essentially an instrument. As K.Khan observed:
[I]n assessing the compatibility of an international 
economic institution with the contemporary international 
legal order, it is necessary to examine that institution in 
all its relevant dimensions and environment (emphasis
added). (2)
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• Outline and Arrangement of Topics.
A short description of the Bank's internal structure and functioning in the first 
chapter is necessary to understand the Bank's influence on the LDC borrowers. It 
provides background material on the internal and external environment within which the 
Bank has to function and the pressure with which it has to cope if it is to remain 
assured of its finances, and thus its survival. The focus in this chapter is on the main 
characteristics of the Bank's decision making processes and financial resources. It 
shows from the very beginning, an institution heavily dominated politically, legally and 
institutionally by the market elite and where the vast majority of the Third World 
countries has no role to play.
Chapter two discusses at length the relation between the Bank and its borrowers. 
This chapter is mainly descriptive and narrative. It attempts to set out the various stages 
leading to the conclusion of the loan agreement, which is the prelude to the Bank's 
controversial influence on its borrowers.
In chapter three, an attempt is made to examine the various conditions imposed by 
the Bank through some concrete cases. The thrust of the argument in this Chapter is 
that loans have a direct impact on the borrower since these agreements are prepared and 
im plem ented within the context of different legal systems and institutional 
arrangements.
Through a thorough examination of privatisation, chapter four attempts to discuss 
the dangers of importing and imposing foreign institutions into Third World countries. 
It also shows that the real impact and function of the imported institution is to drive 
Third World economies into adopting models of the world's capitalist investment and 
trading systems for the sake of the First World.
Chapter five maintains that by making its future lending policy conditional on 
political reforms in the borrowing countries, the Bank has triggered revolutionary
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changes in the political institutions of its borrowers. Yet the new criteria imposed are 
neither common in conventional banking practice, nor do they derive from any explicit 
or im plicit constitutional arrangements. The new criteria seem rather dictated by 
external events which are totally alien to the Bank's actual policy, which has so far 
relied basically on economic criteria in its lending practice. By responding to such 
external pressure, the Bank has cast serious doubts on the consistency of its previous 
policy of economic conditionality, and has damaged its political neutrality by interfering 
directly in the domestic affairs of its borrowers. From a legal point of view, this 
chapter argues that such interference, although immaterial, ie. non physical, is 
nonetheless unacceptable because it is indirectly coercive. From the economic point of 
view, the issue at stake is whether a combination of economic and political 
conditionality would prove salutary for the economic development of the Third World 
countries.
• Summary of Findings
The influence of the Bank on its borrowing members represents a far reaching 
change on the legal and institutional arrangements of the developing countries. It is a 
major trend that has been gaining ground since the institution began its operations in the 
late forties and has become even more pronounced in the last decade. This influence is 
basically due to the Bank's developmental policy which consists in forcing borrowers 
to undergo major reform in their economic and political systems of governance. To 
achieve such a purpose, the Bank has devised various kinds of leverage, some of 
which are extremely painful, with varying degree of economic, social and political 
effects on the borrowing countries. These problems demonstrate to a large extent the 
uneasy relationship that has been growing between the Bank and its borrowing 
members. At the centre of such a conflict is the Bank's conditionality policy, the terms 
on which it lends, and the influence it exercises on its borrowers.
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One predominant argument in this thesis is that, the Bank is not limited to the 
supply of funds only. The indirect effects of the conditions which the institution 
imposes on its borrowers are sometimes more important than its financial aspect. In 
other words, what the Bank lends in terms of money is not commensurate with the 
important changes it demands from its borrowers. Furthermore, the implementation of 
such conditions do not seem to be always conducive to prosperous economic 
development in the recipient countries, as the institution claims. The reasons are 
manifold.
In the first place, there is a great deal of scepticism among the LDCs as to the 
"legality" or "legitimacy" of many of the Bank's actions, including its conditionality, 
whether economic or political. Moreover, many of the changes have been forced upon 
the LDCs will and are therefore coercive and disputable from the point of view of 
international law. Furthermore, the laws and institutions recommended by the Bank are 
not always adaptable to the specific conditions of the developing countries, despite their 
technical merit and efficiency elsewhere. Finally, there are at certain stages of the thesis 
some questions about the relevance of the Bank and its proper role, and in the 
exam ination of certain country cases, the question is asked whether the Bank's 
conditionalities (economic and political), and their subsequent effect on borrowers have 
not been counter productive, i.e. contributing to problems rather than to their solutions.
• A Note on Sources
The primary sources for the material contained in this thesis are the documents to 
which I was given access by the Bank and interviews with Bank officials.
It is generally known that the Bank is not a noticeably open institution. 
Nevertheless, after a period of time, I was able to obtain, informally, access to a 
considerable number of internal documents that are generally labelled "confidential" and 
therefore not available to the public at large. Among these, were specific loan
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agreements and structural adjustment programmes of recent dates and particular 
countries.
In gaining access to such material I agreed to certain basic rules. I agreed to 
quote, without naming the country concerned, and without citing the date, the title, or 
any reference that may identify either the borrower, or the country to which the 
borrower belongs, if the loan was made to an entity other than the government.
During my stay at the headquarters of the Bank, I carried out approximately 
seventy interviews with Bank staff at all levels. Many interviews were informal and 
took place at lunch time or tea break. My interviewees were from different background 
and ranking in the Bank hierarchy. They include economic experts, consultants and 
various staff from different departments. Other few and more formal interviews were 
arranged for me in advance. They include five Administrators (two from the developed 
world and three from the developing world), several members including the President 
of the legal department, and few senior officials in the IMF. The talks took place in the 
offices of the interviewees and were subject to the Bank's regulations on giving 
interviews by the Bank's staff.
As expected, many interviewees talked to me on condition that their views and 
observations (which were not necessarily critical), remained anonymous. It is only 
legitimate that their wishes be respected. Part of the interviews in the thesis were 
carried out with Algerian officials in the Ministry of Finance, and with the staff of 
major Algerian banks which have direct contact with the World Bank.
Finally, the nature of the topic and the changing events that may affect the 
substance of its content made it necessary, in the absence of academic material, to resort 
to a wide range of respectable daily newspapers (eg The Financial Times), weekly 
magazines (The Economist) and sometimes radio and/or television broadcastings 
(BBC) This is especially noticeable in the last Chapter (Five), which deals chiefly with 
the emerging of a new form of lending policy based on political criteria and which is
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still in its formative stage.
It is hoped that such an attempt and efforts will not be interpreted as "vulgar 
journalism".
Notes To Introduction
1 IBRD/WB: The official and original title, the IBRD is rarely used and has 
been replaced through common usage by the World Bank, but the initial 
IBRD have been retained.
2 K. Khan, The Law of International Economic Institutions and the Principle of 
Universality in the Contemporary International Legal Order, in W. E. Budler, 
Perestroika and International Law. Martinus, Nijhoff, 1990, at 227.
• References throughout are to the US Dollar, unless otherwise specified
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CHAPTER ONE
SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BANK.
I never saw a more rigid institution...It is an institution, 
not a bank, why they call it a bank, I don't know...(1)
This was Georges D. Woods as he took office as President of the World Bank 
(1963-1968 ). Such a statement denotes to some extent the complex nature of the Bank 
which the present chapter tries to identify. Broadly speaking,the Bank is often looked 
upon by its own insiders as "an International financial institution whose main purpose 
is the economic development of its m e m b e r s ." ^ )  This characterisation involves, in 
essence, more than one institutional case study:
a)- the Bank is an international organisation,
b)- specialised in finance related matters,
c)- with the specific task of promoting development.
The issue which arises is one of reconciliation between the three components, 
which, in the case of the World Bank, seems not easy to reach. This chapter argues 
that a comprehensive study of the Bank can only be made by looking in some depth 
into each of these three components. Far from compartimentalising the institution, such 
an analysis has the advantage of avoiding a number of misunderstandings which have 
often been made in the study of the Bank. For example, most of the Bank's analysts 
who are overwhelmingly economics experts, stress, or give pre-eminence to the
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financial aspect of the institution, while losing sight of the other two components. One 
such a view is well illustrated by economist B. Hurni's definition of the Bank, as she 
wrote:
The Bank can be defined as a prototype public institution 
for politically neutral and untied investment in economic 
development, with its rules shaped more like those in a 
commercial corporation than an intergovernmental 
organisation. (3)
Generally speaking, what is important for economists, is how well the Bank is 
doing business. They are more concerned on matters such as the exchange rate 
affecting the borrowing capacity of the Bank, its volume of lending, the issue of 
interest, and like subjects which deal mainly and directly with money. It is this kind of 
approach which presently predominates in the Bank's literature, and it is favoured by 
most of the developed countries which are the main fund suppliers of the institution.
This technical approach, albeit indispensable, has the disadvantage of neglecting 
the other two aspects of the Bank as a development agency and above all as an 
intergovernmental institution. In respect of this latter aspect, the Bank is seen from a 
politico-legal point of view as an international organisation in the whole sense of the 
term. That is to say, the property of all member states with all consequences that such 
ownership implies in Public International Law.(4)
On the basis of such an assumption, a vast majority of member states, namely the 
LDC's, tend to think that the Bank in its present form and functioning totally eludes 
their control in many respects. Among the arguments which are in blatant contradiction 
with the Bank's status as an international organisation, the LDCs leaders invoke the 
decision making process and the human component of the Bank (ie. the personnel) 
which are both under Western control or influence. As will be seen later, it is this kind 
of structural imperfection that the LDCs want to eliminate in order to press the Bank to 
improve its role as first and foremost an intergovernmental financial institution.
This state of confusion between the various components of the Bank has led to 
many doctrinal as well as practical controversies as to the real nature of the institution. 
As E. S. Mason and Asher rightly remarked, it is a problem of identity:
The line is indeed difficult to draw, and from time to 
time, the Bank as a bank has been contrasted with the 
Bank as a development agency, or as intergovernmental 
organisation leading thus to many controversies as to the 
real identity of the institution.^)
Generally speaking, no matter how deep and scientific the study of individual 
aspects of the Bank may be, there is always the danger of reaching an incomplete view 
and, therefore, any solid judgement on the Bank's activities, policies, and objectives, 
must remain incomplete.
In the present chapter, an attempt is made to consider separately, and as succinctly 
as possible, each of these main institutional aspects of the Bank. The belief is that each 
of these aspects fulfills a certain function, obeys a different set of rules, and is 
integrated into an appropriate system, which, put together, plays a significant role in the 
shaping of the Bank, and explains to a large extent the originality, if not the 
uniqueness, of the institution.
I-The Bank as an International Organisation.
For the purposes of the present thesis, it is unnecessary to go through the history 
of the antecedents of the World Bank.(6) It is necessary, however, to draw attention to 
the main features of the institution and, in particular, to concentrate on three main 
aspects of the Bank as an international organisation, which are: the rules governing 
membership, the relation of the Bank with its members, and the issue of the Bank's 
decision-making. These aspects, although typical to all existing international 
organisations, do bear some peculiarities in the case of the World Bank. Their
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examination helps to understand the various contradictions that explain the present 
functioning of the Bank. Furthermore, these three aspects demonstrate certain central 
points of this thesis which are the voting procedures, the so called autonomy of the 
Bank vis a vis its members, and the pertinent issue of the domination by a minority of 
states of the remaining vast majority.
A- M embership.
The rules regarding membership in the Bank made it compulsory for states to 
acquire prior membership of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter, the Fund or 
IMF) (Art. II, sect. l a ) . D e s p i t e  objections by some delegations during the Bretton 
Woods Conference, that "the country's freedom would be jeopardised if membership 
of one organisation was made contingent upon the other", the link between the Fund 
and the Bank was ultimately sealed/*^ Explaining to the delegates the reasons for such 
a close relationship, one architect of the draft outline said:
Basically, we wanted to force countries to agree to 
standards in the monetary field as a condition to get the 
benefits of the Bank.(9)
This has enabled the Bank to acquire a much wider transparency in the members' 
conduct of their monetary policies and eventually helped the Bank to assert with 
accuracy whether prospective borrowers will be able to meet their financial 
commitments. Membership procedures provide for new members to be admitted by the 
action of the existing members. It is the Board of Governors which has the power to 
admit new members and determine the conditions of their admission. This practice 
differs from that of other agencies in which members are admitted by a formal 
acceptance of the terms and agreements of the institution concerned. So far there is no 
precedent of a state being refused membership by the Board of G overno rs/^ )
In 1946 when the Bank opened for business, it had 45 members, of which 14
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were European countries, 18 Central and Southern American, 9 from Asia (including 
Australasia and the Middle East), and 2 from Africa.
Growth in IBRD membership.
Region 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1991
Africa 2 2 34 44 49 50
Asia 3 13 17 20 24 25
Australasia 1 1 2 5 7 8
Cent&S/Amer. 18 20 22 26 28 28
Europe 14 16 20 21 26 28
Middle East 5 6 9 14 14 14
North/Amer. 2 2 2 2 2 2
45 60 106 132 150 155
• Source: Compiled from various World Bank Annual Reports.
At present membership totals 155 countries, the increase being due mainly to the 
entry of the newly independent states of Africa and Asia and more recently the former 
socialist countries.
Unlike most post war international organisations, the Bank's Articles do not 
require membership of the United Nations.^ ^  In practice, however, only states in the 
full meaning of international law are members. This may be inferred from the treatment 
by the Bank of non-autonomous entities and non-independent territories. In the Bank's 
Articles, these non-independent territories and the like entities which lack international 
personality and recognition are made subject to the administration of their respective 
tutors or colonial powers (Art. XI sec.3 (g)). In other words, a country under the rule 
of another country (colony, mandate, protectorate, suzerainty.), cannot directly claim 
assistance from the Bank. It is the administrator country which, as a formal 
representative, is responsible for the request of loans to assist in the economic 
development of its colony.
Such practices were more common during the years of colonialism, ending in the
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early 1960's. Examples of loans made by the Bank to the colonial powers for the 
benefit of their colonies include: $ 70 million to Belgium (1951) to assist in financing a 
development programme in the Congo; $ 59 million to France (1958) to build a 
hydroelectric dam in Algeria, to cite only these two e x a m p l e s . ^ )
Needless to say such practices have become obsolete with the U.N. resolution 
on The Right of Peoples to Self D e te r m in a t io n /P e r h a p s  the only question that 
remains unanswered so far is whether the Bank's action at that time was for the benefit 
of the poor, colonised, territories, or to help Europe in the expansion (or maintenance) 
of colonialism in Third World countries. Without falling into any kind of subjectivism 
or demagogy, it can be argued that it is time that such provisions disappeared from the 
Articles of Agreement because they are psychologically incompatible with the noble 
mission of the Bank, which is the assistance of the poor countries. Unless colonialism 
is a political issue and the Bank does not want to get involved in political activities as 
directed by its Statutes.
All the members of the Bank are equal. In theory, there is no distinction between 
a developed or undeveloped country as it is found in several post-war international 
organisations such as FAO and U N C T A D .^ ) The distinction between members in 
the Bank is subordinated to the date of their entry into the institution, v iz , whether 
original or non original members (Art.II sec. 1). Original members are those who 
participated in the Bretton Woods negotiations who acquired membership before 31 
December 1945 according to Article XI sec. 2 (e). In the Articles of Agreement, 
original members are referred to in Schedule (A) and were admitted to the institution 
without prior negotiations of their subscriptions, nor were they instructed on the 
methods of its payment. Non original members are the states which joined the Bank 
after the deadline set by the Bank's Articles. Their entry into the Bank is governed by 
the complex provisions of Article II, section 1 (b) as interpreted and completed by 
Article XX of the Bye Laws.
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In practical terms, the distinction between original and non original members is 
only fortuitous, and is strictly limited to the conditions of entry. It does not reflect the 
real structure of the Bank's membership. For taxonomical reasons, the Bank divides 
its members into three categories. This "politique de classement" or "graduation 
process" as it is known in the Bank's jargon," is an important index of the progress 
made by the borrowing countries since the IBRD and IDA were established.^-*)
• Category A:
Although the Bank was initially set up to lend to 'any member' there are, 
however, some states which have been explicitly deprived of the Bank's resources. The 
decision to discard some members from the Bank's funds was taken by a resolution of 
the Board of Governors, after it had ascertained the economic conditions and progress 
of the members c o n c e r n e d . ^ )  appears from the arguments put forward in the 
resolution, that the reasons for disqualifying the 'richer' members are threefold:
Firstly, the Bank's ability to borrow is limited by the provisions of Article III, 
section 3, under which the total amount of outstanding loans held by the Bank must not 
exceed the total of its subscribed capital, surplus and reserves. This limitation known 
in economic parlance as 1:1 ratio, is seen as an extremely prudent prescription, and 
prevents the Bank from lending more money than it originally possesses.^ ^ )
Secondly, by denying loans to relatively wealthier members, the Bank will 
undoubtedly have more resources available for those who are in real need; and therefore 
have priority in the use of the Bank's resources. This is not only fair and just, but 
particularly helpful for the less developed countries at a time when traditional suppliers 
of the Bank's funds (official and private) tend to be more reluctant in providing such 
funds to them.(l^)
Thirdly, the Bank's Articles made it clear that the institution does not intend, nor 
is it allowed, to compete with private lenders (Art.III sec. 4 (ii)). One of the main 
conditions for lending imposed by the Bank is to ascertain that the prospective
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borrower cannot obtain finance on reasonable terms from other (i.e. private or bilateral) 
sources. Therefore, if a relatively rich member needs financial support, it can seek help 
from private sources of lending, which, it must be recalled, is obtainable on terms and 
conditions which are substantially different from those of the Bank
• Category B:
According to the Bank's own calculations, this category comprises all members 
whose annual per capita GNP has reached a limit of $ 410 (1983 figure). In effect, this 
means that members in this category are judged on their ability to borrow and meet the 
obligations deriving from such a borrowing. By the Bank's standards, the economy of 
these countries is deemed deficient, but worthy of assistance without risking eventual 
defaults. However, members in this category who have achieved substantial economic 
progress may become eligible for category (A) and thus become ineligible automatically 
from Bank assistance. This was the case of Japan, for example, which until 1976 was 
a heavy borrower from the Bank and now has become one of the main fund suppliers. 
Venezuela, on the contrary, was in the 1970's, in category (A) but was downgraded to 
Category (B) in the mid 1980's because of a sharp decline in her oil revenues, which 
constitute the main financial resource for the Venezuelan economy. With respect to the 
Bank's volume of operations, Category B covers most of the Institution's activities and 
areas of intervention. Moreover, it is Category B, not surprisingly, which consumes 
almost the entire lending operations of the Bank in terms of development f i n a n c i n g / ^ )
• Category C:
This category comprises all the countries which are not in a position to borrow 
from the Bank because of their inability to meet the financial requirements which follow 
as a result of their borrowing; namely repayment of principal plus interest. These 
countries are excluded from the Bank's loans because of their extreme state of poverty. 
By lending to the countries in this category, the Bank, as it is framed, would inevitably 
'go bust' as one Bank official puts it. The economy of these countries is so depressed
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that profitable business is virtually impossible. Furthermore, the economic situation in 
these countries is often aggravated by natural calamities such as drought, famine or 
epidemics which may diminish even further the Bank's hope of contemplating any form 
of security for its repayments. As a financial institution, it would be unprofitable to do 
business (in the capitalist sense of the term) with this category of m e m b e r s . ^ )
To remedy the situation, the Bank, acting on the basis of its implied powers, 
established in 1961 the International Development Association (ID A ).(^) Through the 
IDA, the Bank has somewhat restored its credibility vis-a-vis  its lenders and 
borrowers. The Association works in a close relationship with the Bank, and carries 
out practically all the tasks that the Bank cannot statutorily do. IDA provides credit (not 
loans) in the form of grants to the least developed countries. It lends only to 
governments, without interest, except for a nominal administrative charge (0,075 %) of 
the allocated amount. The major weakness of the IDA however, is its total reliance on 
the will of the rich industrial c o u n t r i e s . ^ )
The system of classification operating within the Bank is very flexible and states 
may, as an exception, take the advantages of one category, while being officially in 
another. Thus, countries in Category A, although by the Bank's criteria are not eligible 
for the Bank's loans, may nevertheless benefit from the Bank's expertise and the like 
technical assistance. Similarly, countries in Category B may exceptionally benefit from 
IDA.'s concessional grants (which are designed for Category C), and from the Bank's 
conventional loans. This extract from one of the Bank's publications is quite 
informative:
Of the 34 very poor countries that borrowed money from 
IDA in the earliest years, more than two dozen have 
attained sufficient economic strength for them to need 
IDA money no longer. Of these, two -Columbia and the 
Republic of Korea- have not only moved from reliance 
on IDA credits but have attained sufficient economic 
strength to be able to contribute to IDA. Similarly, about
20 countries that formerly borrowed money from the 
IBRD, no longer need to do so - an outstanding example 
is Japan. For a period of 14 years it borrowed from the 
IBRD. Now the IBRD borrows from Japan. (23)
In all the three categories of members, the Bank has an active but different 
relationship.
B- The Relationship Between the Bank and its Members.
In dealing with its members the Bank has, as an international organisation, 
developed a special relationship, the purpose of which is to avoid as much as possible 
direct contact with governments in their capacity as political organs. Article III section 
2 is very strict on this point:
Each member should deal with the Bank only through its 
treasury, central bank, stabilisation fund or other similar 
fiscal agency, and the Bank shall deal with members 
only by or through the same agencies.
This Article should not be construed, however, as barring governments 
completely from the Bank's scene. The provisions of the above cited Article have 
simply introduced some limitation on member states' interference in order to give the 
Bank a greater autonomy in the conduct of its business. For, it is believed, too much 
involvement of states in the Bank's activities goes contrary to the very nature of the 
Institution's purpose, which is a bank before anything else. As such, it must keep 
distant from governments and politicians. The reverse is true for the Bank. It must 
deal with its members only through the same channels (i.e those enumerated in Art. Ill 
sec. 2), and it must not interfere with the politics of its members.
The Bank's Articles provide that the Institution cannot be guided in its decisions 
by political considerations. Only economic criteria are relevant to the Bank's lending 
decisions.(“4) The Bank is thus neither allowed to interfere in the domestic politics of
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its members, nor to take into account the political character of the prospective 
borrowers. However:
These prohibitions... do not mean that [the Bank] must 
not take into account political situations or developments 
in member countries which may have an impact on their 
economic situation. Economic policy may be linked to 
political policy and thus Bank decisions may be 
influenced by or have an influence on the domestic 
affairs of a country. (25)
The Bank's non political stance has raised many controversies which have been 
shown in several w r i t i n g s . ^ )  However, recent developments confirm the view that 
the Bank has become more and more involved in politics, notwithstanding its Articles 
which prohibit it from such activity. At the risk of over-simplification member states 
come into contact with the Bank on very few occasions such as:
By subscribing their shares to the capital of the Bank at the time of the state's 
entry into the institution (Art.II sec. 3 a)
- Through the 'supply' of guarantees whenever the loan is made to an entity 
belonging to the member state.( Art. Ill sec. 4(i))
In case of litigation where only the state, be it a borrower or guarantor, may 
be a party in a conflict with the Bank. (Art. VI sec.4)
While clearly attempting to diminish government intervention in the Bank, the 
drafters of the Articles were faced with the corollary question of how the Institution is 
to be linked to its members. Were the Fund and the Bank purely financial institutions 
whose direction could be entrusted to a group of international civil servants? Or did 
their operations have such economic and political implications as to require close 
control by the member g o v e r n m e n t s ? ^ ^  \n other words, would the representatives of 
the member states represent the views of their respective governments, or would they 
owe complete allegiance to the Bank ? As with several questions, this one has no
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answer in the Articles, and it seems to have been left deliberately to the discussion of 
the conference.
In their study, Mason et al, supported by a large majority of authors, argue that 
Bank officials, especially the Executive Directors, although showing complete 
obedience to the Institution, do nevertheless work in close contact with their respective 
governments.(28) \n ap other major aspects of the Bank's functioning, policies and 
activities, the Institution has developed its own methods independently from any direct 
governmental interference, but heavily influenced by the views of the Western powers 
and especially those of the United States. America's influence on the Bank is so 
important that i t  deserves special a t t e n t i o n .  (29)
a)- US Dominance.
Being the promoters of and by far the largest contributors to the Bank, it was 
quite natural that the Americans had their own blue print on the institution. "This was 
inevitable", as Bank officials admit:
because of the location of its [the Bank's] headquarters, 
the financial strength of the United States and Western 
Europe vis a vis the rest of the World... (30)
But it was not always easy for the Americans to secure such privileges. The first 
worry facing the US delegation in 1944 was to secure a locus for the Bank on 
American soil. After slight resistance from the British delegation, the Americans 
succeeded in having the Bank not only on their territory, but in the very place they 
wanted i t  to be, W a s h i n g t o n . ^ ! )  That is to say, under close surveillance of Congress 
and in permanent (informal) contact with Wall Street.
The following step for the Americans was the utmost necessity of having a US 
citizen at the top of the institution. There too, they have been more successful than they 
may have anticipated because, since 1946, all the Bank Presidents have been US
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nationals, totalling an unbroken record of nine Presidents in nearly half a century .^-) 
Through the Articles of Agreement, US predominance is also omnipresent. It is either 
expressed openly, such as in Article XI section 2 which starts in the following terms: 
"The government of the United States of America..." Or it may be insidiously hidden 
under the cloak of paraphrases such as in Article V section 9 (a), which reads: "The 
member holding the largest share...", knowing that they are referring to themselves.
Perhaps, the most direct and concrete American influence on the Bank comes 
from the US Congress, which voted in 1945 to establish the National Advisory Council 
on International Monetary and Financial Problems, (N A C ).(^) The NAC was set up:
in order to coordinate the policies and operations of the 
representatives of the US in the Fund and the Bank and 
all agencies of the government which make or participate 
in making foreign loans or which engage in foreign 
financial exchange or monetary tra n sa c tio n s .(3 4 )
The Council consists of the Secretaries of the Treasury and Commerce and the 
heads of the Federal Reserves Board, the Exim Bank and experts on monetary and 
financial issues and acts as a watch-dog. The Council has two main functions. It is an 
advisory body to the President (of the USA) and, in this capacity, it coordinates US 
foreign economic policy at the cabinet level. Secondly, the Council is the supervisory 
body of the US representatives in the Bank and the Fund. Thus, whenever the 
approval, consent or agreement of the US is required before an act may be done by the 
respective institutions, the decision as to whether such approval... must be given by the 
NAC under the direction of the President. The Council meets regularly and reports to 
the Congress on all aspects of the Bank's activities. Among other things, the NAC 
makes various recommendations to the US Executive Director (in the Bank); it instructs 
him to oppose loans to specific countries, and orders him to veto any decision which 
runs counter to U S interests.@5)
Even if the domination of the US was an inevitable consequence of its financial
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contribution, certain acts were disproportionately symbolic of American prevalence. 
Thus, until 1962, for example, a newly admitted member in the Bank signed the 
Articles of Agreements in the Department of State, presided over by an Assistant 
Secretary of State. Ideological hostility towards public enterprises, particularly in non 
service areas, is also another feature of American influence. English is also the only 
official language; and some half of the top officials in the Bank are US c itizens.^^
One major factor contributing indirectly to the "Americanisation" of the Bank was 
the absence of the former Soviet Union and her allies from the institution. The Russian 
delegation participated in all the stages leading to the Bretton Woods conference. It 
signed the Final Act, but never ratified the IMF and IBRD Articles of Agreement, and 
thus never became a member. In Bittermann's words:
the Russians did not believe that the Bank should require 
general economic information and they insisted that 
countries with state trading should receive loans without 
prior investigation.(37)
At the meeting of the UN General Assembly in 1947, the Soviet representative 
charged that the Bretton Woods institutions were merely branches of Wall Street and 
that the Bank was subordinated to political purposes which make it the instrument of 
one great power^S) Russia's "defection" deprived the Bank of one of its potentially 
most influential members and presumably, the only country which, ideologically, could 
have counterbalanced the Western capitalist doctrine upon which the entire Bretton 
Woods system was founded. Without serious competitors, the US dominance over the 
Bank had no difficulty in expanding comfortably. This led many writers and politicians 
in the Third World to express their worries, and to question the real independence of 
the B ank.(^) As Hoon Mok Chung remarked:
Too close association between [ the US and the World 
Bank ] would only deprive the Bank of its greatest asset- 
a reputation of being an international agency. Without
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this, the Bank would not be immune from the charges of 
undue political pressure of the LDCs. Thus there was 
and still there is a great need for the Bank to achieve a 
delicate balance between being international and being 
"dependent" on the largest stockholder.^)
As a consequence of this unmatched capital subscription, the Americans enjoy a 
privileged position in the decision-making process of the World Bank. This position is 
in fact so important that it deserves careful examination.
C- Decision Making Structure and Procedure.
The capacity of the Bank to adapt to the changing environment and expand the 
scope of its functions unhindered by national governments is, to a great extent, the 
result of its internal structure. Therefore, a brief examination of the Bank's internal 
organisation is necessary because it determines directly or indirectly the quality and the 
features of all decisions taken within the institution, as well as the influence of the rich 
contributors on the Bank's functioning.^!)
a)- Internal Organisation.
The internal structure of the Bank is very simple and can be summarised briefly.
(i)- The Board of Governors.
The Board of Governors is one of the five constitutional organs of the Bank 
together with the Executive Directors, the President, the Advisory Council and the Staff 
Loan Committee. The Board of Governors is the highest organ in the Bank's 
hierarchy. It is composed of representatives of all the members who are generally 
Ministers of Finance. Each Governor is seconded by an Alternate. The Board is the 
supreme decision-making body in a formal sense since " all powers of the Bank [are]
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vested in the Board of Governors."(Art.V sec.2a ) The Board retains certain non 
delegable powers (admission and suspension of members, international agreement 
making and approval of amendment to the Articles...), but has delegated most of its 
authority to the Executive Directors (Art.V sec. 2b).
(ii)- The Executive Directors.
The Executive Directors are responsible for the conduct of the general operations 
of the Bank (Art.V sec.4a ). They exercise all the powers delegated to them by the 
Board of Governors. The Bank's Articles fixed the number of the Executive Directors 
at twelve; consisting of five appointed by each of the five major shareholders (US, UK, 
France Germany and Japan); the others are elected by the rest of the members. The 
Articles left the number of the Executive Directors flexible. The number has been 
gradually increased to twenty two as a result of the admission of new members.1(^2)
The Executive Directors elect the President of the Bank, determine all loan 
proposals as well as their conditions, make recommendations on the admission and 
suspension of members. They are, in practice, the Bank's supreme decision making 
body. Although the final decision (as to loan or other major activities) must be made by 
the Executive Directors, the initiative for all actions lies with the President and his staff.
(iii)- The President.
The Bank's Statutes define the President's role in a very simple way. According 
to Article V section 5b, the President is the chief of the operating staff. He conducts 
the ordinary business of the Bank in collaboration with the Executive Directors, and is 
responsible for the organisation, appointment and dismissal of the staff. The only 
constitutional constraint imposed on the exercise of his powers are the requirements to 
discharge his duty in the interests of the international community and to be subject to 
the direction of the Executive Directors. In practice, however, these constraints are of
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little significance, and the President is a major source in the Bank's policy and decision­
making process. (43)
b)- The Decision Making Process.
The issue of decision making has been, and still is, the most controversial area 
where frictions between the DCs and LDCs are the most p r o n o u n c e d / 4 4 )  To the 
repeated calls from the Third World countries to change the voting rules, the Bank has 
responded by proposing a mid-way answer. It has tactfully dropped the formal rules 
and instituted instead a smoother procedure in the form of consensus in almost all its 
decisions. This led to the emergence of a dual system of decision making which has no 
comparison in any other international organisation; one theoretical, the other
practical/45)
(i)- The Theory.
The pivotal principle affecting the Bank's decision making is the weighted 
vo te /4^) Thus, the actual size and importance, the voting power and the ability to 
influence the Bank's decisions vary widely between the members. Voting power on 
the Board of Governors and among the Executive Directors is weighted on the basis of 
the number of shares held by each member ( Art. Ill sec. 2 ). That is of the amount of 
capital subscribed by each member, allocated on the basis of economic strength as 
expressed in the IMF holdings. Each member has 250 votes. In numerical terms, it 
amounts to 11 percent of the votes distributed on the basis of one state, one vote. In 
Gold's opinion these:
basic votes were intended to give expression to the 
classical doctrine of the equality of states in international 
law and to provide some safeguards against shares in 
total voting for some members that might seem to be 
absurdly small that their voices could be ignored/47)
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The remaining 89 percent are allocated on the basis of shares of stock held by 
each member. The value of each share is $ 100.000 in terms of US Dollar of the 
weight and finesse in effect on July 1, 1944. An application of these voting 
arrangements gives the following result. For example, Costa Rica's subscription is $ 
131 million, it has thus, 250 votes plus 131 equal 381 votes; which is, in terms of 
percentage, 0.04 percent of the total voting powers. A small arithmetical exercise 
shows that nearly 400 Costa Ricas are needed to equal the USA.
Voting power thus ranges from the US current 17 percent to the 0.04 of both 
Costa Rica and The Republic of Lao. The ten most developed countries hold slightly 
less than 56 percent of the total of votes. The proportion becomes nearly 63 percent, if 
five other developed countries are added. Whereas, a hundred and twenty one LDCs 
has each less than 1 percent of the voting power and hold together 19 percent, slightly 
more than the US. Of the LDCs, only China holds 3.27 percent. Because of the few 
members holding large shares of stock, the numerical expansion of membership did not 
affect the distribution of voting powers as it did in other UN Specialised A gencies.(^) 
Potential influence of the OECD countries, for example, as a whole has been 
diminished during the years as increase in membership may indicate. Gradually, the 
voting power of the US, UK and France have been proportionally reduced, but it was 
due mainly to the admission of Germany and Japan. Total voting power thus 
pertaining to the OECD remained proportionally more stable than the voting power of 
individual members.
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.
As a consequence of increase in membership, the total voting power of the US 
has dropped from the original 42 percent in 1947, to the present 17 percent (1991). 
This means that the US, which is still the biggest shareholder, is in no position to block 
a decision by its own vote alone.(^9) They need the concurring votes of at least six 
major shareholders to do so, because the Bank's Articles require, for most purposes, a 
simple majority ( Art.II sec.3 ). Such figures and mechanistic voting calculations may 
look dramatic, but their real significance is far from reflecting reality, since the practice 
is all together different. For few, if any, matters of importance are decided by a mere 
tally of votes.
(ii)- The Practice.
The procedure of the weighted vote so far described is only theoretical; in the 
sense that at least it reflects the meaning and spirit of Article V section 3 as it reads in 
the Bank's Statutes. In practice, however, voting power is not all important in decision 
making. Executive Board decisions are often based on general consensus arrived at 
through debate rather than voting. It has become a fashion within the Bank (and the 
Fund ) to state that an affirmative vote is often less important than a wide consent. As 
one Bank official put it "it is more important to ascertain the sense of the meeting than 
to observe formal voting procedures." One major consequence of the consensual 
method is that the Directors are rarely, if ever, asked to decide issues and problems on 
which a prior consensus has not been already reach ed /^ )
The Bank has always argued that such a consensual approach is advantageous to 
both LDCs and DCs. For the former, it is an opportunity for them to have their opinion 
expressed; henceforth, they will psychologically feel as being part of the decision 
making process. Therefore, they will be more ready to accept the outcome of the 
decision thus reached. For the latter, the consensus method gives them the opportunity
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to present the Bank as a democratic institution governed by all the members without 
discrimination.
The use of consensus remains from the point of view of law unclear. For, such a 
method is neither part of the Bank's Articles of Agreement, nor has it been formalised 
in any other subsequent document. It may be sometimes confusing for an institution to 
operate on a dual system, one formal the other informal, especially when it is the latter 
which seems to prevail. For many authors such as A. Fatouros, the Bank deliberately 
maintains such a duality to keep the developing countries under pressure; and at the 
same time to avoid internal conflict between Bank officials should formal voting be 
used. Said the above mentioned author:
From the very start, the Bank's management has chosen 
to follow a policy of total avoidance of confrontation 
(and divided votes at the level of Directors or Governors) 
and has adopted instead a decision-making process 
which functions smoothly by means of continuing 
consultations and informal contacts between Executive 
Directors and Bank officials at various stages of the 
lending process and before a loan is formally submitted 
for approval.^ 1)
While consensus is voiced proudly in the Bank, in the background however, the 
spectre of the weighted vote lies dormant. For, in practice, any member who is not 
satisfied by a decision taken by consensus, has the right to ask for a formal vote. For, 
whoever asks for a formal vote, will be in fact asking for a weighted vote; therefore a 
vote to the advantage of the DCs minority. Indirectly thus, it is not to the advantage of 
the LDCs to resist anv consensus, since a formal vote will be also unfavourable to 
them. The widely held view that the Bank works on consensus is no more no less than 
misleading propaganda. Otherwise, why are the LDCs still asking for a revision of the 
decision-making process in the Bank ? The issue of decision making is particularly 
crucial for the LDCs, because it affects the way the Bank's funds are allocated to them.
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This leads us to consider the second and main characteristic of the Bank as an 
international financial institution.
II- The Bank as a Financial Institution
Proving that a bank is a financial institution, may not be a usual exercise. 
However, in the case in hand, the issue whether the Bank should be called a bank is 
worth exploring since it may help to shed light on several aspects of the institution that 
will be considered in the course of this study. The question, in fact, arose immediately 
during the Bretton Woods conference, and was the subject of futile exchanges between 
d e l e g a t e s / - ^ )  Without going into the core of the debate, it is sufficient to state that the 
delegates eventually retained the name Bank "only for a want of a better word."
The creation of the Bank was an entirely new 
venture...So novel was it, that no adequate name could 
be found for it. Insofar as we can talk of capital 
subscriptions, loans, guarantees, issue of bonds, the 
new financial institution may have some apparent claim 
to the name of Bank, but the type of shareholders, the 
nature of subscriptions, the exclusion of all deposits and 
of short-term loans, the non-profit basis, are quite 
foreign to the accepted nature of a Bank. However, it 
was accidently bom with the name Bank, and Bank it 
remains, mainly because no satisfactory name could be 
found in the dictionary for this unpreceden ted
institu tion .^ )
As a financial institution the Bank is, in many respects, different from other 
international organisations, because of its overall structure which R. Lavalle describes 
as follows:
Elle [la Banque] ressemble a une societe commer9iale de 
capital variable, dont les associes seraient les Etats 
membres...(54)
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Like any financial institution, the Bank needs at least two main supports: A)- 
capital, and B)- shareholders. Since it is not an ordinary bank, there may be some 
others C)- peripheral functions worth examining.
A - The Sources of Funds for the Bank.
The Bank draws its funds from two main sources: a)- payments made by member 
subscriptions and b)- borrowings from capital m arke ts.^^
a)- Member Subscriptions.
Upon their entry into the institution, states contribute to the Bank's funds by fixed 
quotas determined on the basis of formulae that reflect their economic strength. In 
broad terms, country quotas are decided by a resolution of the Board of Governors, 
according to a procedure closely linked to the member participation in the IMF. 
However, unlike the case of the Fund, there is no relation between a member 
subscription and the amount of money, or the number of loans it may request and 
receive from the B ank.(-^
According to the Articles of Agreement, member subscriptions are divided into 
two parts. A small part, representing 10 percent of the Bank's subscribed capital, 
(Art.II sec. 5 (i)) constitutes the member states permanent contribution to the B ank's 
equity assets. Of this 10 percent there is 8 percent paid in gold or US dollars and is 
usable by the Bank without restriction in general operations (Art. II sec. 7 ( i) ) .(^ )  The 
largest part (i.e. 90 percent) still remains with the member country, but may be called in 
at any time by the Bank to meet its financial obligations arising from its own 
borrowings (Art.II sect. 5 (ii)). This callable part is often referred to as the guarantee 
fund, which provides the Bank with an essential element of credibility within the 
international financial community. It serves exclusively as protection for the Bank's
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creditors. In addition, the callable portion may in any case be the subject of bargaining 
by other members should any one of them fail to honour it. In other words, if the Bank 
needs funds and calls on members to provide their unpaid share (i.e the remaining 90 
percent), and in the event of one member refusing to fulfill such an obligation, the other 
members cannot rely on the default of that one member to abstain from paying in their 
share.(-^) If, on a call, the amount of money received is insufficient to meet the 
obligations of the Bank for which the call is made, the Bank has the right, and is 
bound, to make further successive calls, until the aggregate amount received by it is 
sufficient to meet such obligations. However, no member may be required on any such 
a call to pay more than the unpaid balance of its capital s u b s c r i p t i o n / - ^ )
b)- Borrowing by the Bank from the Capital Market.
This is, in reality, the most important source for the Bank. The Bank borrows 
about 70 percent of what it le n d s /^ )  As a borrower, the Bank enjoys great popularity 
in the free market which enables it to acquire funds at extremely favourable rates 
because of the guarantee fund, referred to earlier. The Bank borrows either directly 
from government central banks such as the United States, Japan, West Germany and 
Switzerland, and recently from some OPEC countries namely Abu Dhabi, Saudi 
Arabia. Or it may borrow from private institutions such as the inter American Bank, 
the Asian Bank of Development, the Exim Bank or any other respectable financial 
institution. A survey of the B ank's borrowing operations shows that the institution 
tends to favour the latter type of borrowing to the former. This may be explained by 
the Bank's traditional distrust for governments in general, and partly because the 
majority of the private lenders are American dominated agencies. As of June 1990, the 
amount of money subscribed by the members amounted to $ 0.09392549 billion (less 
the uncalled portion); whereas the total of loans approved by the Bank was 11,4 billion. 
It is clear that the members paid-in portion alone is far from covering the Bank's huge
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lending operations.
The magnitude of the B ank's involvement in the free market is reflected in the 
Articles which give the Bank ample powers to contract such borrowings (Art. IV sec. 
la  (ii)). However, this capacity to borrow, although very high, is not unlimited. The 
amount of money the Bank can borrow may be assessed indirectly from the provisions 
of Article III section 3 which prohibit the Bank from lending more than its authorised 
capital. This 1 to 1 gearing ratio is, of course, highly conservative, and suggestions for 
change have been repeatedly made by LDCs. For, with a different and more flexible 
gearing ratio provision, the Bank's lending could be expanded greatly to the benefit of 
the borrowing members. This point will be discussed further when a p p r o p r i a t e / ^ )
Paradoxically, what is more important is the non paid capital that the Bank uses to 
bkck its borrowing from the free market. On the basis of such a limited subscription 
imposed upon the member states, it was possible for the Articles to make government 
intervention in the Bank impotent; as it can always argue that it is other's money which 
the institution is using, not the member's. So, in a sense, it is not the private market 
which makes the "strength" of the Bank, but governments in their capacity as states 
enjoying international legal personality. This distinction has to be made because quite 
often the Bank is unduly presented by its officials as an institution depending heavily 
on the free market, and, from there, they deduct a whole panoply of rules and 
principles which have a tremendous effect on the way the Bank shapes its policies and 
carries out its activities. As Mason et all remarked:
The fact that the Bank was dependent on capital markets 
for the bulk of its funds was to the managment an asset 
rather than a liability... since this meant that the Bank 
was limited to the kind of lending that, because it had to 
be productive, would "build confidence in the Bank".
Furtherm ore, dependence on the m arket meant 
independence from the political pressure of donor
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governments. (63)
But this is not the whole truth. It may be right to say that by relying on the private 
market, the Bank reinforces its autonomy vis-a-vis its members, but, at the same time, 
it should be noted that this non reliance on government monies is self imposed. That is 
to say ,it was the founders of the Bank which wanted it to be so. Furthermore, most of 
the Bank's private lenders deal with the Bank mainly because it is an intergovernmental 
institution, backed, run, and managed by governments. Had it not had such strong 
support from governments, the Bank would certainly not enjoy such confidence and 
credibility in the market place. In sum, it is not the private bankers which make the 
Bank's strength, but the member governments in their capacity as shareholders
B- Shareholders.
The Bank is owned by 155 governments which may be compared, in many 
respects, to shareholders in a private financial institution. However, as the Secretary of 
the US State Treasury, Fred M. Vinson pointed out, "the Bank is not an ordinary 
institution with ordinary shareholders, It is a cooperative enterprise of governments and 
its chief business is with governm ents".^) Unlike private shareholders, governments 
do not have unlimited share of participation. In the Bank's regulations, the amount of 
shares allocated to individual members joining the institution is fixed by the Board of 
Governors, the highest authority in the Bank. Like shareholders in a private enterprise, 
governments do not interfere directly with the day to day running of the Bank. They 
invest their money and leave the daily business of the Bank to the Board of 
Management. Moreover, the distinction between big and small shareholders has not 
been without effect on the structure of the Bank which appears rather like an institution 
where the largest subscribers dominate the small ones; despite the formal equality 
which exists between all shareholders in their capacity as members of the international 
c o m m u n i t y . ^ )  This is a hierarchy which, it must be recalled, has been made possible
34
and encouraged by the Articles of Agreement.
The Banks retained earnings have been accumulated from the net profits which 
the Bank has made every year since 1948. Unlike most other financial institutions, the 
Bank is not a profit making agency. Shareholders in the Bank do not receive dividends 
or interest on their paid in subscriptions. Instead, earnings have been used to build up 
the Bank's reserves to meet its own internal expenses. Under its present policy 
guidelines on liquidity, the Bank maintains "a pool of liquid holding", which at any 
given moment should be equal to a minimum of 40 to 45 percent of its estimated 
borrowings during the following three years. This policy is designed to protect the 
Bank from being forced to borrow under suddenly deteriorating market conditions to 
meet its own commitments. In recent years, part of the reserve surplus has also been 
directed to the financing of the Bank's two affiliates, IFC and ID A .(^ )
The Bank also increases its resources by cashing various remittances which are 
due to it as a result of its lending contracts. The institution is free to fix for itself the 
interest it charges on its loans as prescribed by the A r tic le s /^ )  Since the Bank 
borrows heavily from private lenders, its interest rates are accordingly closely linked to 
those available on the market place. Although the Bank is in principle allowed to 
borrow only in order to lend it can, however, invest its resources if they are not being 
used, and generate extra funds for its reserve. As a lending agency, the Bank has to 
develop a special relationship with both its lenders and borrowers.
To the lenders, the Bank must provide certain basic guarantees such as a return on 
the loan plus interest. The Bank must also build up a certain credibility and faith to 
attract private lenders. In recognition of such "Cooperation" the Articles provide the 
Bank with only a "partial" jurisdictional im m unity .(^) in other words, in order to 
protect the lenders, the Articles have established provisions which enable them to have 
recourse to municipal courts in order to secure performance by the Bank of its 
obligations. Broches, who agrees with these rather unusual provisions, maintains that
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a complete jurisdictional immunity would only "discourage prospective investors in its 
securities. "(69)
To the borrowers, the Bank must ensure that its money is spent efficiently within 
a healthy economy and get a return in order to pay back its lenders. For that purpose, 
the Bank is involved with its borrowers in practically all the stages of the project 
financed by its funds. Unlike a private banker, the Bank does not require from its 
client a repayment of the loan plus the interest only, but insists through its own method 
that the money should be spent on pre-agreed arrangements that are always transformed 
into law in a loan agreement and, as such, legally binding the borrower to the 
institution^ See infra at 77 et ss).
Since the beginning of its operations, the Bank has not had any losses on loans. 
It has never had to write off of a loan. It has never had a non accruing loan. It has, 
per contra, a firm policy against rescheduling its outstanding loans. Because of such 
financial discipline, the Bank claims that, so far, no member has defaulted, and that 
borrowers always meet their obligations to the institution in a timely fashion. However, 
in most situations, compliance with the loan agreement is not so much the borrower's 
faithfulness to its contractual obligations, but rather his fears of the implications of 
defaulting on the Bank's loan. A default to the Bank carries serious consequences that 
would affect the international credit of the country involved both with other countries 
and with commercial suppliers of r e s o u r c e s . ( ^ O )  Borrowers know that these resources 
will no longer be available to them should their relationship with the Bank deteriorate. 
As E. Rotberg clearly explained:
There are substantial pragmatic reasons why borrowers 
do not default on World Bank loans. In the event of a 
default, no further disbursement would be made on that 
loan or any other loan outstanding but not yet disbursed 
to the country. And, no new loans would be committed 
until the default had been made up. Borrowers know our 
policies in this regard, and given the substantial amount
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of the Banks undisbursed loans, they would be 
extremely reluctant to take steps to jeopardize the transfer 
of future resources.(71)
C- Others Peripheral Functions.
Besides its financial functions per se, the Bank is also engaged in other parallel 
non financial activities which are rather unusual in conventional banking practice. In 
view of the importance of such extra activities and their implications on the overall 
functioning of the Bank, it is useful to describe some of these peripheral activities.
a)- Technical Assistance.
It is largely a futile exercise to scrutinise the Articles of Agreement of the Bank to 
discover even a single provision which suggests that technical assistance should 
become a part of the institution's f u n c t i o n s . T h e constitutional provisions upon 
which the Bank has justified its technical assistance is Article III section 4  (v) which 
directs the Bank to:
...pay due regard to the prospect that the borrower and 
the guarantor will be in a position to meet its obligations 
under the loan and the Bank shall act prudently in the 
interest both of the particular member in whose territories 
the project is located and of the members as a whole.
As the location of this Article suggests, the spirit of the provision is nothing more 
than a warning that the lending institution must exercise financial prudence when 
granting a loan. Stretched a little further, the Article may indicate that the lender has a 
right to investigate the borrower's capacity to carry out his prospective obligation under 
the terms of the lo a n .^ )
According to the Bank's own definition, technical assistance is any service
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provided by the Bank "unrelated to any immediate request for financing."(74) initially, 
such services were limited to general development surveys of economic potentialities, 
and to specific programme surveys in order to assist a country formulating long term 
development programmes. Eventually, such a definition gave way to further expansion 
until it included activities such as the promotion of coordination among aid giving 
countries and training of officials of aid receiving countries. Barely a few months after 
the Bank began operations, it started giving technical assistance to some members. The 
policy was promptly endorsed by a committee of the Board of Governors which 
justified its decision on the ground that:
The extent of the Bank's activities cannot be measured 
simply by the number or amount of its loans. Experience 
has shown that particularly in the development field, the 
Bank can act with full effectiveness only if in addition to 
passing upon the merits of loan applications presented to 
it, the Bank takes positive steps to assist its member 
countries in outlining the general pattern of their 
development programmes, in specifying the field of 
activities which would be given priority, and in 
formulating the specific projects within those fields.(^)
The third Annual Report of the Bank was even more precise, and indicated that: 
"successful development depends in most cases just as much upon the provision of 
technical assistance ...as upon, the availability of capital."(76) Through the years the 
Bank has developed four main types of technical assistance. Briefly these are:
• Technical assistance incorporated in the loan agreement:
This kind of assistance is generally connected with a specific loan. The most 
frequent one is the inclusion in the loan agreement of special funds for the employment 
of foreign consultants to help launch the project. The loan may also include funds to 
help the borrower select appropriate equipment and prepare tenders for international 
bidding.
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• Independent technical assistance:
This kind of technical assistance is normally related to any immediate 
development project. Examples of such assistance include extra funds for a ministry of 
a member country to improve its overall functioning, or expand its activities.
• Technical assistance related to preinvestment.
This type of assistance is provided for the purpose of preparing country 
development programmes, establishing development priorities,training nationals of the 
borrower to administer and prepare projects that are connected with external financing.
• UNDP financed preinvestment studies:
The Bank provides also a large amount of technical assistance by administering 
feasibility studies financed by the UN Development Programme (UNDP). By mid 
1991, the Bank has acted as executing agent for 12 projects financed by various UN 
o rg a n isa tio n s /^  In most cases, however, the Bank makes use of private consultancy 
firms or cooperates with governmental agencies when available in member countries. 
In sum, the speed at which the Bank developed and continuously improved these 
peripheral activities show, to some extent, the institution's intention to secure a much 
deeper and wider scope of interv ention in the LDCs. For, by providing funds alone, the 
Bank's leverage will be somehow limited, in the sense that less access into the 
borrower's economy will be available. Yet, publicly, the Bank argues that its technical 
assistance is as essential as money for the institution to pursue its objectives as a 
development agency.
I ll-  The Bank as a Development Agency.
The original drafters of the Bank refer to the institution as a Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. This duality of function led to prolonged
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controversies between the participants in finding the proper balance between 
reconstruction and development. The issue divided the European delegates, who 
favoured the reconstruction of their war damaged countries, and the poor nations, who 
were more interested in enhancing their backward economies by development.(78) The 
issue of equilibrium was further complicated by the silent attitude of the Bank's 
Articles, as Mason et al remarked:
The Articles of Agreement which would have normally 
s tatuated  on the issues of priorities between 
reconstruction and development have left the question 
entirely to the discretion of the Bank. (79)
As a matter of interest, it may be worth looking at how the Bank in practice 
resolved the issue of the dichotomy by looking first into the early involvement of the 
institution into the field of reconstruction, and how it dealt with it, before considering 
the second and present function of the Bank in the field of development.
A- The Structure Produced at Bretton Woods:
It is the opinion of all writers that the delegates at Bretton Woods vastly 
underestimated the urgent need for a development agency.(^) Instead, they were more 
concerned by the recovery of war torn Europe. "From the outset", wrote Gerald, M. 
Meier, "it was apparent that issues of development were not to be on the Bretton 
Woods a g e n d a ." ^ )  Among the 44 delegates present, some less developing countries 
were invited but the real power lay with the United States and, to a lesser extent, the 
U nited K ingdom . The LDCs presence was felt unnecessary and somewhat 
cumbersome as Lord Keynes cynically observed:
Twenty one countries have been invited, which clearly 
have nothing to contribute and will merely encumber the 
ground. "(82)
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The LDCs, whose preoccupations were different, naturally emphasised the need 
for development as the main task in terms of priority of the Bank's objectives. At the 
Bretton Woods conference, the Latin American nations insisted that the stated 
objectives of the Bank include an explicit commitment to development. They pointed 
out th a t" the task of reconstruction is only a temporary one and that most of the Bank's 
effort should be vested in the long term developm ent."^) The case for an accelerated 
role for development was vigorously defended by the Mexican delegation which called 
on the Bank to allocate a substantial portion of its funds for development purposes. The 
Mexican statement contended that:
In the very short run, perhaps reconstruction will be 
more urgent for the world as a whole, but in the long run 
... development must prevail. Without denying the 
initial importance of reconstruction, we ask you (the 
Chairman) not to relegate or postpone development.... If 
we tackle our own wide domestic problems, and for that 
we require sums of capital we do not dispose of at home, 
we will undoubtedly benefit not only ourselves, but the 
world as a whole, and particularly the industrial nations, 
in that we shall provide better markets for them and 
better customers. We submit therefore that capital for 
development purposes in our countries is as important 
for the world as is capital for reco n stru c tio n  
purposes. "(84)
This was categorically rejected by the Chairman Lord Keynes as he said "we 
cannot accept the resources should be divided equally between reconstruction and 
development, but I am sure the word equitably would d o ." (^ )  (italics added). The 
result was the insertion of the phrase in an Article of the Bank's Charter that:
The resources and the facilities of the Bank shall be used 
exclusively for the benefit of members with equitable 
consideration to projects for development and projects 
for reconstruction alike. (Art. Ill sec. 1)
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But this was in blatant contradiction with the earlier Article 1 setting the purpose 
of the Bank in the following terms: "To assist in the reconstruction and development 
of territories members" (italics added). Article I clearly states the dual purpose but fails 
to indicate an order of priority. However, several authors have argued that as 
reconstruction is mentioned first, this may indicate that the drafters intentions were 
inclined more towards reconstruction than development. Thus, the provisions of Article 
I would have eventually settled the question of priorities had it not been the provisions 
of Article III, section 1. A brief comparison of Article I and Article III reveals 
profound contradictions that make the issue of priorities even more confusing.
First, there is a serious disparity in the actual phrasing of both Articles in relation 
to the exact position of the words reconstruction and development. In Article I, 
reconstruction comes first, followed by development. In Article III (1), it is 
development which is first mentioned with reconstruction relegated to the second 
position. Therefore, authors who have based the priority of the Bank's objectives on 
the premises of Article I, will have to look for further indications to support their 
assumptions. This is what Mason et all did when they took the view that it was the task 
of reconstruction that dominates the Bank's purpose .(^) The authors focus on the 
Bank's special duty to lighten the financial burden for countries that suffered great 
devastation from enemy occupation. This is particularly true when considering Article I 
which refers to "The restoration of economies destroyed or disrupted by war." 
Similarly, Article III shows the same affection and compassion for devastated Europe. 
It recalls in section 1 that the resources of the Bank shall be:
for the purpose of facilitating the restoration and 
reconstruction of the economy of members whose 
metropolitan territories have suffered great devastation 
from enemy occupation or hostility.
The novelty brought by the inclusion of the word 'equitably' in Article III section
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1, does not solve the problem of priority either. In a juridical sense, the term equitable 
comes from equity which means, amongst other things, impartiality, fair conduct. In 
the context of the Bank, it means that in its lending operations, the institution will give 
the same treatment to both projects for reconstruction and development. In other 
words, the Bank will not necessarily provide more finances for one type of project than 
to the other. This does not mean, however, providing an equal treatment for both types 
of projects as some LDCs have wished. Nor, and more importantly, does it indicate 
clearly the Bank's position in terms of priorities. For, to treat equitably is one thing, 
and to treat equally is another.
The question of priorities saw an end only when the Bank opened for business as 
the first loans found their way to Europe. Between 9th May and 21st August 1947, 
four European countries devastated by the war (France, the Netherlands, Denmark, and 
Luxemburg) received altogether the sum of $ 450 million. The four loans appear in the 
Bank's records as reconstruction p r o j e c t s . T h e  prevalence of reconstruction over 
development can only be explained by the international economic relations that 
prevailed at the end of World War II, and they should be evaluated in terms of 
economic recovery for Europe and also in terms of economic expansionism for the 
United States. As Secretary of the Treasury, H. Horgan explained :
The reconstruction of the devastated countries of Europe 
and Asia is essential if normal trade relations are to be 
resumed promptly. The countries are vitally important to 
the export and im port trade of the W estern  
hemisphere. (88)
Economically, a revitalised Europe serves the American interests domestically as 
well as internationally. On the domestic front, the U.S. emerged as the major nation 
with the financial ability to engage in post war investment overseas with Europe as the 
ideal recipient market for most American products (machinery, equipment, and raw
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m aterials). Furtherm ore, a prosperous Europe was a sine qua non for the 
enhancement of the world economy, in which the United States would play a 
determinant role. As Bittermann remarked, "domestic and international (U.S.) 
objectives coincided." (89) Shortly after the Bank engaged in its scheduled programme 
for Europe, it appeared to the Americans that:
The sources needed for the reconstruction costs were not 
likely to be obtainable neither in sufficient quantity nor in 
time to speed up the recovery of Europe. (90)
This motivated the American Secretary of State G.C. Marshall to step in and 
announce a major financial rescue operation (known as the Marshall Plan), for the 
European continent. (^1) Beside the economic miracles of bringing Europe back on its 
feet,the Marshall Plan was also ideologically essential for the Americans which feared 
that "without it, the existing Western governments might have capitulated to local 
communist movements."(92) Besides, the Plan remains in the annals of financial aid, 
one of the best examples of transfer of resources without strings or pre-conditions
attached to it. This partnership between the USA and Europe was first proposed by
George Marshall himself in a speech at Harvard University in June 1947:
It is logical that the USA should do whatever it is able to 
do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the 
world, without which there can be no political stability 
and no assured peace....It is already evident that before
the US government can proceed much further in its
efforts to alleviate the situation and help start the 
European World on the way to recovery, there must be 
some agreements among the countries of Europe as to 
the requirements of the situation, and the part those 
countries themselves will take in order to give proper 
effect to whatever action might be undertaken by this 
government. It would be neither fitting nor efficacious 
for this government to undertake to draw up unilaterally 
a program designed to place Europe on its feet
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economically. This is the business of Europeans. The 
initiative, I think must come from Europe. The role of 
this country should consist of friendly aid in the drafting 
of a European program and a later support for such a 
program so far as it may be practical for us to do. The 
program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number of, 
if not by all European nations.(^)
The huge amount of capital injected by the Marshall Plan into the Continent 
literally upset the chess board of the Bank's finance and ultimately led the institution to 
withdraw discreetly from the reconstruction field into development. It is to such a 
change of priorities that the next section will be devoted.
B- From Reconstruction to Development.
The passage from the field of reconstruction to that of development was officially 
acknow ledged by outgoing President McCloy (1947) when he said: "The 
reconstruction phase of the Bank's activity is largely over and the development phase is 
underway."(94) As the Bank entered into the "new field" of development, it faced two 
problems: the structure of the Articles of Agreement and the insufficiency of funds. As 
to the first, G Meier wrote:
When the Bank began the transition from reconstruction 
to development financing, it found that its operating 
guidelines were not as explicit as they had been 
regarding reconstruction and other activities.(^)
This is true and may be a relevant argument to back the point discussed earlier that 
the Bank was more concerned with reconstruction than development. In their original 
form, the Articles pay little attention to the issue of development. There is no 
comparable drive towards economically backward countries of the southern 
hemisphere. No appropriate terminology such as fighting poverty, eliminating endemic
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diseases or illiteracy existed, despite the fact that, as in war-damaged Europe, it was 
reality. On the moral side, the case for development was even more justified since 
Europe's destruction was man made whereas most of LDC misfortunes are due to 
natural calamities such as drought, flooding, earthquakes, in addition to colonialism. 
The vacuum thus created by the Articles was also admitted in a staff paper which said:
Once the Bank moved from reconstruction into 
development lending, the guidelines of the Articles were 
only the beginning of the path in to new territories .(96)
Since the third Annual Report (1949), expressions such as " the World Bank is 
learning through experience" became common in the institution's language; a sign that 
the Articles were (and still are) not interested to regulate statutorily one of the Bank's 
legal objectives. More importantly, however, the imprecision and vagueness of the 
Bank's Articles helped greatly in the shaping of an institution which derives most of its 
work through a certain methodology developed in its most salient features outside the
existing l e g a l  f r a m e w o r k / ^ )
As to the second issue relating to the insufficiency of the funds, the Bank 
seemingly had no other alternative but to content itself with what it could raise in the 
market with all the implications discussed earlier. The question of development was 
looked at in relation to the resources available, not as a human need motivated by other 
considerations than economic factors. Unlike in the reconstruction phase of the Bank, 
the idea of a second Marshall Plan -this time for development- seems never to have 
been e n v isa g e d /^ )  This left the Bank entirely dependent on aleatory and limited 
resources to finance the development of more than half of the population of the globe. 
Under such conditions, it may be only legitimate to ask what kind of development -if 
any - the Bank has in mind.
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a)- The Bank 's Conception of Development.
The lack of any clear commitment in the Articles of Agreement to development, 
coupled with the rapid change in the overall structure of the International community, 
explains to a large extent the uncertainties of the Bank in the field of development. 
Although it may be said that "the Bank has no fixed ideology for development", it is 
still possible, with some simplification to trace the evolution of the institution's 
conception of developm ent.^)
(i)- Early Period.
There are at least three levels at which the conception of the Bank on development 
can be asserted. The first level is the 'abstract' notion of the developm ent 
phenomenon. In this context, development is conceived on merely economic grounds, 
as an economic overdue. According to this view, development can be cured basically 
by economic formulae such as the injection of financial aid or a reinforcement of 
private investment. As C. Payer remarked: "An emphasis on GNP growth was the 
primary if not the only definition of developm ent."^^)
The second level is the general framework in which such a development is carried 
out, which even in the absence of a formal endorsement of a specific development 
theory contained the grand lines of a certain liberalism that is easy to foresee. When, 
for example, the Bank intervenes only as a lender of last resort, it is indirectly throwing 
the LDCs into the hands of private bankers of Europe and America. More importantly, 
however, are the underlying principles which are contained in the Articles of Agreement 
such as the Bank's promotion of private investment, the introduction of the rules of 
competition, the preference for the private sector. In other words, all the activities 
which constitute the very nature of the capitalist philosophy seem to have been
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espoused by the Bank within its conception of development. As J. Touscoz wrote:
La Banque Mondiale est fondamentalement et par nature 
au service des principes de l'economie de marche quels 
que soient 1 'esprit inventif de ses dirigeants et la 
souplesse de ses statuts, elle ne saurait abandonner ses 
principes sans renier sa raison d 'e tre ...E lle  tend 
manifestement faire prevaloir une conception capitaliste 
du developpement.(lOl)
The third level is related to the so called 'neutrality' of the Bank in its 
development policy. The Bank, to some extent, does not investigate whom the 
development project is likely to benefit. For the Bank it seems to be a simple 
mathematical exercise. As long as the project is justified and financially sound, the loan 
is almost automatically granted. It was not the Bank's business to know what was 
happening in the African and Asian continents as a result of war and/or colonialism. As 
is known, the Bank is apolitical. And that was sufficient for the Bank to extend its 
lending operations to colonial powers for use in their respective colonies, as discussed 
earlier. Needless to say, most of the time these projects yield more benefit to the 
metropolis than to the indigenous populations. As Khadidja Haq remarked: "The Bank 
seems to have been more preoccupied by the development of Europe-at any cost- than 
the needy World." (102)
This brief sketch of the Bank's early conception of development may be 
summarised as follows: To begin with, the Bank has been considerably influenced by 
the capitalist approaches to development that prevailed at that time; from which the 
GNP growth theory was selected and applied. Furthermore, there is in the Bank's 
Articles certain statutory limitations which have unduly forced the Bank to consider 
almost exclusively only specific projects (Art.III,sec, 4 (vii)). That is to say, projects 
which were self supporting and would pay back the loans, e.g. infrastructure projects 
such as roads, highways, ports and airports and energy.
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Last, but not least, the Bank has quite frequently neglected the social aspect of its 
projects. It was more preoccupied by the financial return of the loan than its impact on 
the welfare of individuals and society alike.
(ii)- Later Development:
The decolonisation era that followed the 1960's saw a massive influx of newly 
independent states into the Bank. The vast majority of these countries (except OPEC) 
were among the most financially deprived and the least able to sustain their own 
developm ent.(103) This had a tremendous impact on every aspect of the Bank. 
Compared to the early period, the Bank underwent two major transformations in its 
attempt to shape its own development policy: one doctrinal, the other political 
(ideological).
By doctrinal change is meant the Bank's shift from the GNP theory to the 
adoption of a new theory more suitable and more responsive to the needs of its new 
member. Explaining the sudden shift in the Bank's developmental theory, Bettina S. 
Hurni wrote:
Its [Bank's] development policy changed in the 1970's 
after the recognition that economic growth had failed to 
bring benefits to the majority of the poor.(104)
The Bank may have thus shifted from one type of development to another. 
However, in terms of law and legal explanations and references to the constitutional 
bases for action, its framework has remained largely unchanged. Among the noticeable 
changes made in the direction of its new members, the Bank has introduced major 
reorganisation plans to accommodate them .(^5) These plans include:
- More geographical representation in the Bank.
■ Diversification of staff nationalities.
- Increase in the lending programmes.
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It has also extended its lending programme to new sectors such as agriculture, 
energy, health, education and even tourism .(l^) In other words, many of the projects 
which were considered in the early period as non self-supporting projects, viz. which 
do not directly generate capital, became progressively integrated into the lending policy 
of the Bank. The style of the Bank as well as its language have also changed.(107) 
President McNamara speeches include slogans such as 'attacking poverty' leading 'the 
green revolution' (agriculture) and improving social conditions for the poor. The 
Bank's publications have carried out extensive research on specific remote areas where 
under-development is particularly severe such as in South East Asia and the Sub- 
Saharan countries in general. It appears, at least on the surface, that the Bank has 
become more aware of the social problems of the developing countries than in the 
p a s t . (1^8) However, being aware of the problems may provide only a partial solution, 
if the instruments envisaged to carry out such changes do not exist, or, as in the case of 
the Bank, are inappropriate.
Of particular importance to the Bank's conception of developm ent is its 
ideological stance which has remained unchanged ever since the institution was created. 
On the contrary, it may be safely said that the Bank has in effect worked even more 
towards the strengthening of its capitalist orientation with more emphasis on 
competition, liberalisation, privatisation and so forth. In pushing for such a radical 
policy, the Bank knows that it is moving safely in an area where neither the recent large 
scale influx of newly independent countries, nor their political vigilance will have any 
significant effect. As already discussed, the Bank depends on its fund-raising activities 
on the political principles, moods and prejudices of it investors who, by lending to the 
institution, engage both their money and their philosophy. This is an equation which is 
not always compatible with the borrowing LDCs. Broadly speaking, it seems that there 
is a serious time-lag between development in the Bank's conservative policy and the 
radical version (or vision) of the Third World notion of development.
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b)- The LDCs Conception of Development.
Upon their accession to independence, the LDCs have, among other things, 
fashioned a certain idea of the concept of development. Such a view was not always 
compatible with the Bank’s own interpretation of development, and clashes were 
i n e v i t a b l e .  (109) One factor which contributed to the diversion between the Bank’s and 
the LDCs' view of development is the existing legal framework; that is to say the 
Articles of Agreement. As already stated, the Articles did not foresee development as 
the most pressing or major priority of the Bank. For the drafters it was a new area in 
which the institution had no experience. Like self determination and co-existence, 
development is one of the new emerging concepts brought into contemporary society 
by the sudden and rapid changes that have occurred within the international community. 
Furthermore, states have, until now, been unable to agree on its definition, as well as 
its meaning and scope of a p p l i c a t i o n . ^  10)
For the developed world, the idea of development is first a matter of internal 
policy with little or no connection with the outside world and economic relations. It is 
up to individual states to carry out the burden of the welfare of their people. In the 
sphere of law, the DCs have raised doubts as to whether development should be 
included at all in the legal literature.(m )
For the Third World countries, the notion of development derives from two 
distinct and complementary factors. One is the historical responsibility for the DCs of 
the present state of underdevelopment of the LDCs. Thus, practically all the Third 
World demands formulated in various resolutions and other international documents 
take as a basis this historical elem ent/H ^) From this, the LDCs have developed the 
idea that in order to repair this past misfortune, the rich countries must assist in the 
recovery of the Third Word economies. In other words, the DCs have the moral duty, 
and this is the second element, to participate in the development of the LDC countries.
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To this moral duty the Third World countries opposed for them a right to development 
and ask the DCs to recognise such a righ t/! !^) n  follows from that, that the concept 
of development has economic as well as legal and political connotations. In the Third 
W orld’s view, development is not forcibly about economic welfare only. It cannot 
either be measured in terms of GNP growth, the number of schools, hospitals or rate of 
inflation. The concept of development goes beyond these purely materialistic 
considerations to cover a much wider area such as culture, democracy and political 
independence. As Brigitte Stern put it: “Developpement, c ’est mettre 1’homme 
debout. ”(H 4)
Furthermore, disagreement between the Bank and its less developed members in 
reaching a common approach to development is aggravated by the institution’s structure 
which has been designed for a specific type of development, inspired by a capitalistic 
oriented ideology which is not compatible with the LDCs’ view. In terms of law, this 
contradiction is reflected in the maintenance of rules of conduct in the Articles which do 
not always fit in with the emerging principles that the Third World countries strive to 
promote.
As far as the Bank is concerned, the LDCs would have preferred an institution 
which would have ideally lent funds to them without conditions; or at least on 
smoother conditions than the existing ones. They see in the present Bank’s loans a 
kind of purely business like operation, whereas they expected the Bank to be a 
“humanitarian” agency which would not only provide unconditional but also unlimited 
funds to help them eradicate poverty and overcome their general state of economic 
backwardness.^ 1-*) For the Bank, on the contrary, its lending is a purely commercial 
enterprise which is guided by the principles of liberal philosophy which puts profit 
before morality or humanism. As E. Rotberg pointed out:
We are not a social agency committed to making transfer
payments to solve the problems of misery or poverty.
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We are a development bank using the most sophisticated 
techniques available to facilitate development while 
providing unmatched protection and strength for 
creditors and shareholders^ 116)
It becomes clear from this statement that the Bank means business and that it 
remains to be seen how the institution can reconcile its business operations with the 
development needs and aspirations of its poor member countries.
iI
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Conclusion to Chapter One.
In this chapter, it was essential to state the conditions in which the Bank was set 
up, and the kind of relationship it has developed with its members. The first 
conclusion to be drawn from this concise overview, is that, although conceived initially 
as an international organisation, the Bank in reality belongs to a m inority of 
industrialised countries, which because of their financial might, exercise a significant 
influence on the policy of the institution. Could it have been possible for the Bank to 
avoid such a situation? The answer is no, since the Articles of Agreement were laid 
down in such a manner as to make Western superiority inevitable. The same Articles 
were also responsible for the weakened position of the remaining majority of the 
members which come from the Third World countries. Their weakness was "legalised" 
through such provisions regarding subscriptions, management and above all voting 
powers.
The second conclusion to be drawn, is the difference in the interpretation of the 
objectives of the institution between the Bank and its members. For most LDCs, it 
appeared that, apart from the name, the Bank has no real connection with the real world 
of development. They expected and hoped for a genuine aid giving agency that would 
help them overcome their socio-economic problems in a different way than the one 
imposed on them. For the Bank, there seems to be no difference between development 
and business as far as the institution's functioning and operation are concerned.
McNamara's rhetorics in the early 1970's did not alter the course of the Bank's, 
which remained as ever, an agency committed to working on commercial basis. 
McNamara's view on "humanising" the Bank lacked the support of the international 
financial community, which is the main funds supplier and whose objectives do not 
coincide with the development objectives of the LDCs.
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By possessing the money, the Western world extended de facto  its authority on 
the structure, functioning and policy of the Bank. For the vast majority of non Western 
countries, this policy of le fa it accompli was unacceptable since it amounted to an 
"highjacking" of the Bank by a minority of privileged states, and impeded the 
sacrosanct principle of state equality. In 1945, few countries refused to join the Bank 
because they did not agree with such a state of things; but for a large number of the 
Third World countries, they had no other alternative but to "surrender".
It is against this background of conflicting interest and objectives, that the Bank 
opened for business. How the institution will deal with its borrowing members, will 
be the purpose of the next chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE BANK  
AND THE BORROWING COUNTRY.
Direct lending to member countries is the major instrument of Bank action. The 
loan agreement is the main document governing the contractual relationship between the 
state and the organisation. It lays down the conditions upon which the Bank has agreed 
to lend and the extent of its financial assistance. The basic legal rules governing the 
Bank's Loan and Guarantee Agreement, are laid down in Article III and IV of its 
Articles of Agreement.^)
In their original form, however, the Articles envisaged a Bank that would act as a 
guarantee institution by guaranteeing, in whole or in part, loans made by private 
investors to fulfill the Bank's purpose as stated in Article IV sec. 2a (iii). In practice 
however, the Bank has used its constitutional capacity to extend guarantees only in a 
very limited cases, and in 1956 dropped out altogether from the guarantee field.(2) 
From a purely legal point of view, abandoning the guarantee field was not followed or 
consolidated by similar action on the legislative front. That is to say that since 1956, 
the Articles of Agreement have not been amended and the guarantee function remains in 
principle valid despite the Bank's acknowledgement of its inutility .^) The Bank 
normally concludes two types of loan agreements and exceptionally a third type of loan 
agreement.
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• A loan agreement directly with a government or one of its political subdivisions 
e.g. a ministry, for the construction of a particular project. This is by far the most 
common and most substantial transaction.
• A second type of agreement is the guarantee agreement which the Bank requests 
when the loan is made to another entity, whether public or private, situated within the 
territory of the member country. For example the Bank lends to the Tunisian Mining 
Corporation and asks for the Tunisian government to support the Corporation's loan by 
a government g u a r a n t e e . ^ )  Compared to a loan agreement, a guarantee agreement is 
relatively less important and comes only in a second position to ensure that the state, as 
an international legal person, will give its full economic support in case the national 
entity is unable to comply with the undertakings laid down in the loan agreement. In 
terms of law, the guarantee agreement gives the loan agreement an international 
dimension which enables the Bank to transfer indirectly the national entity's 
responsibilities to the state which, as a subject of international law, is more 
conveniently "justiciable" for the Bank.(~^
Exceptionally, the Bank in "special circumstances" lends funds to governments 
for programme le n d in g .^  This third type of loan as opposed to project lending 
consists mainly in the Bank's relief operations in emergency situations such as flood or 
earthquake. Such loans generally bypass the ritual procedure of the Bank as they do 
not fall in its traditional lending operations, since they are provided for a non 
development project.(^) Broadly speaking, these loans are very small in size and 
number, and have no specific conditions attached to them; although it may be said that 
the Bank, in collaboration with the recipient country, monitors the use of such loans. 
Since these loans are the exception, they are not included in the present study.
The request for a loan is made formally either by writing or dispatching a 
government representative(s) to the Bank's Headquarters to explore the possibility for a 
loan. However, before a formal loan request is filed, the Bank considers whether the
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prospective borrower is eligible for Bank's financing, in accordance with the 
provisions of Article III section 4, which set up the criteria on which the Bank grants 
loans.
I-Criteria on which the Bank May Make Loans.
Although in theory all members are eligible for Bank assistance (Art III sec. la), it 
does not follow necessarily that membership in the institution gives automatic access to 
the Bank's funds, nor does it mean that loans may be granted on row or quota basis as 
is the case in some other a g e n c i e s . I t  is the borrowing country which requests the 
Bank for the financing of a particular project. On the basis of a certain number of 
criteria laid down in its Articles of Agreement, the Bank studies the borrower's 
application and decides whether or not the borrower is eligible for Bank's funds.
The main criteria upon which the Bank concludes loan agreements with its 
developing members are contained in Article III of the Bank's Statutes-(^) Broadly 
speaking, these criteria are couched in very general provisions and do not define 
precisely what the institution aims at, nor do they explain how to achieve such aims. 
Taken together, these criteria seek:
to ensure that the Bank's loans are made in member 
countries for financially and economically sound 
purposes to which these countries have assigned high 
priority and that the funds lent are utilised as 
intended. (10)
On the basis of such principles, the Bank has created a whole methodology and 
lending procedure that has no comparison in any contemporary lending agency. One 
explanation advanced by the Bank in its early formative years was that these criteria and 
their further extensive interpretation was necessary:
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to prevent a recurrence of some of the unsound practices 
characterising international lending in the 19th and early 
20th century which led to the great depression of the late 
1920's.( 11)
This argument provides, however, only a limited guidance for Third World 
governments which think that "the Bank invokes quite often these provisions in 
justifying some of its policies of omissions or com m issions."(^) For them, the 
criteria serve as a mere facade for all sorts of actions that the Bank wants to undertake, 
but has no explicit constitutional power to do so. In such circumstances, they see the 
Bank's criteria as not only imposing on them constraints but also ensuring a large 
freedom of action for the Bank's management. As Fatouros remarked:
In perceiving, defining, and proclaiming its criteria and 
judgments as technical and non political, the Bank 
perhaps mainly provides itself with certain defences and 
assurances of security in order to operate effectively /^)
To avoid lengthy and repetitive discussions, three among the criteria set up in the 
Articles and which have been allegedly extended beyond their constitutional limits, will 
be singled out for more detailed analysis. These are: the creditworthiness requirement, 
the rule of last lender resort, and the specificity of the project.
A- Creditworthiness.
The requirement of creditworthiness finds its legal legitimacy in the vague and 
somewhat general language of section 4 of Article III which requires that the Bank:
shall pay due regard to the prospects that the borrower o r ... 
the Guarantor will be in a position to meet its obligations 
under the loan [and that] it shall act prudently in the interest 
both of the particular member...and the members as a whole.
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One way of being prudent, the Bank thought, was that it was necessary to assess 
whether or not the prospective borrower was in a position to meet its future financial 
obligations born out of the loan agreement, without undue s t r a i n . I n  so doing, the 
Bank undertakes a thorough examination of the country's economic performance 
involving the study of a variety of indicators for the most part of an economic nature. 
This is how Eugene H. Rotberg, a Bank official describes what the Bank's financial 
analysts look at, in evaluating the creditworthiness of a potential borrower:
The Bank staff examines the country's per capita 
income, and its potential for the future. It looks at the 
country's population growth, its savings rates and 
vehicles through which saving occurs. It examines the 
country's foreign position, its sources of borrowing, its 
tax base, and its terms of trade. The staff closely 
monitors the potential borrower's external debt- its 
interest and principal requirements for the immediate and 
forseeble future. It studies the country's reliance on 
export commodities, whether one or several and prepares 
the economic analysis required to show how the 
country's export could be affected by declines in 
international commodity prices. It examines the 
country's imports and whether imports could be curtailed 
in order to conserve the necessary foreign exchange to 
meet debt obligations. It examines the country's tariff 
structure, its reliance on food and energy imports, its 
overall economic health and the relative commitment of 
resources to productive and unproductive projects".(^)
Despite several efforts to keep creditworthiness within the ambit of economics, 
the Bank could not in practice avoid overlapping on extraneous factors, mainly 
political. The impossibility of remaining guided solely by economic considerations 
was first demonstrated as early as 1949, when the Bank was looking into a loan 
application from the Chilean government. At that time Chile was heavily indebted and, 
in many cases, in a defaulting position towards its western creditors. In a statement,
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the Bank made it clear that Chile had to clear its previous commitments prior to 
consideration of any Bank's assis tance /^ )
The involvement of the Bank in politics became even more visible with the 
accession of many Third World countries to independence, some of whom engaged in
vast programmes of expropriation of local and foreign a s s e t s / ^  As most of these
assets belonged to western interests, the Bank stood openly against such acts and, on 
the basis of its "prudent policy", made them a bar to the institution's funds. Thus, 
expropriations, without arrangements for adequate compensation, was a bar to much 
Bank lending than otherwise might have been made to Algeria (1964-1973), Indonesia 
(under Sukarno) and Iraq (mid-60's), to cite only these few e x am p les /^ )  Explaining 
the official attitude of the Bank, Broches wrote in the Egyptian case:
In the UAR [United Arab Republic], when wholesale 
expropriations and sequestrations had taken place, and
no moves appeared to be made towards a solution, and
the governments which felt their nationals had not been 
fairly dealt with, were some of the major members of the 
Bank, we considered that for a combination of reasons, 
we could not proceed with financing in the UAR.09)
This led the Bank to admit that "creditworthiness is not determined by economic 
factors alone. "(20) ^nd  Baldwin to remark: "The Bank has.greatly.diverged from that 
provision in the Articles of Agreement which specifically forbids consideration of 
political factors."(21) Despite their economic impact, default and nationalisation are in 
the first place political acts carried out by sovereign governments. Their insertion in a 
loan agreement, in addition to being unconstitutional, is inconsistent with the purpose 
of the loan which adresses issues of development assistance. Furthermore, national, as 
well as international, law provides various means for states to resolve these and other 
kinds of disputes which go beyond the scope of this s t u d y / ^ 2 )  The main concern here 
is whether an international organisation, in the exercise of its functions, may actually be
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called upon to act on behalf of a portion of its members for the achievement of their 
"private business interests." This led some of the Bank's critics to qualify the 
institution as a " d e b t - c o l l e c t o r " . ( “ 3 )  Defending the Bank's attitude, Mason et al wrote:
In order to lend, the Bank itself had to borrow in the 
m arket, and how could it borrow on behalf of 
prospective clients who had failed to pay back existing 
debts including indemnisation.(24)
Without indulging into a polemic with the noted authors, their logic would have 
remained unchallenged, had it not been overshadowed by the subsequent and 
somewhat inconsistent practice of the Bank. For as it appears from a general survey of 
the Bank's loans, that there are a multitude of countries which have been recognised by 
the institution as economically bankrupt, therefore uncreditworthy, but nonetheless 
were granted loans on the ground that these countries have accepted that they would 
im plem ent the Bank's a d v i c e . I f  the borrower has passed the first test of 
creditworthiness, then the Bank moves on to consider the second criterion.
B- The Rule of Last Resort Lender
When considering a loan application, the Articles explicitly forbid the Bank to 
lend to any member unless it is satisfied that the borrower is not able to obtain funds 
elsewhere under conditions which, in the opinion of the Bank, are reasonable for the 
borrower. The official interpretation often advanced by the Bank is that it acts only as a 
last resort le n d e r /* ^  That is to say, that the institution must be convinced that the 
applicant has exhausted all existing sources of finance possible, whether public or 
private, before soliciting its assistance. One extreme application of such an 
interpretation may well be that the borrower "should be turned down by every banking 
house in the world" before going to the Bank.(“^) The rationale underlying the last
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resort clause is that it is a restrictive clause. In the particular case of the Bank, the last 
lender rule finds a more logical and meaningful interpretation in the context of the 
Bank's relationship with the private investment market which the institution endeavors 
to promote. This promotion appears first in Article I section 3 stating in part the 
purpose of the Bank as follows:
... when private capital is not available on reasonable 
terms, to supplement private investment by providing, 
on suitable conditions, finance for productive purposes 
out of its own capital.
Article III. sec.4(ii) is even more explicit in the sense that it makes loan 
agreements subject to the condition that:
the Bank is satisfied that in the prevailing market 
conditions the borrower would be unable otherwise to 
obtain the loan under conditions, which in the opinion of 
the Bank are reasonable for the borrower.
The interesting point which has raised so many questions in the writings of 
lawyers such as Baldwin, Fatouros, Broches and many others, is the "reasonableness" 
element. That is to say, the determination of whether reasonable interest could be 
obtained is determined by the opinion of the Bank alone. In Baldwin's view:
[SJince the Articles leave to the Bank's officials to define 
"reasonable terms"in each specific case, one can hardly 
accept the proposition that Bank officials are inhibited in 
this respect.(28)
This is what prompted the Bank's critics to react and establish a link between the 
Bank and the private financial m a rk e t.^ )  From a political point of view, the core of 
the debate is the commitment by the Bank not to compete with the private (foreign) 
market. A commitment which, in the eyes of Third World countries, denotes a certain 
"complicity" between the Bank and the business community at large. As one Bank
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official reported:
[T]he Bank is intended to promote private investment not 
to compete with it, and does not undertake business 
which private investors are willing to transact on a 
reasonable basis.(30)
As a consequence, the Bank has been accused of being prepared to finance only 
limited branches of the economy of its borrowers, while leaving the others to private 
c a p i t a l . T h i s  remark leads to the consideration of the third criteria in respect of this 
chapter.
C- The Specificity of the Project.
The legal basis of this requirement lies in the provision of Article III section 4 
(vii), which reads as follows:
Loans made or guaranteed by the Bank shall, except in 
special circumstances, be for the purpose of specific 
projects for reconstruction or development.(emphasis 
added)
What is meant by specific project has never met a general consensus among either 
lawyers or p o l i t i c i a n s . ^ )  in the Bank's understanding,1(33)
A specific project is the only safeguard by which the 
Bank can assure that its resources are in fact used to meet 
[essential] needs is to require, before granting a loan, 
that an agreement be reached with the borrower on the 
precise purpose of the loan. This is essentially all what 
the specific provision i m p l i e s . ( 3 3 )
To be even more specific, the Annual Report of the Bank added:
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If the Bank were to make loans for unspecified purposes 
or for vague development programs ...there would be 
danger that the Bank's resources would be used either 
for projects which are economically or technically 
unsound or are of a low priority nature... (34)
It follows from this description of a specific project that the project must be of 
quite an important size, have a remarkable development impact and generates a 
reasonable rate of return. According to the Bank, without such specifications, it would 
be impossible for it to judge whether, or to what extent, a loan would be effective in 
contributing to the general economic development of the borrower.
One immediate conclusion to be drawn from the Bank's interpretation is that the 
specific project approach tends to limit the scope of lending of the institution. Although 
such limitation has been rejected by Baldwin and others, the Bank sees such an action 
as only "natural", considering the limited amount of money that the Bank is allowed to 
raise, and the amount which it can actually lend. (Art. Ill sec. 3) Furthermore, the 
limitation imposed may be, according to the Bank, beneficial to both lenders and 
borrowers. Through the specific project, the Bank monitors the use of its money in 
such a way that it is not invested in uneconomic projects or "white elephant" projects as 
they are sometimes called. The issue has been often raised by the Bank that a great deal 
of U.N. money and some of that of the specialised agencies as well goes into items 
which are not high priority items. Supporting the Bank's view, J. Williamson wrote:
The Bank wants to ensure that projects are carried out, 
and the money does not just get fluttered away into 
building monuments or luxurious airports or in the 
pockets of certain individuals. It is healthy to get outside 
organisations to give assistance on a project basis, rather 
than just handing over money, assuming that the terms 
are reasonable.(35)
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Despite the Bank's concern over the use of its monies, and its declared bona fide 
intention towards the LDCs, the specific approach as it is interpreted by its officials, 
draws a cutting line between "doing good" and "doing business".
The initial reaction to the Bank's specific approach was that the institution would 
be looking for projects which could generate a rate of return, make profits and 
accumulate capital. There has been considerable criticism from the LDCs of the specific 
project approach. It was alleged that such an approach was based on the assumption 
that the Bank examines the merits of particular projects in isolation , regardless of the 
overall economic situation of the b o r r o w e r . T h i s  practice seems to have prevailed 
in the early lending operations of the Bank but was soon overturned, and the institution 
now claims that it does "exactly the reverse":
It is a cardinal requirement, that financing any given 
[specific] project depends not only upon its technical and 
financial viability but also upon the suitability of the 
project within the economic conditions of the country as
a whole.(37)
For, in the Bank's economic logic, it serves no purpose to finance one sector of 
the economy if the whole economy is impotent. For no matter how viable or profitable 
the particular project proposed may sound, it is not worthy of support if its economic 
return is "swallowed" by loopholes in other sectors of the economy. In this case, the 
Bank does not want to be seen by its major creditors as supporting ailing economies. 
Nor does it want to give the impression that the projects it finances subsidise other 
inefficient or uneconomic (e.g. military), sectors of the borrower's econom y/-^)
From a purely business point of view, the specific project is strategically 
important for the Bank in many respects. 1) The financing of the construction of a 
hardware (ie. specific) project, a port for instance, not only generates revenues for the 
country's economy (imports/exports of goods, taxes), but it also offers guarantees that 
the loan will be paid back. Otherwise the Bank would have never allocated the funds
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for the project to be built. 2) Taking the same example as above, a port construction is a 
grandiose undertaking, involving advanced technology in marine building, highly 
skilled expertise and sophisticated equipment, which can be provided only by the 
western industrialised world. In other words, the project has a high foreign exchange 
component and, as such, is likely to bring business to the creditors. 3) Financing a 
specific project, such as a port, may also find its justification in the long term ambition 
that the Bank has always nourished in laying the ground for the private sector be it local 
or foreign:
A primary concern in the Bank's financing hard projects, 
has been to provide the framework needed for the 
expansion of private enterprise, the real motive behind 
economic developm ent.^)
Despite earlier remarks that the Bank has varied its lending policy, the specific 
project is an integral part of the rules of the game. As such, the institution has to cling 
onto it because, as a constitutional requirement, the Bank is not in a position to depart 
from it as it did with the guarantee function. To do so may prompt some suppliers to 
cease financing the i n s t i t u t i o n . ^ )  This is at least in appearance. On more "sensitive" 
ground, the specific project option, because of its impact on the borrower's economy, 
may prove a useful facade behind which the Bank is in a better position to "advise", or 
perhaps better to influence, governments on policies affecting all parts of their 
economy. For Baldwin, for instance, the Bank is more interested in influencing the 
behaviour of governments than in making loans. Said the author:
Many of the Bank's actions in promoting economic 
development are clearly of an actor of international 
politics; that is the Bank often tries to induce 
governments to behave in ways in which they would not 
otherwise behave. (41)
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In its second Annual Report, the Bank refers to the goal of exerting a "helpful 
influence" on member governments in order to persuade them to remove trade barriers 
and adopt sound financial p r o g r a m m e s . ^ )  The third Annual Report clarifies even 
further the objective of the Bank as seen by its administrators:
It seems clear that the real measure of the Bank's 
effectiveness will be, not so much the number of its 
loans and guarantees, significant as they may be, but 
rather its success in influencing attitudes. In promoting a 
realistic constructive approach to development problems 
on the part of its members and in fostering a greater 
degree of confidence among investors. (43)
As will be seen shortly, the Bank's "helpful influence" starts the very moment the 
Bank dispatches its fact finding mission to the borrower's country. The actual process 
of investigation usually falls into two general stages, although in some cases both may 
proceed more or less concurrently. Whereas the first stage is concerned with the overall 
investigation of the economy of the borrower, the second stage is rather limited to the 
examination of the project(s) selected for financing.
II- The Various Stages Leading to the Conclusion o f the Loan  
A greem ent.
A mere application for a loan does not necessarily imply acceptance by the Bank 
to finance the project. Wherever possible, the Bank prefers to hold informal exploratory 
discussions with prospective borrowers before any formal loan request is filled. These 
discussions enable the Bank to determine whether the economic conditions of the 
borrower are favourable for Bank financing; if not, to indicate to the prospective 
borrower what kind of information the Bank will wish to have concerning the project to 
be financed. This is the beginning of the first stage.
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A- The Study of the Economy of the Borrower.
When considering a loan application from a member borrower the Bank starts by 
sending representatives and experts (known as a Bank mission) to the applicant country 
for a preliminary investigation on the state of the economy of that country.(44) 
Although as already stated, the Articles did not say anything about technical assistance, 
the Bank soon "discovered" that, in applying for loans, its less developed members 
were not likely to present well prepared project proposals without the Bank's 
intervention.
The Bank's decision to undertake investigations of economic conditions in its 
LDC members is followed by a series of missions. The aim of these missions is to 
obtain for each member country an inventory of development problems and progress, 
which could later be updated and expanded. As they were lacking the explicit support 
of legislative enactment, these missions were, quite surprisingly, justified on moral 
grounds. This was made clear in the Fifth IBRD Annual Meeting:
It is a combination of technical and financial aid which is 
the new aspect of the Bank's program and the one which 
gives the most promise that the program may be 
effective. The Bank recognizes that when it sends out 
such a mission, it assumes a moral obligation to help, 
with its financial resources, in the development of the 
country concerned... (45) (emphasis added)
As stated earlier, the Bank's intrusion into the borrower's economy started as 
earlier as 1949 when the first loan to an LDC, Chile, was being discussed. Despite 
strong pressure from the Chilean government, the Bank management insisted that 
before it could proceed with the loan, it had to know more about the Chilean economy, 
and about the project. An economic mission was later dispatched, and from that time 
onwards feasibility studies were required before any financing was undertaken.(46)
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From the legal standpoint, The Bank's Statutes are silent on the establishment of 
country economic missions. At the begining of the Bank's operations, there is no 
formal provision or any clear indication in the Articles of Agreement which empowers 
the Bank to carry out such an investigation*(^7) The main reason advanced by the 
Bank's own repeated statements is that it wants its resources to be spent with prudence, 
soundness, effectiveness and similar vague and imprecise terminology. On the basis of 
such a vocabulary, the Bank has developed one of its most exceptional techniques 
which is the right to set foot inside the borrower's economy.
There is, however, no certainty about the uniformity of such practice in the 
Bank's subsequent lending because of the lack of legislative reference. According to 
the Bank's critics these missions were selective and sent only when the institution had 
doubts about the economic performance of the borrower.(^8) j t was not untq 
seventies, a decade which coincides with the emergence of the Third World in the 
international arena, that the Bank formally enacted the country study mission as a legal 
requirement prior to any lending a s s i s t a n c e / ^ )  T h e  description of the work of such 
missions may be briefly related here as it plays an important role in the whole process 
of the Bank's lending operations.
Before a country study gets underway, the Bank and the borrower set up various 
objectives and agree upon various commitments. One of the most important of these 
commitments is that the borrower government agrees to open its books and provide all 
the necessary information that the Bank's staff may deem relevant to the completion of 
their study. In principle the purpose of these missions is technical in nature, since the 
Bank is required by its Statutes to "pay due attention to consideration of economic 
efficiency, without due regard to political or other non economic considerations. (Art. 
Ill sec. 5 (c)) The task is enormous and time consuming, as is formally acknowledged 
by the Bank's officials:
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The amount of time it took to process loan proposals, the 
interrogations involved and the elaborate documentation 
required by the Bank at all stages of lending gave rise to 
understandable impatience among bo rrow ers.^ )
Information gathered is varied and covers practically all aspects of the borrower's 
economy, education, transport, health, energy, employment and defence spending. In 
the light of this overall analysis, the Bank produces a report upon which it makes its 
own judgement and defines its lending policy vis a vis the prospective borrower. The 
Report usually opens with a debt table and a data sheet that scrutinises in minute detail 
the external financial position of the borrower. (This is in fact the outcome of the 
creditworthiness test discussed earlier). Then the report moves on to a broader analysis 
of the economic conditions of the borrower. Under the heading "The Economy Of The 
Country", a host of information is brought into light, compiled, analysed and 
commented o n .^ ^
The reasons underlying the necessity of such in-depth investigation are manifold. 
The Bank needs that kind of overall view in order to assess the economic performance 
of the borrower and decide whether or not to start the loan proceedings. Another reason 
the Bank is interested in such findings is to pinpoint the deficient parts or sectors of the 
economy and situate the project to be financed within the general framework of the 
borrower's development programme.
Country economic studies carried out by the Bank's missions are in theory 
confidential and their use in principle restricted only to the Bank management and the 
borrow ing g o v e rn m e n t.^ -)  This latter may take advantage of the Bank's 
professionalism and expertise and use the report's findings for its own purposes. The 
borrower can, for instance, introduce changes in its economic policy, restructure some 
parts of it or review its entire economic strategy. He may also, in the light of such 
reports, request the Bank's financial assistance to carry out such programmes. There
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are also occasions where the reports may be used by other governments and/or 
international organisations which happen to be engaged in the economic development 
and aid assistance to the b o r r o w e r . ( 5 3 )  in these cases, known as aid consortia, the 
Bank's reports are said to contribute more efficiently to the ventilation of these 
collective efforts. Critics of the Bank, however, allege that such confidential reports 
are quite often made available to private bankers willing to invest in a particular 
country .(^) For the Bank, the most immediate effect of the country economic study is 
to determine the priority sector in the country for lending. It is only then that the Bank 
considers whether the project submitted to it is worth funding. As in the country study, 
the Bank also needs an in-depth analysis of the sector it finances. This is the second 
stage of the loan project.
B- The Sectoral Identification.
Once a decision is reached in principle on the appropriateness of the loan, the 
Bank proceeds to a second investigation directed mainly to the particular project(s) 
selected for financing. The procedure is commonly known as the Project Cycle and 
aims at a thorough examination of the project proposal from conception to completion 
and operation.^-*) Projects submitted to the Bank may take two different forms; a) The 
project may be limited to a particular sector of the econom y such as 
telecommunications, or b) the project may be only a portion of a large sector such as the 
construction of a railway which is itself part of the transportation network. Both forms 
of projects present different approaches, but in general they undergo the same 
itinerary.(^)
When considering a particular project, the Bank always insists that it must be well 
prepared. In principle it is the applicant candidate who is responsible for such 
preparation. He must provide to the Bank, together with the loan application, a 
complete description, technical, financial economic and so forth of the project to be
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financed. In most cases, however, a candidate which is a less developed country may 
be unable to satisfy the Bank's high requirements and eventually may fail in his 
application/*^)
According to the Bank's own testimony, loan refusals have been quite frequent, 
especially in the early lending operations of the institution. The Bank has always 
complained that it does not receive a significant number of well prepared high priority 
projects to use all the funds that could be made available. In his statement before the 
UN ECOSOC in 1950, President Eugene Black emphasised that the reasons why the 
Bank has made so few loans to LDCs:
had not been so much the lack of money, but the lack of 
well prepared and well planned projects ready for 
immediate execution/^)
The obstacles in the L.D.Cs to the making of well conceived "bankable" projects 
include, among other things, the shortage of skill and expertise in various areas, the 
low level of education, and the lack of well formulated development plans. There are, 
however, limited ways for the L.D.Cs to get their projects appraised. They can obtain 
expert assistance from some international organisations for projects in which these 
institutions are specialised; namely, UNDP for industrial projects, FAO for agricultural 
projects, and UNESCO for educational projects. These international organisations may 
either undertake the feasibility studies themselves, through their own expertise; or hire 
consultants to do the job for them for the benefit of the LDCs/*^) In this context, the 
Bank remains by far the most active institution in feasibility study work because of the 
high professionalism which it possesses in almost all fields. Since the 1960's, the 
Bank has become increasingly involved in helping the poor countries to organise and 
finance a series of projects and sector studies according to the Bank's n o r m s / ^ O )  \n 
1976, the feasibility study was institutionalised through the creation within the Bank of
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a Project Preparation Facility (PPF) which has since expanded remarkably. The Bank, 
however, undertakes feasibility studies only when it is convinced that such studies are 
likely to clear a direct channel for Bank investment. PPF then, became the second 
"legalised" window through which the Bank penetrates, once again, the borrower's 
national economy. For many Third W orld lawyers and politic ians, the 
institutionalisation and the use of PPF signals that the Bank's staff will be actively 
involved from the first phase of identification, to the completion of the last operation of 
the project. As a result, the participation of the developing countries in the preparation 
of projects has become even more problematical. On one hand, the Bank's officials 
claim that:
Each project is based on close collaboration at all stages 
between the Bank and the government/61)
On the other hand, the Third World countries maintain that the Bank's role in 
project appraisal is carried out in such a manner that:
The role of the borrower is overwhelmingly nil, reduced 
to a passive attitude [and that], it is the Bank which 
decides what is good for the Less Developing
Countries/^-)
This latter view is supported by the Bank's critics who argue that the poor 
countries are so weak that they have no say in project preparation except to provide 
i n f o r m a t i o n / ^ )  The Bank might, fo ra  number of possible reasons, refuse a specific 
loan request. It might refuse the loan on the ground that the project is not sufficiently 
high priority for the potential borrower's development. Or that the project is unsound, 
too ambitious, or badly prepared. The Bank might also consider that the candidate 
could obtain finance on the proposed project from other sources on reasonable terms. 
Another reason for the Bank not to lend might be that the project is in a sector in which
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the Bank does not operate (e.g. oil exploration). It might also consider the prospect of 
repayment too uncertain, and refuse to lend on the ground of common prudence, which 
its Articles enjoin it to observe. This excess of prudence reassures more the fund's 
suppliers but suits less the LDC borrowers, which, incidentally, have no defined rules 
(or rights) to challenge the Bank's decisions.
During the appraisal of a project several aspects, technical, institutional and 
organisational, economic and financial, are reviewed in order to determine whether the 
project has a reasonable chance of achieving its objectives, and whether these objectives 
constitute the best set of alternatives available for the project at that time. Despite the 
fact that the study of the vanous aspects of a project is within the domain of a multitude 
of different disciplines, (economics, engineering, architecture, etc...) a brief description 
of their work would illustrate in non technical language the scope and area of the 
origins of the so called "Bank's interference" in the domestic affairs of the borrower. 
For whatever the Bank does, it has always maintained that it does it on a purely 
technical basis, taking into account the sole success of the project.
a)- Economic and Financial Aspects.
It is known that the Bank supports only projects that are financially viable and 
economically sound. On the financial side, the Bank's analysis consists mainly in 
evaluating the cost of the project during the construction period and the resources 
expected to be available. This means, essentially, estimating the cost of goods and 
services required, engineering services, allowances for escalation and contingencies, 
interest and so forth. Of prime importance, too, is the precise identification of the 
origin of the other part of the financial resources i.e.from where the money comes to 
meet the project's requirement. Bearing in mind that the Bank provides only a small 
portion of the loan, the remaining, (usually the biggest), portion has to be clearly 
identified at this s t a g e . H e r e ,  the borrower is faced with several options. He may
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provide the rest from another lender who might be a government, a private bank, or an 
international organisation.
As a prudent institution, the Bank gives equal importance and care to new loans 
from the other co-lenders. The nature of loans, whether long or short term 
borrowings, the debt service, and the capability of the borrower to repay are all 
discussed in this phase of the project. The economic analysis, however, focuses on a 
wide range of parameters that the Bank considers, among which, the rate of return is
particularly controversial.^)
In order to keep a project economically sound, the Bank's economists have 
instituted a 10 percent rate of return that the project must generate after completion. 
Below such a figure, the loan might not be granted. The calculation of such a rate is 
worked out in such a manner that it will ensure that the project will be both self- 
liquidating (i.e.bring back the money spent for its construction) and self-sustaining 
(i.e. bring a reasonable return on the capital invested).
Broadly speaking, in making a project economically productive, most of the time 
the Bank asks the borrower to intervene in a multitude of "highly sensitive" areas such 
as tariffs, pricing, wages, foreign exchanges, investment law and interest rates.(^6) 
Quite often, it is only by carrying an adjustment in these peripheral areas that a rate of 
return may be calculated, and the project made profitable. From the legal point of 
view, to carry out these adjustments often involves among other things, legislative 
enactment, parliamentary procedure or even constitutional amendment. Furthermore, 
these changes have rarely occurred without social unrest which has frequently 
threatened the very (political) existence of many LDCs governm ents.^^
b)-Technical and Commercial Aspects.
This part of the project appraisal looks at all the technicalities involved in the 
project such as engineering, design and maintenance. Questions may arise here about
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about the location of the site where the project is to be implemented, the choice for the 
best route for a highway, or any particular issue relating to the physical aspect of the 
project. For example, industrial projects must be planned with reference to the sources 
of raw materials, power, skilled and unskilled labour, the infrastructure in place, 
(roads, railways, ports). More concretely, technical appraisal is concerned with 
questions of physical scale, layout and location of facilities. As such, the findings of 
the experts can hardly be said to bring the Bank and the borrower into direct conflict as 
this occurred in the study of other aspects of the project. However, the few problems 
which might arise in the technical appraisal are of a completely different nature but, 
when they occur, may have a far-reaching impact on the whole country and possibly 
the whole planet. The Polonoroeste Project in the northern Brazilian state of Rondonia 
provides an illustration of the kind of "technical error" that the Bank's technical staff 
may commit. In 1982, to ease the migration process, the Bank lent to the Brazilian 
government $ 250 million to pave the road to the state of Rondonia. The Bank's 
technical experts prepared the project and recommended the financing of the project. 
Four years later, the project turned out to be "one of the fastest and most avoidable 
case of environmental destruction ever ach ieved ."^)
During the technical appraisal, particular attention is also attached to the proposed 
arrangements for the financing operations of the goods and services needed to 
construct the project, or procurement as it is known/®^ This aspect touches upon the 
commercial edges of the project, as the main objective is to obtain the best value for the 
money spent. This aspect is also particularly "sensitive" for the Bank because it 
concerns directly the use of its own resources. For, as stated in the institution's 
lending criteria (Art,III), the Bank finances only the foreign components of the project. 
Since this part deals mainly with the use of the Bank's money, a great deal of work 
has been done by the institution in order to ensure that its money is spent within its 
members and without discrimination between th em .(^ ) jn other words, the Bank is
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required by its own Statutes to restrict its money solely for the purchase of goods and 
services acquired in hard currency in the developed world. As will be seen later these 
provisions do not always fit with the borrower's wishes to shop freely and, here too, 
disagreement with the Bank often em erges.^^
C-Institutional and Organisational Aspects.
The Bank always insists that, before a project gets underway, it must be satisfied 
that there should be a favourable environment for its construction, implementation and 
operation. There is a general consensus among insiders as well outsiders of the Bank, 
that it is not the financial, but the managerial and institutional difficulties that are most 
serious:
Experience suggests that it is a good deal easier to 
identify and provide the tangible elements of the project- 
the civil works,the equipment and the funds needed to 
pay for them- than the less tangible project elements such 
as the adoption of policy changes or the creation of an 
operating entity with a well trained staff and a competent
management.^-)
If such an organisational environment does not exist, and in the case of many 
LDCs it does not, the Bank insists that it should be created. The creation of such an 
adequate milieu, however, has not been always an easy task. In the words of the Bank:
An accurate evaluation of the institutional capability of 
each borrower is essential to the successfu l 
implementation of lending operations. But it is time 
consuming and d iff icu lt/^ )
From the Bank's loans surveyed, it seems that the difficulties stem from the broad 
vision that the Bank gives to the project, and what the LDCs consider as going beyond
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the actual limit of a loan. Broadly speaking, there are two main types of institutional 
arrangements that the Bank usually presses for.
(i)- The Creation of (semi) Autonomous Agencies.
The Bank regards ownership and operation of the project as important as the 
finance of the project itself. Sometimes,when such an authority does not exist, the 
Bank insists that a separate entity be created which would be permitted to conduct its 
day to day operations and handle its own affairs. As one Bank official remarked:
In our institution, we strongly prefer to deal with the 
entities carrying out the projects and we like to see them 
enjoy a certain amount of autonomy, believing that there 
is a better way of running th in g s .(7 4 )
The rationale underlying such a policy is the Bank's willingness to keep the 
authority for the project as far as possible outside the framework of government 
regulation and, above all, control. In a general manner, the requirements that the Bank 
seeks, when evaluating the institutional and organisational aspects of a project, may 
take one of two forms and sometimes both; a) the borrower may be required to take 
positive action in ensuring the Bank that he is ready to comply with the Bank's advice, 
and adopt certain policies for the organisation and management of the entity running the 
project, b) alternatively, the borrower may be induced to take a negative attitude and 
refrain from taking certain measures possibly detrimental to its own as well as the 
lenders' interests. If the borrower wishes to act, he must then request and obtain the 
Bank's agreement. Problems arise when, for various reasons, the government does 
not yield to the Bank's requirements, and in response the Bank witholds the loan, or 
makes the creation of such an entity with proper powers, a condition of effectiveness.
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(ii)-The Approval by the Bank of the Professional Qualities of Key Personnel.
To ensure that a project is properly managed, the Bank has also shown a 
particular interest in the human aspect of a project. The quality and experience of the 
borrower's personnel comes under close scrutiny by the Bank's officials. When the 
Bank is not satisfied with the quality of the staff, it asks for additional assurances in the 
form of provisions which have to be eventually inserted in the loan a g r e e m e n t . ^ )  The 
provisions usually call for changes in the management and/or improvements in all key 
posts responsible for the running of the entity to be made. Depending on the 
circumstances of each project, the Bank's concern over the staffing is sometimes 
pushed "to the point of insisting on representatives [of the Bank] on the controlling 
body [of the borrower's new e n t i t y ]  ".(76) It is not usual for the Bank to appoint or 
recommend a particular person to fill a specific post. What it does, is to advise on a 
certain degree of professionalism to be observed in recruiting the staff for the project as 
well as the right to have a say on the people recruited. This extract from a relatively 
recent grey report, confirms the Bank's worries over the issue of management of the 
project it finances. In this loan, the Bank opposes the presence of a Minister of the 
borrowing country at the head of the institution.
The general issue of the composition of the Boards of 
public enterprises in {...} is being reviewed by the Bank 
in the context of a proposed Public Enterprise 
Restructuring Loan; the aim is to make these boards 
more professional and effective by including in their 
membership people with technical and managerial 
experience. The Minister of {...}  is serving as acting 
director General of {...}. During the current transition 
period and until new organisational and management 
systems are in place.... A permanent Directory General 
is expected to be appointed by 1988. (77)
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The question which arises here is that such expertise advised by the Bank is most 
of the time available only in the developed countries; and the requirement to their 
employment is made compulsory in the loan agreement. From an LDCs point of view, 
the use of foreign expatriates presents too many drawbacks, economic, social and even 
political. The LDCs are dismayed at the extent to which the Bank loan involves the use 
of foreign expertise. They believe that the use of such expertise is very expensive and, 
as such , it begs the very purpose of the project, which is a development assistance. 
This is how, for example, the point of foreign expertise was brought up, in a 
discussion on development lending by an African official banker:
I know of one project in which a country was involved 
and the lender (the Bank), insisted as a condition for 
approving the loan that a particular person be recruited as 
advisor... It was suggested that the advisor be taken on 
at a salary of about 9,500 pounds (prior to 1977 value); 
the government considered this salary excessive, because 
the President of that country earned less than half this 
sum. And here was a person who was supposed to 
come as advisor and to be paid from the proceeds of the 
loan. But it was a question of taking it or leaving it. It 
was finally agreed to because there was no choice. I 
repeat this is not actually perhaps interference but it is 
something close to it, especially in a poor country, which 
has to pay out of the loan for something whose value is 
not cl ear... (78)
Furthermore, such expertise may do more harm than good to the project, in the 
sense that it may demoralise the borrower's own civil service, by preventing it from 
developing its own intellectual capabilities. Moreover, the danger here is that too much 
reliance on foreign expatriates may well make the developing countries too much 
dependent on foreign expertise with all the consequences that such dependence may 
imply. For the Bank, such foreign expertise is necessary to strengthen the capacity of 
the civil service and that the expense is unavoidable. Once all major obstacles have
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been cleared "in the field", the Bank invites the borrower to its headquarters to discuss 
the details of the loan.
C- The Negotiation of the Loan.
At this stage, the Bank and the borrower meet to reach an agreement on the 
proposed project.(^9) It is a meeting dominated by the Bank which unveils to the 
prospective borrower the different measures to be taken, if he is to benefit from the 
loan. All issues that have been raised prior to and during appraisal to ensure the 
success of the project are thus cleared. For example, if the Bank has suggested price 
increases, or the use of consultants or any change to be introduced, this is formally 
agreed upon during the negotiations. At this stage the borrower may still object to the 
Bank's requirements, but he will inevitably lose the loan. In practice this never 
happens, as most of the obstacles are cleared well in advance and the borrower, at this 
stage, is generally ready to agree to implement the Bank's conditions.
At this stage also, the Bank does not insist that all remedial measures which may 
appear necessary in the case of any given country may be completed before that country 
may qualify for a loan. On the other hand, the Bank is not normally willing to rely 
simply on a representation by the government that such remedial measures will in due 
course be taken. The Bank's position is midway between these two extremes. It 
requires concrete evidence that the government is actually taking appropriate steps to 
establish stability but, once given such evidence, it is usually willing to make a loan 
concurrently with the execution of the measures a d o p t e d . O n c e  both parties have 
agreed on all the details of the loan, the agreement thus reached is converted into legal 
obligations binding on both the Bank as a debtor and the borrower as a creditor. A 
final report is submitted to the the President of the Bank, who in turn submits the loan 
to the Executive Directors ( Administrators), for final approval.
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a)- The Adoption of the Loan.
Once negotiations are complete, and the contract technically formulated, the 
President of the Bank submits a report to the Administrators where he recommends the 
adoption of the loan. The report, along with other legal documents (covenants), is then 
studied by the Executive Directors, and eventually submitted to voting. The loan must 
be approved by a quorum of a majority of the Executive Directors who must possess 
between them at least half of the total votes. The loan is adopted through a resolution. 
The resolution may be reached through a vote according to the majority of voices 
expressed, or through a consensus. As already discussed, it is very rare that a loan is 
rejected at this stage through a negative vote. For, if there is any opposition to the loan, 
it is generally manifested in the very beginning of the loan procedure, since the 
Executive Directors are usually aware of all the lending programmes of the institution. 
Nevertheless, it may happen that some opposition to the loan appears at this terminal 
stage from some m e m b e r s . T h e s e  objections appear in the form of abstention to 
the voting or by a negative vote. The reason behind these objections may or may not be 
directly linked to the loan agreement. But in most cases, the objections have their 
sources in bilateral dispute between the borrowing country and the voting Executive 
Director of another country, dispute of a completely different nature and which have 
nothing to do with the loan p ro p o sa l.^ )
b)- Applicable Law.
The question arises whether the loan and guarantee agreements concluded 
between the Bank and its members are international agreements, and as such they are 
governed by International L aw .(^) j he question arises because of the mixed nature of 
the loan agreements which contain elements from both municipal and international law
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in such a confusing way that it is difficult to ascertain whether the contract is governed 
by one or the other, or both, laws.
One view is that Bank agreements lack the explicit support of international law 
and, therefore, should be considered as falling within the jurisdiction of the borrowing 
state. This view is based on the premise that neither the Articles nor the General 
Conditions make direct reference to the application of international la w .(^ )  In these 
documents, as well as in the loan agreements, however, there are several express and 
implied references to municipal law. For example, Article IV, section 4.10 (General 
Conditions) states tha t:
Any payment required under the loan agreem ent... to be 
made to the Bank in the currency of a country shall be 
made in such a manner ... as shall be permitted by the 
laws of such country...
The second and predominant view is that the Bank's loan and guarantee 
agreements with its members are basically international agreements governed by 
international law.(^5) vjew js reinforced by the insertion in the General
Conditions of certain standard clauses such as Article X, section 10 (1) which 
provides:
The rights and obligations of the Bank, the Borrower 
and the Guarantor under the loan agreement, the 
guarantee agreement and the bonds shall be valid and 
en fo rceab le  in accordance wi t h their terms 
notw ithstanding the law of any state or political 
subdivision thereof, to the contrary7.
The first declared objectives of this section is that the law of a country on whose 
territory the project is carried out cannot prevail over the provisions of the loan 
agreement. In other words, member states, or their entities, which are the signatories 
of the loan agreement, cannot invoke their national laws to repeal one or several clauses
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of the loan. This precaution is especially valid for the period after the implementation 
of the loan. It makes redundant any legislation passed by a state on its territory which 
is not compatible with the Bank's contractual obligations. For this reason, the Bank 
has always demanded and indeed received, a legal certificate stating that the loan 
agreement is in full compliance with the prevailing laws in the borrowing country. Such 
a letter is considered as much part of the contract as any other obligation in the loan 
agreement. Infringement of its content is treated as infringement of any of the initial 
clauses in the original loan a g re em e n t/^
This is a particularly sensitive point for the Legal Department of the Bank. 
Lawyers in the Bank fear that since they are dealing with sovereign states, there is 
always the possibility for governments to overrule unilaterally existing laws, or repeal 
international engagements. So the very purpose of section 10 (1) is precisely to recall 
the principle of the inopposability of internal law to international agreements. Indirectly 
therefore, the Bank has excluded the application of the borrower's domestic laws and 
has underlined its preference for international law. Broches, who has discussed this 
question in a lecture given at the Hague Academy, concluded after a thorough 
investigation into some legal aspects of the Bank, that the Bank's agreements are 
governed by international law. He justifies his findings by saying that:
The steps by which I reached this conclusion were that 
the Bank is a subject of international law, that it has 
treaty-making capacity, that that capacity extends to the 
conclusion of loan and guarantee agreements and, 
finally, that the Bank's loan and guarantee agreements 
with its members are concluded in the exercise of that 
capacity and are intended to be, and are, governed by 
International Law."(87)
Broches cited as evidence of his findings:
• The Loan Regulations of the Bank (referred to as the General Conditions)
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• The registration by the Bank of its loan agreements with the Secretariat of the 
United Nations in accordance with the provisions of Article 102 of the U N 
Charter.
In practice, the Bank has always avoided entering into conflict with its members, 
and cases to support which law applies to the Bank's litigation do not exist in the 
absence of precedent in the lending history of the institution. Although the lack of an 
express provision in the Bank's Statutes of a particular applicable law may be of some 
doctrinal significance, in practice, the question has never been raised. Commenting on 
this precise point, A. Fatouros remarked:
As in so many other instances, it is the actual practice of 
the Bank rather than the doctrinal debate that appears to 
provide the answers.(^8)
The question is unlikely to arise in view of the lengthy procedure followed in each 
loan as described earlier. Furthermore, it is not in the member's interest to come into 
conflict with the Bank by, for instance, cancelling unilaterally its contractual obligations 
with the institution, or altering previously agreed arrangements. For, as in the case of 
default discussed earlier, cancellation, or non respect of the loan agreement provisions 
carries serious consequences on the reputation of the borrower and may put at risk its 
future lending from both the Bank and other suppliers of resources.
Last, but not least, it is equally important for the Bank not to get involved in 
repeated and endless legal disputes with its borrower members. This would only 
impede the course of its operations and, more importantly, damage its reputation and 
credibility vis a vis its creditors upon which it is so dependent.
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Conclusion to Chapter Two.
Between the request and the granting of a loan, the Bank has developed a policy 
which enables it to maintain direct relationship with the borrower through the life of 
each loan. In developing such a relationship, the Bank appears to be not only interested 
in supplying money, but it was equally anxious to know in minute detail, how such 
money should be spent by participating directly in the realisation of the project(s) it 
finances.
Under the umbrella of technical assistance, the Bank undertakes a thorough 
examination of the borrower's economy, before going on finally to agree to finance a 
modest fertilizer plant. By qualifying its criteria and actions as technical and non 
political, the Bank aims at several objectives. In the first place, the Bank claims that it 
wants to establish a certain financial discipline, which, it alleges is missing in most 
LDCs and which is imposed on it by its limited resources.
Secondly, by resorting to technicalities, the Bank's management tries to fill a legal 
vacuum left by the Articles of Agreement concerning the agency's intervention in the 
field of development. Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly, by emphasising on the 
technical aspect of its action, the Bank wants to free itself from the common constraints 
on non intervention that the international order imposes on public organisations.
The Bank technical and financial superiority gives the loan agreement between the 
institution and the borrower a particular taint, that makes the contract looks more like 
un marriage cle raison que d ' amour. In theory, borrowers are associated in all stages 
leading to the conclusion of the contract. But in the absence of a real bargaining power, 
the LDCs appear more like executing agents than authentic partners. This second class 
position in contract making makes the borrowing LDCs more vulnerable to the Bank's 
demands. It also explains to a large extent, the impact of the Bank's policy on the laws 
and institutions of the borrowers, as will be discussed in the following Chapter.
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CHAPTER THREE.
THE MODALITIES OF THE LEGAL IMPACT: 
A STUDY OF THE BANK S CONDITIONS.
The loan agreement does not come into force by the mere signatures of the Bank 
and the borrower. Before granting any loan, the Bank subjects its borrowers to a set of 
conditions which range from the most common conditions contained in all loan 
agreements, down to the very specific obligations tailored to the nature of the 
p ro ject.(l) Although these conditions may be inspired from objective as well as 
operational reasons, they nevertheless serve to guarantee to the institution a 
predominant role in the transaction. Depending on their place and importance in the 
loan agreement, these conditions may be classified by order of importance into three 
categories. These are, (1) conditions of a general character which are found in all loan 
agreements and, as such, are applicable to any potential borrowers w ithout 
discrimination. Governments which solicit financial assistance from the Bank are 
usually supposed to be aware of these conditions. Once the Bank has agreed in 
principle to lend to the applicant, it may, (2) either before or during the negotiations of 
the loan, require additional particular conditions to a specific loan which, in the Bank's 
thinking, would enhance the effectiveness of the loan. The Bank may finally (3) resort 
to other implicit conditions to force the borrower to act outside the proper context of the 
project being financed from the institution's fund.
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I- G eneral C onditions A pplicab le  to Loan and Guarantee  
Agreements
These represent the first type of conditions the Bank requires from any borrower 
seeking its financial aid. The General Conditions Applicable to Loan and Guarantee 
agreements (hereinafter BGC), deal with a particular aspect of the Bank's conduct of its 
business. They define the relationship between the Bank and the borrower in many 
areas, such as the way the financing of the project should be conducted, the 
reimbursement method, the payment of interest, and matters of the like that concern the 
administration of the loan d i r e c t ly .B e c a u s e  the Bank has always relied on very 
precisely formulated loan agreements, it was therefore indispensable for it to lay down 
from the very beginning "a standard framework" for the formulation of its contracts to 
be followed by all borrowers. In view of the important role that the BGC play in the 
formation of the contract, it may be useful to consider: a) under what circumstances did 
these conditions come into being; and b) the delimitation of their field of application.
A)- Background.
Historically speaking, the BGC were not part of the original talks that led to the 
creation of the Bank. Nor were they included subsequently in the Articles of 
Agreement. They were "instantaneously" developed by the Bank's Administrators as 
they ventured into the lending business. Anxious to impose their own methodology in 
contract making, the Administrators decided to set up pre-conditional clauses that 
would apply de facto  to every potential b o r r o w e r .^ )  The first clauses appeared as 
early as 1947 and were known under the official heading of "Loan Regulations". Each 
Loan Regulation contained a certain number of clauses which were more or less 
common to all loans that the Bank granted to its borrowers.
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Loan Regulations were identified by a code number. For example, Loan 
Regulation No 1, published in May 5th, 1947, deals with the procedure of arbitration 
applicable to litigation between the Bank and the borrower. Loan Regulation No 2 
established the US Dollar as the main currency in the Bank's transactions. These loan 
regulations were not static. They changed and evolved in accordance with the Bank's 
experience and evolution. Thus, Loan Regulation No 1 was later fused with Loan 
Regulations No 3 and 4 (published in 1950), whereas the Loan Regulation No 2 was 
dropped as it became obsolete. However, it was only in 1967 that the Loan 
Regulations underwent their most significant change when they were consolidated into 
one single document known as the "BGC Applicable to Loan and Guarantee 
Agreements.
In the opinion of many authors, such as R., Lavalle and D., Zavala, the 
substitution of the term Conditions to Regulations was appropriate and reflects better 
the legal nature of the clauses.^) Like their predecessors, the BGC have undergone, 
since 1967, revisions, namely in 1974 and 1980 (twice, July and October), and more 
recently in 1985. The purpose of these changes has been to update the clauses.
B)- The Context of Application
Perhaps the major and immediate concern of the Bank in any loan agreement is to 
have a clear idea as to how its money is going to be used by the borrower. It is a 
practical concern which implicitly invites the Bank to intervene massively in the loan 
agreement by laying down procedural rules to be followed by all borrowers in any loan 
agreement. To give the BGC a legal nature, therefore a binding force, the Bank has 
made them an inherent part of the loan agreement. A glance at any loan agreement 
reveals the existence of a standard clause which reads as follows:
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The parties to the agreement accept all the provisions of 
the BGC Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements
dated [______ ] with the same effect as if they were fully
set forth herein.
A variation of this clause which may be found in more recent contracts, reads:
The BGC Applicable to Loan and Guarantee Agreements
of the Bank dated [______ ] (the BGC) constitute an
integral part of this agreement.
As may be noticed, there is no difference in meaning between the two quotes 
above. In both clauses, the objective of the Bank is to make the borrower aware of the 
obligatory character of the BGC, hence their strict observance in the execution of the 
loan agreement. As they stand presently, the BGC dating from January 1985 deal with 
four main areas:
• A set of clauses giving definitions of the various terms and expressions used in 
connection with any loan agreement (Arts. I and II BGC). The terminology used by 
the Bank is rich and extensive and it appears constantly in the various loans made to 
different countries with different concepts and terminology. One way of avoiding 
misinterpretation between the Bank and the borrower is to provide a kind of common 
language used and understood by all parties. For example, since most of the Bank's 
loans are designated in Dollars, there is in the BGC a definition of what is meant by 
such a currency: "Dollars and the sign $ means dollars of the United States of America" 
(Art. II, sect. 2.(1) (a) ). Another example would be the definition of the term taxes, 
which includes "imports, levies, fees and duties of any nature (Art.II sec. 2.(1) (18) 
BGC).
These are roughly the kind of questions the BGC try to settle before going into 
the details of the loan. As elementary as this exercise may be, it does, nevertheless, 
help the Bank to maintain a certain uniformity in its lending style; and by the same
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token, avoid futile repetitions, which would only overload the formulation of the 
contract. These definitions are compulsory and every borrower must comply with them 
in accordance with Article II section 2.(1) BGC which reads:
The following terms have the following meanings 
whenever used in the BGC.
Since the BGC are an integral part of the loan agreement, it follows that all the 
terms defined would obligatorily retain that particular definition whenever used in 
future contracts. Thus, if China borrows money from the Bank, and there are some 
taxes involved in the loan, the Chinese government would, or should, know what this 
term covers in the Bank's view, and not in its own national legislation. Moreover, these 
compulsory definitions are constantly reiterated in all loan agreements under the 
following clause:
Whenever used in this agreement, unless the context 
otherwise requires, the several terms defined in the BGC 
have the respective meanings therein set forth.
Despite their "universal" character, these definitions are by no means exhaustive 
and they are quite frequently supplemented by additional definitions and terminology 
proper to each loan as the above clause provides:
...and the following additional terms have the following 
meanings.
For example, in a loan made to Nigeria, one additional clause reads: " Naira or N 
means the currency of the borrower. "(6) Additional clauses may also be brought in to 
clarify or explain local abbreviations used in connection to a particular loan. Thus, in a 
loan made to Algeria, one additional clause goes:
M.H.E.F. means the "Ministere de l'Hydraulique, de 1'Environnement et des
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Forets", then follows the English translation or its equivalent" the borrower's Ministry 
of Hydraulics, Environment and Forestry."^) Additional clauses may also help to 
specify certain events or dates which are peculiar to the borrower and related to the loan 
such as the following clause:
Fiscal year means the borrow er's fiscal year 
commencing January 1st and ending December 31st.
This is to distinguish this particular borrower from other borrowers whose fiscal 
years may be set at different dates.(^)
• The second set of clauses deals mainly with financial matters such as the Loan 
Account, the withdrawal of funds, interests or reimbursement (Arts. Ill to VIII BGC). 
Perhaps the subject which is discussed most in this part of the BGC is the issue of 
vtfithdrawal of the proceeds of the loan, as it appears from Article V, which is entirely 
devoted to that particular issue. In the Article in question, the Bank imposes the 
maximum safeguards by laying down various and extremely detailed procedures to be 
followed by borrowers whenever they want to make use of the Bank's funds. Thus, 
section 5.(3) of the above Article states:
A pp lica tio n s  fo r w ith d raw a l, including the 
documentation required... shall be made promptly in 
relation to expenditures for the project, (emphasis added)
Another strict requirement from the Bank is the borrower's obligation to produce 
supporting evidence:
The borrower shall furnish to the Bank such documents 
and other evidence in support of the application as the 
Bank shall reasonably request, whether before or after 
the Bank shall have permitted any withdrawal requested 
in the application. ( Art. V, sect. 5.05 BGC )
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It follows that, in the absence of a formal application or insufficient documents in 
form or substance, the Bank will deny the borrower the right to use the money, which 
in principle he is entitled to by the mere signature of the loan agreement (Art.V , sect. 
5.(7). Another area of special interest for the Bank in this part of the BCG is the 
question of repayment of both the principal and interest. Here too, the Bank has put 
into place quite a rigid procedure by setting deadlines for reimbursement, locating the 
locus for repayment, defining the currency of repayment and the calculation of interest.
• The third set of clauses calls for the Bank and the borrower to co-operate for the 
success of the project by providing an exchange of information on all matters related to 
the loan a g r e e m e n t . ^ )  Thus, Article. I X ,  section 9 . ( 1 )  BGC, states:
The Bank, the borrower, and the guarantor shall... from 
time to time, at the request of any one of them, exchange 
views whith regard to the progress of the loan and the 
performance of their respective obligations under the 
loan agreement and furnish to the other party all such 
information....
That the Bank requests information is not a novelty in the Institution's practice. 
As has already been discussed earlier, this kind of request, although uncomfortable to 
the borrower, is typical of the Bank which has ceaselessly shown a particular interest in 
the follow up of the projects it finances until their completion, and even once they have 
been completed. The argument here is that the exchange of information is not always a 
two-way business as the Bank claims. Although the Article uses the expressions 
"exchange" and "co-operation", thus denoting a certain reciprocity, in practice, 
however, most of the information is one way; viz from the borrower to the Bank.(lO) 
This superiority is underlined in the provisions of Art. IX, section 9.(1) (c) BGC:
The member of the Bank, which is the borrower or the 
Guarantor shall afford all reasonable opportunity for 
representatives of the Bank to visit any part of its 
territory for purposes related to the loan.
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The above privilege has no sense nor any counterpart from the borrowers side, 
since, even in the event of a borrower visiting the headquarters of the Bank for the 
purpose of the loan, the information he may get is less important than that which the 
Bank receives when visiting the borrower's territory. Moreover, in several countries, 
especially the economically weak ones, it may be hard to conceive that officials from 
such countries would challenge a "Giant" such as the Bank. As Mason et al notice:
the information requested by the Bank is more and is 
usually less than required by the borrower itself for the 
efficient control of its own operations/11)
This can only be logical for a borrower, no matter how strong he is, may be 
constantly called upon to make concessions as long as he remains a debtor. Security 
over the repayment of its principal and interest is another area of concern for the Bank. 
To that effect, the BGC have introduced what is called the "negative pledge." The 
purpose of this clause is "to ensure that no other external debt should have priority over 
the [Bank's] loans." (Art. IX,sect. 9.03 (a) BGC). The inclusion of such a clause in 
the loan agreement acts as a security found in private law whose effect is to limit, if not 
forbid, the borrower to create any lien on any of his assets as a security for debt 
incurred by him. The purpose is to enable the lender to recover his money from such 
assets, should the borrower fail to repay the loan. In the context of the Bank, there is 
no security as such, but the borrower undertakes in writing that he will not secure any 
of his public assets for any external debt which will result in a priority for the benefit of 
the creditor of such an external debt/*-)
Finally, there are other administrative clauses which aim at keeping the Bank and 
the Borrower in close contact over the day-to-day life of the loan. Among these clauses, 
section 9(7) of Article IX BGC summarises in a succinct manner the Bank's intentions:
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The borrower shall maintain records and procedures 
adequate to record and monitor the progress of the 
project to identify the goods and services financed out of 
the proceeds of the loan... to enable the Bank's 
representatives to visit any facility and construction sites 
included in the project... and to furnish to the Bank at 
regular intervals all such information concerning the 
project.
• The fourth and last set of clauses relates to some legal matters such as 
enforceability of the loan agreement, failure to exercise rights, arbitration, entry into 
force and termination. The two main areas in this respect are the clauses dealing with 
Enforceability (Art. IX, section 10.01 BGC) and Arbitration (Art. IX, section 10.04 
BGC).
As far as Enforceability is concerned, the issue has already been discussed in 
another context, namely in Chapter Two. Therefore there is no need for elaboration on 
this point again. The other and no less important part dealt with in the BGC is the way 
the Bank and the borrower settle their differences. Article XI, section 10.(4), provides 
that:
Any controversy between the parties to the loan 
agreement... which has not been settled by agreement of 
the parties shall be submitted to arbitration.
Thus, there are two ways of settling disputes. The first one is amicably; that is to 
say, through negotiations and mutual understanding. The second is arbitration, through 
a tribunal, of which the BGC define the composition in advance. The Arbitration 
Tribunal consists of three arbitrators appointed as follows: one arbitrator by the Bank, a 
second by the borrower and / or Guarantor, the third (called the Umpire) by agreement 
of the parties. If they do not agree, then he is appointed by the President of the ICJ; in 
case of failure, then by the UN General Secretary. The procedure is simple and similar
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to that found in any conventional Arbitration Tribunal. The award is final and binding 
upon the parties to the loan agreement/ ^  According to the Bank's own records, it 
does not seem, till now, that such a procedure has ever taken place. The Bank has 
either settled its differences with the borrower amicably or has applied its own legal 
sanctions (namely suspension or cancellation of loans ).
From a legal point of view, the immediate effect of the BGC is to subject the 
borrower to a set of pre-established or "ready-made" clauses. As such, the BGC are 
somewhat comparable to the clauses found in the contrcit d'adhesion in French private 
law, where one party has to abide by conditions set in advance by the other p a r t y / ^  
In the case of the Bank, this practice has both its advantages and drawbacks. The 
advantage is that the BGC, by their universality, contribute to the uniformity of the 
rules and procedures, although partially, giving thus all the Bank's users the feeling of 
equal treatment. The disadvantage is that, like in the contract d'adhesion, the borrower 
is completely dissociated from the process of the formulation of the final contract.
The borrower is thus presented with a set of clauses which he has no choice or 
chance to discuss, only to accept or give up the loan. The acceptance must be total and 
without any reservation. Moreover, the unilateralism in law making, makes the BGC 
extremely rigid from the borrower's side, but too flexible from the Bank's side, and the 
Institution has always used this flexibility to its advantage. In principle, all loan 
agreements make it compulsory that the contracting parties must accept the clauses as if 
they were an inherent part of the loan. However, most of the agreements do carry 
some modifications on the clauses of the BGC, or sometimes explicitly stipulate the 
inapplicability of some of them / ^  A good illustration may be to compare the 
standard clause of Article 1 relating to the status of the BGC in a few loan agreements:
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• Example One: In a loan made to Algeria, Article 1 reads as follows:
The parties to this agreement accept all the provisions of 
the BGC applicable to the Loan and G uarantee 
Agreements, dated October, 1980 with the same force 
and effect as if they were fully set forth here in /16)
• Example Two: In a loan made to Hungary, Article 1 reads:
The BGC applicable ....dated October, 1980, with the
last sentence of section 3.02 deleted ( The BGC ),
constitute an integral part of this a g r e e m e n t / 17)
Unlike in the first example, in the case of Hungary, the Bank has exempted the 
borrower from the provisions contained in section 3.2. of the BGC. A glance at the 
said section reveals that under normal circumstances, the borrowers are subject to a
payment of a commitment charge on the amount of money unwithdrawn. In this
particular loan, the Bank has, for specific reasons, exempted the Hungarian 
Government from such a payment.
• Example Three: In a loan made to a Yugoslavian bank, Article 1 reads:
The parties to this Agreement accept all the provisions of 
the BGC... dated October, 1980 with the same force and 
effect... subject however to the following modification 
thereof... namely that the following sub paragraph (d) is 
added to section 3.04 of the B G C /l^ )
The said section deals with the method of repayment, and the Bank thought it 
necessary to add, in this particular loan, specific provisions for its repayment by the 
Y ugoslavian Bank.
• Example Four: Sometimes, the modifications entered by the Bank into the BGC
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are long and numerous, and it may not be convenient to insert them in Article 1. This is 
the case of a loan made to Morocco where Article 1 reads normally (as it does, e.g. in 
example one), then follows a reference to a schedule at the end of the loan agreement 
listing the modifications introduced/^)
It seems that the BGC, as they stand, have fallen short in this particular loan, to 
provide all the necessary assurances for the Bank to grant the loan. Therefore, new 
additional clauses have to be found to fill the gap in the existing legal framework 
provided by the BGC. The legal nature of these additional clauses seems to have been 
resolved simultaneously as the Bank always attaches the mention that the additional 
provisions have become part of the BGC, i.e. that they are legally binding like any 
clause contained in the original BGC/^O) However, the deletion or addition of any 
particular section(s) is valid only for a specific borrower for whose benefit the changes 
were made. It cannot be extended ex-officio to other loans, nor can it be used as a 
precedent by other borrowers to claim similar treatment. Despite their general 
character, the BGC remain from the legal point of view part of the contractual and 
obligatory package. As Zavala pointed out,
[T]hey , (the BGC) flow from the loan agreement itself, 
and as such are nothing else but a mere continuation of 
the loan like any contractual clause in the 
agreement. "(71)
Such a binding character is also recalled, although implicitly in Article II section 
2.01 (BGC) in the following terms:
[T]he loan agreement includes these BGC as applied 
thereto and all schedules and agreements supplemental to 
the loan agreement.
It follows that non-compliance with any clause in the BGC would, at least in 
theory, amount to a breach in the form of the contract, and eventually lead to the
1 19
application of the appropriate legal sanction, (suspension / cancellation of the l o a n ) / 7 7 )  
From the point of view of this study, it may be worth recalling that the BGC per se are 
neither a substitute, nor a replacement for the conditions that the Bank lays down in the 
Articles of Agreement, or the specific conditions it may attach to individual loans. 
Despite their binding force, the BGC by their content may be said to stand at the bottom 
of the ladder of the various conditions which the Bank imposes on its borrowers. The 
coercive element that the term conditions generally implies is almost non existent in the 
BCG clauses. In addition, the BGC do not contain any "sensitive" clause which may 
"hurt" the borrower. For example, they do not deal with the nature of projects to be 
financed by the Bank, nor do they set a limit to the money to be lent. They do not fix 
the limit of reimbursement or the rate of interest. They were initially set up mainly for 
practical reasons, i.e. to unburden the text of the loan agreements in order to facilitate 
their negotiations. Broadly speaking, most of the clauses set in the BGC are more 
bureaucratic guidelines, a kind of routine rather than serious stringent rules. As such, 
the BGC do not pose any real threat or constraints on borrowers, who usually tend to 
accept them without too much reticence, since most of them are clauses directly attached 
to the formal aspect of the loan, rather than its substance. The BGC have no legal 
effect on their own. As mentioned below, they draw their legal force basically from the 
loan agreement in which they are i n s e r t e d / ^ )  Consequently, i t  is the loan which 
governs the contractual relationship between the parties according to the old established 
rule Pacta Sunt Servanda, as it is faithfully recalled in Article 1, section 1.02 (BGC):
If any provision of a loan agreement or Guarantee 
Agreement is inconsistent with a provision of these 
BGC, the provisions of the loan agreement or Guarantee 
Agreement as the case may be shall govern.
From the Third World point of view, the BGC help the Bank to fulfill certain 
hidden objectives. One of them is to use the BGC as a way to add or delete whatever
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the Bank wants. This gives the Institution a large margin of manoeuvre in meeting any 
kind of changes that may occur in its lending policy. It is especially a clever legal 
technique to introduce conditions without having to change its main Statutes, the 
Articles of A g r e e m e n t . ^ - ^ )  This means in legal terms avoiding amendment, a 
procedure that the Institution has always rejected. And if the Bank has so far 
successfully resisted such amendments, it owes this resistance mainly to the BGC. For, 
as stated earlier, it is the Administrators who are the architects of the BGC. They shape 
the clauses as they think would suit the Institution's functioning. Their work is not 
supervised, or submitted to discussion to any external authority such as, for example, 
an inter governmental group, or a special independent body of e x p e rts /-^
II- Conditions of Effectiveness.
In the Bank's parlance, the conditions of effectiveness are those conditions which 
the institution deems indispensable for the success of the project. In other words, 
without such conditions there is no guarantee that the loan will achieve the purpose for 
which it is made.(26) The nature and scope of these conditions is still a mater of 
controversy between the Bank and its developing country members. Although, in 
principle, the conditions of effectiveness are the subject of bargaining between the Bank 
and the borrower, it is generally agreed that it is always the Bank's ultimate decision 
which p rev a ils /^ 7) By making the conditions of effectiveness a sine qua non for the 
success of the loan project, the Bank has implicitly reduced the borrower's bargaining 
capacity. Since the Bank considers such conditions as indispensable, it follows 
automatically that their content cannot be challenged or disapproved by the other 
contracting party. Henceforth, the Third World claim that these conditions are set 
unilaterally, and, as such, imposed on them.^“^
In the Bank's belief, conditions of effectiveness are introduced for the purpose of
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the sole benefit of the borrower. By imposing these kinds of conditions, the Bank 
wants -at least in appearance- to focus its concern on its borrower's success. It is
precisely that concern which led the Bank to consider the conditions of effectiveness as
of paramount importance. This assumption reinforces the previous argument put 
forward by the Bank, that it does not lend for investment purposes only:
What is at stake here, is the concern... that the borrowers 
have done whatever has to be done at the domestic level 
to make the agreement binding. The pre-eminent concern 
of [the Bank], is to get [its] money back... But since we 
[in the Bank], do not lend money just to invest it and get 
return on it, we are concerned as well with all matters to 
be taken into account of to permit the proper execution of 
the project. That concern can lead to the imposition of 
conditions to be fulfilled before the first disbursement is
made.(-9)
Thus, effectiveness became just another key word to which the Bank has attached 
a great deal of importance, and given a wide interpretation in the process of its lending 
policy.(30) Unlike the BGC, conditions of effectiveness are available in no other 
separate legal covenant (eg. in the letter of intent). They are neither general nor 
universal, and their application is strictly limited to individual loans. Each borrower 
has his own conditions of effectiveness attached to his loan. Some loans may carry
more conditions than others, while some others may have none at all. The nature and
content of these conditions depend not on the borrower's status, but on the complexity 
of every loan. Thus, the same borrower may be subject to different sets of conditions 
of effectiveness, at different times of borrowing. This optional characteristic may give 
the impression that these conditions are negotiable when they are n o t . ^ )  Studies of 
Bank operations have cited several instances where acute conflicts developed between a 
member country and the institution over the extent of imposing the conditions of
effectiveness.^-)
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From the legal point of view, the conditions of effectiveness do not enjoy the 
same legal status as the BGC, in the sense that they are not agreed upon, ex-officio, by 
the borrowing state. The sole common denominator between the two sets of conditions 
is that they are both referred to in the loan agreement. This insertion is sufficient to 
give the conditions of effectiveness a binding force in accordance with Art. II, section 
2.01(BGC.)(33) As a consequence, the proper execution of the loan will depend on 
the compliance with these conditions. As Broches wrote:
if conditions established for effectiveness are not fulfilled 
by a specific date, the agreement shall be cancelled 
automatically/3^)
However, unlike the BGC, conditions of effectiveness are not pre-established 
clauses, "fittable" to any borrower. They start taking shape from the early stages of the 
Bank's appraisal mission. They are thus part of the operational aspect which 
distinguishes the Bank from other international organisations such as ILO, WHO or 
FAO, which are rather functional institutions/3-^ ) In practice, not all borrowers are 
subject to the same degree of conditions of effectiveness. The string of conditions 
depends largely on the economic and financial capabilities of each borrower; the less 
fortunate he is, the more stringent the conditions are. In reality, it is the weakest 
countries of the LDCs which have the most to fear from the conditions of effectiveness, 
because of the hard constraints imposed on them.
From the point of view of International Law of Development, the conflict between 
the Bank and its borrowers has its roots in the very nature and opportunity of these 
c o n d i t i o n s / 3 ^ )  On one hand, the LDCs argue, that the Bank unduly requires 
conditions attached to the effectiveness of the loan, as an obligation for the borrower to 
carry out some specific measures. Seen from this angle, the conditions of effectiveness 
would: a) grant the Bank an authority which it does not have in reality, and b) raise the 
corollary question of whether it is appropriate for the Bank to impose on borrowing
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governments policy choices concerning the use of their economic resources, which 
differ from those they would otherwise prefer. On the other hand, the Bank defends its 
position by arguing that the conditions it requires for the effectiveness of the loan are 
part of its prerogatives as an International Institution. As one of the Bank's officials put 
it, in these rather simplistic terms:
The Bank does not obligate the borrower to carry out any 
kind of measures. It has neither the ability nor the power 
to do it. What the Bank does is to subject the 
disbursement of its funds on the existing of certain 
preconditions necessary to the effectiveness of the loan.
These measures rest entirely with the power of the 
borrowing state or entity. (3^)
The conditions that the Bank imposes for effectiveness are numerous and varied, 
and cannot possibly be listed here. Among these conditions, institution building, the 
rate clause and procurement seem to be common in almost all loan agreements 
surveyed. An attempt will be made to look, through concrete examples, in some depth 
at the reasons why the Bank asks for such conditions and what are the legal 
implications of these conditions on the institutional arrangements of the borrowers.
A)- Institution Building.
As discussed previously, a major concern for the Bank when negotiating a loan is 
the borrower's entity which will be responsible for the materialisation of the 
project/3^) In the following loan made to Ageria no such entity existed and the Bank 
insisted that before it agreed to finance the project it made the creation of an 
autonomous entity a condition of effectiveness for the financing of the project/3^)
a) The Algerian Case of E PE O R (^)
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The EPEOR loan, approved on March 13, 1986, is among a series of loan 
agreements made by the Bank to supply drinking water to Oran, the second largest city 
in western Algeria. According to schedule II of the loan, the objectives of the project 
are:
(1 ) To increase water production for the area of Oran to meet the present 
demand and future requirements.
(2 ) To expand the distribution network and improve the efficiency of the 
production system.
(3) To improve the organisation and operations of the Regional Water 
Companies.
(i) The Water Situation in Oran before 1986.
Before the Bank stepped in Oran, like any major city in Algeria, suffered 
immensely from an acute shortage of drinking water. Institutionally, the water supply 
depended on two separate entities: SONADE, which is a state controlled firm under the 
auspices of the Ministry of Hydraulics, with the main task of prospecting for water 
resources. The second entity was the APC, the equivalent of the French Commune or 
the UK District Council, with the main task of selling water to the consumer. The lack 
of clearly defined roles and prerogatives, coupled with bad management between the 
two entities led to chaos in the water supply industry, the result being that a lot of water 
was unaccounted for; no strict list of consumers was available; and there was no real 
effective control on consumers, with some having huge arrears, while others have 
never paid at all. In some instances, people did not even have a meter, and illegal 
connections were quite a common practice. Others were astonished that they should 
pay for water at all, on the religious grounds that it is a natural resource and therefore 
exempt from tarrification. When paid by a minority of consumers, the prices of water 
were insignificant as water was subsidised by the Central Government.
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For many years, there was no fixed rate, and people were paying only a nominal 
charge for a given period of time, no matter how much water they consumed. There 
was no rigid control over the use of drinking water, and some people did not hesitate to 
use it for their own gardening or small factories. There existed by laws to penalise bad 
users or illegal consumers, but they were hardly enforced by the local authorities. As a 
result, less money was getting into the APC funds and no maintenance or repair work 
was carried out in time. Damaged pipes and flooding streets were regular scenes. To 
these man made degradations, the severe drought that had affected the country for the 
previous eleven years or so made the water situation even w o r s e / ^ l )  it was in these 
conditions that the new institution recommended by the Bank to take charge of the 
project came into being.
(ii) The Creation of EPEOR.
As a result of the negotiations between the Algerian Government and the Bank's 
officials, it was agreed, on the insistence of the Bank, that the water supply and 
sewerage be taken charge of by an autonomous enterprise called EPEOR. In legal 
terms, and in the specific case of the Bank, this meant that as a condition of 
effectiveness the Algerian Government had to provide to the Bank a satisfactory entity 
which would be responsible for the project. In other words, the loan would not be 
granted, unless EPEOR was set up/^2) Following the recommendations of a Bank 
sector study in 1982, EPEOR was created by governmental Decree No 83-340, dated 
May 14, 1983/43) The Decree states that:
EPEOR is an autonomous entity.
EPEOR is guided in its organisation and functioning by the principles of the 
"Socialist Management of Enterprises" code.
Tariffs are set by the Government.
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The State has the control over EPEOR's budget.
From this brief outline of the Decree, it may be interesting to trace back the 
Bank's influence on the creation of EPEOR, and see from a concrete case how, and to 
what extent, the Bank's action can affect the borrowers laws and institutions.
(iii) The Role of the Bank in the Creation of EPEOR.
At first glance, there is no noticeable or direct involvement of the Bank which 
may mark the Decree with some of the Bank's own specifications. On the contrary, the 
Decree reflects a great deal of the Algerian socio-economic and ideological realities. 
Among such purely Algerian characteristics, Article 2 (Decree) refers the creation of 
EPEOR to the code of the "Gestion Socialiste des Entreprises" (GSE) thus denoting the 
Government's intention to keep EPEOR in conformity with the national ideological 
f r a m e w o r k / ^ )  This may sound paradoxical in comparison with the Bank's traditional 
dislike of socialist management and state-owned enterprises. One hypothesis may be 
that this was deliberately done to prevent EPEOR from falling into private hands, 
although the Bank may have hoped for this to happen.
However, an intensive study of the Decree reveals that the government authority 
is less important than it appears on the surface, and that the real author of the Decree is 
not the Algerian government, but the World Bank. To support this argument, two 
misleading but nonetheless most important provisions of the Decree will be discussed. 
The first misleading provision in the Decree is that referring to the Code of Socialist 
Managment of Enterprises. In the present case of EPEOR such reference is absolutely 
irrelevant. The salient feature of the named code, its very raison d'etre, is precisely to 
subject all state enterprises to socialist l a w s / 4 5 )  This does not seem to be the case for 
EPEOR where reference to socialist management has been inserted more for political 
reasons than as a matter of principle. For such a reference is in blatant contradiction to 
the provision of Article III section. 3. 02(a) of the loan ,which seeks purposely to
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distance EPEOR from the state:
The Borrower [ie. the government] shall (i) transfer to 
EPEOR upon the completion of the project, all facilities 
provided under Part A of the project ...and (ii) assign to 
EPEOR the responsibility  for the operations, 
management and maintenance of the facilities transferred 
to EPEOR.
Had the Code of Socialist Managment been applied, as it was in other public 
undertakings, EPEOR would have never acquired such autonomy.
As a consequence of Article II, the state has lost the most important aspect of any 
economic enterprise, which is the right to control and dispose of EPEOR's revenues. 
Before the loan, the money collected from water consumption was aimed primarily at 
generating as much cash to the government's Treasury as possible. With the 
establishment of EPEOR, it became the enterprise's ability to take over the whole water 
industry. This involves water exploration (drilling), collecting bills regularly, 
penalising bad and illegal consumers, making compulsory connections, supervising 
maintenance work, building reservoirs and so on.
Though the money collected belongs to the enterprise it must, however, be spent 
according to the Bank's own conventional directives, which set up spending priorities 
in similar loans/46) The first of such priorities is that the money must service the loan, 
ie. pay back the principal plus interest of the loan to the lender which is the Bank. This 
may sound natural since the prime objective of any banker is to recuperate his monies 
and build his business on the interest that is attached to the loan. The second priority is 
that money collected should be used to finance EPEOR investment programmes, 
without relying on government subsidies. This commitment is part of the general 
policy of the Bank of keeping the government away from the enterprise. The third 
priority is that any money left should be used as a contingency for any unpredictable 
expenses that the enterprise may incur. Here again the purpose is to prevent EPEOR
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from falling under government authority under any pretext. The second misleading 
provision of the Decree creating EPEOR relates to the tariff issue, and should be 
handled carefully. For if the Decree states that it is the government which fixes water 
prices, this is not always correct. What the Decree does not say is that the price issue 
has been raised, discussed and agreed upon conjointly by the Bank and the government 
during the negotiation phase; that is to say, before the loan was formally granted. In 
other words, any final price that the Algerian authorities may have come up with at the 
end is a price which had satisfied the Bank, and on which the government had given its 
accord. So, it is essentially the Bank's tariff, not the government's own d e c i s i o n / 4 7 )  
Accordingly, there too, reference in the Decree to the government as the responsible 
person for the tariffs issue was rather motivated by political considerations than being 
an act of a sovereignty. Mainly that it is government officials who decide on such 
important matters as the price issue.
Furthermore, the influence of the Bank on EPEOR can also be inferred, not from 
particular aspects of the Decree, but from the circumstances which led to the 
promulgation of the Decree. It has been said earlier that EPEOR was created at the 
insistence of the Bank. Since the Bank can approve EPEOR only on some sort of legal 
basis, it follows that the Decree creating EPEOR was also submitted to, and approved, 
by the Bank. In other words, the Bank's satisfaction with EPEOR comes from its 
satisfaction with the Decree creating EPEOR. The Bank's right to examine the 
Institution is not argued here, since such a right is guaranteed by Art. IX, section 9.(1) 
BGC, discussed earlier (infra poge 117). The argument can also be explained the other 
way round, i.e. had the Bank not been satisfied with EPEOR, or more precisely with 
the Decree creating EPEOR, it would have never granted the loan.
Perhaps it is outside the Decree, ie. in the loan agreement that the Bank's 
participation in the creation of EPEOR may be best inferred. Under a series of warning 
clauses which actually protect the Decree, the Bank indirectly admits its involvement by
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acting as a "behind the scene" member in the legislative process. Thus, in Article V, 
section 5. (1) (c) of the loan agreement, the Bank threatens to suspend its funds if:
Decree No 83-340 of May 14, 1983 ...shall have been 
amended, suspended, abrogated, repealed or waived, so 
as to affect materially and adversely the ability of EPEOR 
... to perform any of [its] obligations.
The same warning is given in the subsequent paragraph which unequivocally 
states that the loan may be suspended if:
The borrower or any other authority having jurisdiction, 
shall have taken any action for the dissolution, 
disestablishment of EPEOR (or for the suspension of 
[its] ... operations.
These two clauses demonstrate in a clear manner the Bank's tacit approval of the 
Decree and its commitment to seeing its provisions implemented. For it would be 
inconceivable that the Bank would have surrounded EPEOR with such a protection if it 
were not convinced by its overall structure, and above all its ability to execute the 
project s u c c e s s f u l l y / ^ )  There are other further protective measures in the loan 
agreement to ensure that during the execution of the project, and even after its 
completion, EPEOR shall be immune from governmental influence, whatever form it 
may take. In some instances, the government is specifically called upon to refrain from 
taking actions as those stipulated in Article III, section 3.01 (6) of the loan agreement 
which reads:
The Borrower (III) shall not take or permit to be taken 
any action which would prevent or interfere with 
[EPEOR's] performance.
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The second and equally important area where the Bank's influence is most felt, is 
the rate clause, but seen from a different angle than previously.1
B)- The Rate Covenant.
In the Bank's understanding, the rate clause is "a clause which imposes as a 
condition that the borrower undertakes certain obligations to sell (water / electricity) at a 
certain ra te .(^ ) The issue of rate has been one of the most controversial issues which 
is frequently raised in loan agreements dealing with public utility projects such as water 
electricity, and more recently, telecommunication and transport. Part of the controversy 
is that, in some cases, the making of arrangements for the establishment of rates 
acceptable to the Bank is made into a condition of effectiveness. In other words, unless 
the borrower raises its tariff he will not qualify for the loan. The following example is 
an illustration of a loan where the rate clause is at s ta k e d ^
a) The Case o f A2BZ.<52)
In 1987, the Bank made a loan to {....... }, to finance a telecommunication project.
In its finding, the Bank's mission personnel reported that the borrower's tariff structure 
was particularly defective, and that it needed to be reviewed. It was revealed in the 
report that the connection fee ($ 24. 75) was too low to ration some of the large excess 
d e m a n d .^ )  The service charge ($ 1. 68), while not including telephone maintenance, 
was still low. Call units were charged at ($ 0.37) and local calls were not metered. 
There was no peak/off peak pricing. Numerous miscellaneous charges were too small 
to have any meaningful effect on user behaviour (eg., a $ 1.87 reconnection penalty) 
and generated more administrative costs than revenues. In the Bank's opinion such a 
tariff policy sends the wrong signals to subscribers, which may result in sub-optimal 
utilisation of an already inadequate network. Therefore concluded the Bank's report,
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"A2BZ should carry out, as part of the project, a study of its telephone tariff focussing 
on costs of service..." Then follows the relevant clause:
As a condition of effectiveness, A2BZ should have 
furnished to the Bank a program satisfactory to the Bank 
(including action plans, tariff review and time schedule), 
to improve its overall organization, management and 
operations.
In the Bank's view, the insistence on the rate clause, is to provide sufficient 
revenues for the institution responsible for the project. This would permit the institution 
to operate economically, and to ensure its independence from government subsidised 
support. In several instances, however, where such a rate was unbearable by the 
majority of the people, there was social unrest and political upheavals. Examples in 
this area are abundant and include Tunisia in 1984, Morocco in 1985, Sudan and Egypt 
in 1986. In some cases, governments have simply withdrawn the rate clause and 
accordingly they pulled out from the loan altogether, because they could not afford to 
ask their people to pay such high rates. The Third World complaint about the rates is 
that they are deliberately meant to be high so as to ensure enough revenues for the 
project and to prevent it from failure, so that the borrower can eventually pay the loan 
back to the Bank. This argument is categorically rejected by Broches for whom the rate 
increase recommended by the Bank is for the borrower's benefit. He wrote:
We require [rate covenant] not so much to ensure service 
of the loans as to ensure a healthy financial condition for 
the borrower; and a healthy financial condition may mean 
accumulating sufficient income to be able to finance 
expansion out of its own resources.(54)
Broadly speaking, the Third World leaders do not understand the necessity for the 
Bank to impose on their own people prices calculated in the sumptuous offices of 
Washington, and which do not take into account the socio-economic realities of the
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borrower. They feel that the price policy is a matter of domestic determination, and 
that any interference by the Bank is tantamount to an infringem ent of their 
sovereignty.
c)- Procurement Requirements.
The third area where conditions of effectiveness are common in loan agreements 
to LDCs is p r o c u r e m e n t .^ )  it  was stated earlier that one of the particularities of the 
Bank's contracts was that they linked the loan to the procurement (ie. purchase) of 
goods, from certain member countries known before the loan becomes effective. The 
procurement clause as it stands is not found in the Articles of Agreement. It derives 
from a general principle in the Bank's Statutes which directs the institution to use its 
money with "due diligence" This concept, which is borrowed from the Anglo-Saxon 
tradition, means that the Bank should take all precautions to ensure that its money is 
well spent. Translated into law, this principle gave birth to a set of rules known as 
"Guidelines for Procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" (hereinafter the 
G uidelines).(^7) Explaining the reason for the establishment of the Guidelines a 
former legal adviser in the Bank said:
[W]e have a provision in our Charter that the Bank 
should make arrangements that ensure that the proceeds 
are used only for the purpose for which the loan was 
granted with due attention to consideration of efficiency 
and without regard to political or other non economic 
considerations. Based on that, we have evolved the idea 
of requiring international competitive b id d in g /^ )
Briefly the purpose of the Guidelines is to give all eligible prospective bidders an 
equal opportunity to bid for the necessary goods and works related to the project 
financed by the Bank. What is particularly relevant to this study is that in some cases 
the procurement of goods under the Bank's Guidelines is made a condition of
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effectiveness, as will be seen in the following loan made to M o r o c c o . ( ^ )
a) The Case of ONPT.(60)
The project is an integral but self contained part of ONPT's investment 
programme to be implemented during 1987-1994. It aims at expansion, improvement 
and modernisation of the telecommunication network. The project comprises: (i) 
providing and installing about 290.000 lines, (ii) connection of 300.000 new 
subscriber lines, (iii) long distance transmission systems, (iv) equipment to expand 
domestic and international telex service by about 7000 lines, (v) equipment to upgrade 
and automate services in 89 distant rural districts, (vi) technical support equipment and 
vehicles, (vii) specialised transport, tools data processing and training equipment. The 
relevant clause in the loan agreement states that:
Except as the Bank shall otherwise agree, procurement 
of the goods, works and consultant's services required 
for the project and to be financed out of the proceeds of 
the Loan shall be governed by the provisions of 
Schedule 4 (the Guidelines) of this a g r e e m e n t . ^ ! )
In the Bank's interpretation, this means that the loan will not be awarded, unless 
ONPT follows the Bank's Guidelines on procurement and construction works. The 
reason for the lodging of such a clause in this particular loan is explained by the fact 
that the project is heavily capital intensive, requiring sophisticated and expensive 
equipment produced mostly by the developed world. Schedule 4 section 1 of the loan 
agreement, is even more explicit in its wording:
Goods and works shall be procured under contracts 
awarded in accordance with procedures consistent with 
those set forth in sections I and II of the "Guidelines for 
procurement under IBRD Loans and IDA Credits" 
published by the Bank in May 1985.
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For the purpose of the above mentioned clause, and in order to comply with the 
Bank's Guidelines, the Moroccan government must prepare under the Bank's 
supervision a General Procurement Notice, (GPN), outlining briefly the works and 
goods to be acquired through ICB. The GPN is then published in business reviews of 
world wide diffusion, including the Bank's "International Business Opportunities 
Series" (IBOS), and the UN publication "Development Business", to cite only these 
two major sources.(62) jn terms of law, this procedure has the disadvantage of 
reducing the borrower's participation in the formulation of the contract, while giving 
the Bank the key function.
(i) The Role of the Bank in the Procurement Contract.
In the procurement business, the role of the Bank is rather controversial. Despite 
the Bank's numerous statements that the conclusion of the procurement contract is a 
matter between the borrowing country and the supplier of goods and services, it is a 
fact that the buyer's freedom is severely restricted. Not only is the borrower limited to 
buy from certain countries, but he must also get the Bank's approval on any final deal 
he concludes with a supplying p a r t y . ( 6 3 )
The Bank's officials insist that the role of the Bank is not the conclusion of the 
contract, but the interest of the borrowing buyer. That is to say, to help the borrower to 
obtain the adequate goods and services for the best price for the execution of the 
project. In so doing, the Bank says that it is only fulfilling one of its statutory 
obligations which requires it to use its loans with economic consideration and 
e f f i c i e n c y . (64) No matter how plausible this argument may sound, for the vast 
majority of the LDCs, it is not a convincing argument, since the boundaries between 
not interfering in the conclusion of the contract and deciding over who is going to win 
the contract, the line is fictitious.
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(ii) The Legal Implications of the Procurement Clause.
Since the Guidelines have been incorporated into the loan agreement, it follows 
that they have become an inherent part of the obligatory package, like any other clause 
in the contract. Therefore, non compliance with the ICB clause gives the Bank the right 
to refuse to lend to any borrower who does not comply with the G u i d e l i n e s . (65) 
first implication of such a clause is that, indirectly, the Bank makes its contracts tied to 
the purchase of specific goods from specific countries, some of which are not even 
members of the institution, such as Switzerland and T a i w a n . (66) i n  C. Payer's view, 
there is a complicity between the Bank and the western multinationals which provide 
the goods and services for the Third World borrowing countries. As the author says:
Loans and credits disbursed by the World Bank are for 
most part project-tied, which means the money is paid 
directly to the corporation that wins contracts for 
constructing or supplying projects financed by the 
Bank...This is a multibillion Dollar market.(67)
Although the Bank tries to minimise the importance of such allegations, the 
arguments so far advanced are not convincing and the question whether the Bank's 
loans are untied remains, as far as LDCs are concerned, still unanswered. The second 
implication of the procurement clause, is that it makes the LDC borrowers a big 
shopping forum for the DCs goods and services. In this context,the World Bank is 
regarded by most of its critics as a bridge across which the money lent earlier from the 
DCs is being re-injected in the economies of these same countries, perhaps with better 
and larger long term profits.
The third implication, which is a logical continuation of the second, is the feeling 
amongst the LDCs that by forcing them to buy foreign goods, the Bank is implicitly 
discouraging the development of Third World infant industries. To justify its stand, the
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Bank argues that:
There has been a feeling that by insisting on international 
competitive bidding, we do a disservice to the borrower 
in special cases. On the other hand, we have to take into 
account that the providers of our capital are very 
interested and we have to strike a balance between the 
interest of exporters of equipment and goods and 
recipients of l o a n s . ( 6 8 )
This statement confirms the view described earlier, namely that the procurement 
contracts are no more no less than a Bank reward for the DCs financial contribution in 
the institution's capital. They also see the Bank's action in a much wider context, as an 
instrument to maintain the industrial dependency of the South on the North. It was not 
until the late sixties that, the Bank under the pressure of some Third World "advanced" 
countries, such as Brazil, Mexico and India, responded by allowing a certain margin to 
the LDC goods (7%), and civil work ( 15%).(69) The figures have not been changed 
since, despite the capability of some LDCs to participate in the procurement operations 
on a much larger scale than those imposed by the Bank.
I ll-  Conditionality.
Amongst the different conditions that the Bank imposes on its borrowers, 
conditionality is undoubtedly the most stringent set of measures that is most feared by 
the Third World b o r r o w e r s . ( ^ )  Generally speaking, conditionality requirements are 
found in the grey reports which summarise the different stages of the negotiations 
leading to the conclusion of contracts. Since these reports are confidential, it is not 
always easy for an outsider to evaluate the degree of conditionality that accompany 
such agreem ents.(^) Therefore, one possible and feasible approach to evaluate the 
Bank conditionality programmes may be to look at current policies of certain LDCs that 
have been receiving Bank assistance for the past decade. However,since Bank funds
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have been made available to a large number of LDCs, no attempt will be made in this 
section to select any particular country except to cite examples when appropriate. The 
purpose here is rather to try to trace the origin and nature of the concept of 
conditionality; to examine its application in the context of the World Bank; and to 
evaluate its legal and social impact on Third World borrowers.
A-Origins, Meaning and Scope.
There is no single definition of the concept of conditionality.^-) For Mason et 
al, for instance, conditionality is synonymous with leverage, which they define as:
The existence and degree of influence exercised by a 
lender on the behaviour of a borrower.(73)
This definition is incomplete in the sense that it does not limit the scope of 
influence of the lender. In other words, Mason et al do not specify the sphere of 
influence of the lender ie. whether the Bank's influence is limited to the loan, or 
whether it extends beyond the loan.(^4) This lacuna seems to have been filled by T. 
Hayter's definition which is probably nearest to reality:
By conditionality..., is meant the Bank's ability through 
offer of rewards or threat of withholding benefits to 
induce action on the part of a state concerning economic 
policies and institutional reforms not related to the 
particular p r o j e c t . ( 7 5 )
This definition can, to a large extent, be verified from the study of recent cases, 
where it appears that the World Bank is no longer satisfied with the traditional measures 
it has customarily imposed on its borrowers. These latter are not asked to limit 
themselves to implement conditions surrounding the loan project only, but are also 
required to intervene in several other areas. This is what economists in the Bank call
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policy based l e n d i n g . ^ )
From the Bank's point of view, conditionality is regarded as a safeguard that 
borrowers will eventually repay their debts. One method for the Bank to ensure being 
repaid is to get directly involved in the economic process of the borrowing countries. 
But this formula does not always fit in with the borrower's aspirations and objectives 
which he intends to achieve when he applies for the loan. Hence the dilemma for the 
developing countries: on the one hand, they know that they must get the money which 
they need for their economic development; on the other hand, they realise that they 
cannot get the money unless they bow to external pressure and behave in a manner not 
always chosen by them .(^)
On the origins of the word conditionality, there is also the same state of 
confusion .(^) So far, there is no general consensus between writers as to the origins 
of the term conditionality. For some authors such as Frances Stewart and Paul Mosley, 
"Conditionality is probably as old as loans to governments."(79) The authors base 
their arguments on the missions sent to Latin America in the 1920's by Montague and 
others, which already required a certain financial orthodoxy from the countries which 
were asking for credit.
In modern international financial relations, the same pattern of conduct may be 
found. Any creditor, be it private or public may, for "safety reasons", impose certain 
measures, often referred to, in the case of the Bank or official (ie. governmental) 
assistance, as a conditionality p a c k a g e . ( ^ )  The difference with the past however, is 
that the lender is more involved in the borrower's internal economic affairs. The degree 
of involvement is sometimes disproportionate to the value of the loan in terms of 
economic interference and political cost for the borrower. The conditionality packages, 
as it will be seen later, vary in degree and nature from one borrower to another. From 
the cases studied, it appears, paradoxically, that the poorer the country, the harder is 
conditionality. The concept of conditionality, thus understood, covers a much wider
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area and implies, inter-cilia, a direct intrusion of the creditor in almost every aspect of 
the debtor's economy. It is generally agreed that its use in modern times is closely 
associated with IMF operations. It is therefore essential to look, albeit briefly, into the 
Fund's practice, before considering in more detail the Bank's attitude.
a)- IMF Conditionality.
The international Monetary Fund was established at the close of World War II, 
along with the Bank, though for a different purpose. Rather than finance specific 
development projects and reconstruction, the purpose of the Fund is to assist member 
countries, developed and less developed, to finance temporary balance of payment 
problems and foreign exchange shortages.^1) Fund Officials argue that this can be 
done in two ways. First, by providing money and, secondly, by making its provisions 
conditional on governments carrying out programmes which will improve their balance 
of payments situation. Initially, the Fund's Statutes did not provide for arrangements 
to tie borrowers with specific conditions.^-) According to C Payer, the need for 
conditionality appeared as late as 1950 under the US influence, then the sole creditor of 
Fund resources.(^) The American view was that the IMF should not, as its Articles 
state, merely provide more or less automatic access to its resources to help members to 
deal with balance of payment difficulties. For the Americans, the Fund should 
exercise, in parallel, some kind of control and security over all drawings and should 
have discretion to promote what it considered "appropriate domestic policies in 
member co u n trie s"^ ) The industrialised governments which were the biggest Fund 
users at that time did not subscribe to the idea of having to bend their knees to U.S. 
interference in the management of their economies. But as F. Stewart reported, the 
attitude of the same Europeans changed completely when the less developed countries 
became the chief b o r r o w e r s . (86) However, it was not until 1960 that the word
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conditionality appeared for the first time following an amendment of the Fund's Articles 
of A g r e e m e n t . (86) T h u s  Article III refers to conditionality as:
the policies the Fund expect a member to follow in order 
to be able to use the general resources.
From the legal point of view, the aim behind the use of conditionality on potential 
borrowers was seen largely in terms of the need to ensure prompt repayment of 
drawings so as to safeguard "the revolving character of the Fund"; a technique which 
means, in the Fund's jargon, reviewing the Fund's finance in a short time. (87) it has 
constantly been maintained that the Fund is entirely concerned with providing financial 
support for packages of policy reforms. In this respect, the role of the Fund is to 
commit, and make available, its resources purely and simply against the willingness of 
a government to formulate and subsequently to implement, within a period of time, the 
agreed programme. As Gold wrote:
The word [conditionality] is applied to the practice 
according to which under most policies,the Fund makes 
its resources available only if it receives satisfactory 
assurances from a member that it will follow policies 
likely to solve its balance of payments problems within a 
tem porary period and enable it to terminate its 
outstanding use of the Fund's resources not later than a 
prescribed date (88)
But, as LDCs engaged in the Fund's programmes soon came to realise, quite 
often the "stringency of conditionality has sometimes seemed disproportionate to the 
need to safeguard the repayment of Fund credit."(89) The stumbling point is that the 
Articles did not give any express guidance as to what policy the Fund should encourage 
its members to follow under its policies of conditionality. There is, thus, no absolute 
standard of conditionality. However, it appears from the current practice that some of
1 41
the conditions frequently incorporated into IMF loans to LDCs include:
Changes in public investment programmes.
Reform of Public enterprises (autonomy, privatisation).
Raising interest rates.
Reduction/elimination of consumer price subsidies.
Wage and salary control.
Improved management of external debt.
Devaluation of local currency.
Liberalising imports.
Encouraging exports.
Whilst no single loan contains all the foregoing conditions the list, nonetheless, is 
representative of the policies the IMF regularly imposes upon LDC b o r r o w e r s . ^ )  
This relentless insistence on such conditions has given the Fund an odious image in the 
vast majority of Third World countries. For, in most countries where Fund medicine 
was prescribed, no country was able to swallow it properly.(^1) "Certainly", wrote 
Robert S. Brown,
no government leader is going to take the medicine, no 
matter how miraculous it may be, if it believes that the 
likely result will be the overthrow of his regime.(92)
B- The Basis of the Bank's Conditionality.
Although the Bank has always been influenced, and to some extent attracted, by 
IMF conditionality, this influence is not the only decisive factor which is at the origin of 
the institution's decision to adopt a similar concept in its lending operations.(^) There 
are other totally different reasons which go back to the early 1970's. During that 
period, LDC. governments had been able to avoid going to the Bank because they 
could get almost unlimited and, more importantly, unconditional loans from western
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commercial banks which were then busy in recycling OPEC p e t r o d o l l a r s . Wrote 
Williamson:
With that money going around, the vast majority of 
LDCs carried out expansionist policies which the IMF 
and the Bank could not have agreed to . ( 9 5 )
By the end of the seventies, the newly private lending system established 
previously became uncontrollable and eventually collapsed. The world economy 
entered its second deep recession of the d ecade .(^ ) The consequences on Third 
World economies were disastrous: heavy debts and less funds, from either private or 
public resources, were available. It was eventually to the World Bank that most of the 
LDCs turned for a s s i s t a n c e . ^ 7 )  From the Bank's side, the situation was not enviable 
either.
Faced with a private source of funds lending in total disarray and a huge demand 
from the developing countries, it became clear that the World Bank had to take special 
measures to deal with the situation. It was in the circumstances of these global 
economic conditions that the Bank introduced in 1980, a new lending instrument called 
the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL).^ 8 )  j h e most striking novelty in SAL is that 
many observers associate its content with IMF conditionality .^^  To understand the 
concept of conditionality it is, therefore, essential to look briefly at this new type of 
lending arrangement, before assessing its impact on Third World borrowing countries.
a)- Structural Adjustment Lending.
SAL was unveiled for the first time at the Annual Meeting of the Bank and the 
Fund in Belgrade, in September 1979; and the first SAL was made to Turkey in June of 
the following y e a r .^ ^ )  The Bank Operational Manual defines SAL as:
Non project lending to support programs of policy and 
institutional change necessary to modify the structure of
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an economy so that it can maintain both its growth rate 
and the viability of its balance of payments in the 
medium term.(lOl)
SAL is thus supposed to respond to the economic crisis of the Third World 
countries, brought about by maintaining high levels of external debts combined with 
international recession, which together have a negative effect on their balance of 
payments and, at the same time hinder their economic d e v e l o p m e n t . ^ ^ )  p rom the 
above Bank's own definition, it appears that SAL is:
• A non-project lending, that is to say a loan to finance a programmne of policy 
rather than a traditional specific project. The immediate consequence is a change in the 
lending policy of the Bank. Thus, instead of requesting a loan for a specific project, 
the borrower is required to formulate and present a programme of economic reforms, 
which encompasses a particular sector(s), or the entire economy. For example, a $ 300 
million SAL made to Algeria in 1990 was described by the Bank Annual report as:
A non-project loan to support the ongoing reform 
program, designated to turn the economy from a 
centrally planned system to one that is more decentralized
and market-oriented.003)
From this description, it appears that the Bank has indeed moved a long way from 
the traditional approach, under which the Bank used to refuse to lend if the loan were 
not tied to a specific purpose. What is more interesting in the SAL is the areas which it 
covers. In this context, the SAL made to Algeria is quite significant:
Constraints will be addressed in macro-economic 
management, the incentive structure, the financial and 
productive sector and the environmental, population and 
social sectors.(104)
Most critics see this new form of lending as a sharp departure by the Bank from
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its original purpose, and argue that the Bank is deviating from its initial Statutes which 
instruct it to lend only for specific p r o j e c t s .  (^ 5 )
• The second feature of SAL is that its purpose is to modify the structure of an 
economy, namely its growth rate and balance of payments viability. This is a totally 
new function for the Bank which is neither envisaged by the Articles of Agreement nor 
is derived from any past practice or Board decision or executive interpretation. 
Moreover, such a function falls traditionally within the strict competency of the Fund. 
This has prompted an avalanche of criticism of both the Fund and the Bank. The latter 
being accused of unconstitutionally interfering in the business of the former.
• The third feature of the Bank's SAL, is that SALs are never disbursed totally at 
the outset, but always in two tranches; the second tranche being conditional on the 
completion of the objectives agreed upon by the Bank and the borrowers, as stated in 
the letter of intent which is usually annexed to the loan agreement. However, 
borrowers quite often consume the funds before the completion of the objectives agreed 
upon with the Bank. This is what happened to Yugoslavia in 1983, when the Bank 
refused to disburse the second structural adjustment tranche until the government 
complied fully with its previous com m itm ents.^^) The specific measures the Bank 
demanded included:
The introduction of positive real interest rates.
Relaxation of price control.
A more liberal import policy.
• The fourth feature of SAL, is the time limit imposed on borrowers which is 
relatively short as it varies between three and five years, (compared with a traditional 
loan where the time limit is between fifteen and thirty years). This is another stumbling 
block, as most LDC governments are generally hostile to deadlines, because they do 
not leave them enough room for manoeuvre in implementing their reforms. Thus, in 
the previous Y ugoslavian loan, the government agreed to implement the remaining
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conditions referred to earlier; but not immediately. Government negotiators emphasised 
that any such measures should be implemented only gradually in order to minimise
social and political t e n s i o n s / 107)
Originally planned to be exceptions, the Bank's SALs are increasingly becoming 
the rule in the institution's lending policy. This is implicitly recognised by the Bank's 
officials in various statements where it justifies its shift in policy lending by the scarcity 
of the resources in the financial market:
Because of the decline since 1982 in resources available 
for investment...,the number of traditional projects that 
are suitable for external financing has declined. In 
addition, the need for quick disbursing loans has 
increased, the bank therefore has increased considerably 
its commitments for adjustment l e n d i n g / 108)
The real problems for the the LDCs start however, when it comes to putting SALs 
into e f f e c t / 109) ^ e vast maj 0nty of them discovered, SAL implementation is not
an easy process and quite often it involves painful decision making on the part of the 
borrower. This in turn requires a strong political commitment, courage, and, as it will 
be seen later, social risk taking.
The common practice in SAL implementation is for the borrower to spell out in 
detail in a letter of intention, which is explicitly referred to in the loan agreement, a 
precise set of measures to be taken over a given period of time. (See infra Annexe I)
However, in most cases, such commitments fall into desuetude because of the 
Bank's conditionality that accompany these loans. Examples of disillusioned 
governments are numerous and, quite often, conditionality is at the centre of frictions 
between the Bank and the borrow er/110) According to a highly placed Bank Official 
(who wished to be unnamed), a SAL discussed and negotiated with the Senegalese 
authorities was cancelled at the last minute, because of the Senegalese government's
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failure to agree on a particular point of the whole loan. In other cases, governments 
start effectively implementing a SAL but never finish them. In the opinion of the same 
Bank Official, in nearly all the Bank's SALs half of the second loan disbursement has 
been delayed for an average period of six months. The explanation given is that these 
delays reflect disputes between the Bank and the government as to whether agreements 
agreed upon previously have been fulfilled. According to the unnamed Official, some 
governments simply did not want to request the release of the second tranche as 
originally scheduled. This meant that conditions were not met, and that governments 
were reluctant to press for their implementation. In many instances, a member country 
has broken off relations with the Bank on the grounds that the requests or demands of 
the Bank amounted to an infringement of its sovereignty; and on other occasions, the 
Bank has taken the initiative and stopped the loan on the ground that its advice was 
being ignored/ H I)
For the LDC governments, there is no doubt that the SAL represents a sharp 
departure from lending for traditional projects such as infrastructure, agriculture or 
power plant. The reality underlying such a change in policy is that SAL provides the 
Bank with a sharper tool to penetrate the borrowers economy than the specific project 
method does
Indeed heightened concern about the policy framework 
can and does substantially affect the context and focus of 
project lending operations . Bank's structural adjustment 
lending enables the Bank to address basic issues of 
economic arrangement more directly and more urgently 
then befo re /H -)
The sudden shift towards balance of payments difficultes means for most LDCs 
more pain and less money. Unlike project lending, conditions attached to a SAL are 
extremely hard for LDCs borrowers because they encompass almost every aspect of 
their economy, in addition to the short term lending period which adds an extra burden
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to them. Moreover, the continued pressure exercised by the Bank on its borrowers 
through SALs made the Bank move even closer to its sister, the Fund, in term of 
cooperation on policy based lending. Ironically, just as growing discontent and real 
doubts have been raised by many LDCs as to the continued existence of IMF 
conditionality, the Bank has moved in exactly the same direction in its recent lending 
policy of SAL. In fact, such a collaboration existed in the past, but became more 
accentuated in recent years, with the emergence of SALs, as will be seen below.
b)- Bank-Fund Collaboration.
Historically, the principle of collaboration between the Bank and the Fund has 
never been challenged. For, since their inception, the two institutions have been 
working closely through various established m e a n s /H 3 ) ^ t  basjs Gf such 
collaboration are the Articles of Agreement of each institution which call on them to 
work closely -not just between themselves- but with any UN international 
o r g a n i s a t i o n / H 4 ) j^ is  collaboration was expressly reinforced in a 1966 dual 
memorandum which confirmed "the necessity for close and continuous contact between 
the two staffs at all levels.'/ H5) However, it was in the area of responsibility that the 
emphasis on close collaboration was more pronounced. Two relevant paragraphs from 
the 1966 memorandum illustrate the scope of such collaboration. Adressing the Bank, 
the first paragraph of the memorandum reads:
As between the two institutions, the Bank is recognized 
as having primary responsibility for the composition and 
appropriateness of development programs and project 
evaluation, including development priority on those 
matters..., the field missions of the Fund should inform 
themselves of the established views and positions of the 
Bank and adopt those views as a working basis for their 
own work.O 16)
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In almost identical language, the second paragraph of the memorandum reads:
As between the two institutions, the Fund is recognized 
as having primary responsibility for exchange rates and 
restrictive systems for adjustment of temporary balance 
of payments desiquilibria. ...On these matters, the field 
mission of the Bank should inform themselves of the 
established views and positions of the Fund and adopt 
those views as a working basis for their own w o r k / 1  H )
In 1966, at the time this memorandum was issued, the subject of debate was to 
coordinate the work of the two institutions, while keeping each in its own field, in 
order to achieve a better result. This close cooperation was summed up neatly by J. 
Gold in one word: synergism; that is to say:
Cooperative action by discrete agencies such as the total 
effect is greater than the sum of the two effects taken 
independently/118)
Recent case studies show that some of the policies which the Bank actually 
recommends to its borrowers, fall within IMF competence, with the result of an 
overlapping in role and function between the two institutions. Such an overlap does 
not seem to worry the Bank's leadership for which:
As soon as the IMF enters the realm of supply side 
policies, it is inevitably treading on the "development" 
turf of the World Bank. Similarly, as the World Bank 
began its program of "structural adjustment lending", its 
activities began to overlap with those of the IM F /1 19)
In some cases, the Bank is no more no less than applying SAL conditionality to a 
specific project. This means that a country requesting Bank assistance in, for example, 
the construction of a cement plant, is likely to find itself modifying its tax laws, 
increasing public transport fares, reforming its educational system, devaluing its
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currency, and cutting subsidies in staple food. In other words, taking action in areas 
and sectors of the economy which have no direct link with the purpose of the loan for 
which finance has been requested. For J. Williamson, there is no difference between 
the Bank's SALs and IMF stabilisation programmes; they are both complementary and 
mutually enforceable:
Both institutions now provide funds that are available to 
finance a broad range of imports and both impose 
conditionality that requires the development of action 
programmes focussed on policy and management 
issu es /120)
Thus, when the IMF imposes price incentives, it is in fact pointing to the 
redirection of resources towards the private sector, an area of particular interest for the 
Bank. Again when the Fund presses governments to reduce subsidies, it is partly 
preparing the ground for the Bank's privatisation programme. Conversely, when the 
Bank requires from the borrowers tariff increases in water or electricity, it is, in fact, 
indirectly helping fight inflation. What is more disturbing is that as a result of this so 
called modem collaboration between the two institutions, countries securing a Bank's 
SAL were also required to negotiate a stabilisation programme with the IM F.H21) 
This means that before a borrower is granted a loan for a particular project, he must 
undertake a preliminary SAL. In practice, the combination of an IMF programme and a 
Bank SAL has not been an easy task. Since most borrowers had, in the past, 
enormous difficulties in reaching a satisfactory agreement with each institution, how 
could it be possible to ask them now to satisfy both institutions simultaneously ? The 
results reached so far are mixed. In Turkey, for example, the Bank imposed a series of 
SALs during 1980-84 before agreeing to finance a traditional project in agriculture in 
1985.(122) An example where such a difficult loan combination did not work is the 
Tanzanian experience. In 1983, Tanzania was negotiating an IMF agreement and at the
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same a Bank loan. After lengthy negotiations, the Tanzanian government succeeded in 
getting an agreement with the IMF, but had not been able to reach an agreement with 
the B a n k .( ^ )  The reason for such a "linkage" between the Bank's traditional specific 
project method and its new SAL's policy based lending is explained by a Bank official, 
in the following terms:
It is likely that given the current deterioration of the 
worlds economic situation, the scarcity of resources and 
the debt crisis that the World Bank will shift from project 
lending to SAL, or ask for SAL to get lending. This is 
the situation now, and there is a tendency that the World 
Bank is trying to secure anywhere a SAL before 
negotiating a traditional project l e n d i n g / 124)
In other cases, the Bank requires a SAL before agreeing to lend for a project. In 
so doing, as senior officials in the Bank believe, SAL has the merit of cleaning up the 
countries economic mess, and preparing the ground for the implementation of project 
lending.(125) in the Bank's thinking, it would be absurd to run an economy on a 
sectoral basis, ie. providing project lending solely. As J. Williamson put it:
The Bank has come to the conclusion that there is no 
reason to think that a sector of activity can be completely 
reorganised, if the macro-economic context remains in a 
profound state of imbalance/ 126)
I
! Such a curious "liaison" prompted some authors to call the Bank, the Fund and 
vice v e r s a / *27) Others like Van Meerhaegh have simply called for a merger of the two 
institutions. For the author noted:
Close cooperation with the Fund is imperative... In fact, 
a merger of Fund and Bank would seem to be the best 
solution, since the same work is often done in both 
i agencies. (128)
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Bank officials tend to insist that joint intervention of the Fund and the Bank is 
possible only with the consent of the borrowing country. In practice, however, both 
institutions have been implicitly forcing their customers to be bound by each of the 
o ther in stitu tion 's  policy (This is what econom ists call exercising cross 
c o n d i t i o n a l i t y ) / 129) jn t^e Philippines, for instance, the Marcos regime obtained a 
SAL only after the IMF approved two loans totalling $ 654 m illio n s /1^0) The 
conjunction of the three loans was commented on in a US Treasury Department Report 
in the following terms:
Thus, structural adjustment loans are usually approved 
only when the borrower has negotiated an extended 
Fund Facility Agreement with the Fund, a factor which 
is producing increasingly close Bank/Fund collaboration.
Without the added weight and broader focus achieved 
through collaboration..., the Bank's leverage over 
macro-level policy is lim ited/121)
From an economist's point of view, the Bank-Fund collaboration cannot be 
refuted. It may be indeed an initiative which should be encouraged, if there are good 
reasons to believe that it will yield satisfactory results. What is arguable, however, is 
that economists use such an argument to justify the imposition of a conditionality 
package by both institutions. If the logic of economics dictates that sound development 
cannot be achieved except by a combination of macro and micro economic policies, 
from the legal point of view there is no obligation for the two institutions to impose 
necessarily similar packages of conditions on borrowers.
Moreover, there is no legal obligation whatsoever in the Articles of Agreement of 
the two institutions, nor in the interpretation of their respective Executive Boards, that a 
Bank loan is a precondition for an IMF agreement or vice versa. This is even 
recognised by one of the most eminent senior officers of the two institutions, Sir J. 
Gold, as he wrote:
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A stabilisation program supported by the Fund is not a 
legal condition of a SAL by the Bank. Nor is it necessary 
that a member must qualify for assistance under the 
Bank's criteria before the Fund will make its resources
a v a i l a b l e / 1 2 2 )
Thus, if the conditionality packages that accompany SAL are not foreseen by the 
Articles of Agreement of the Bank, it may be only legitimate to raise the relevant 
question as to whether conditionality is a legal concept.
C)- The Legal Nature of Conditionality.
One issue frequently discussed is whether conditionality as applied by the Bank 
(or the Fund), is appropriate (ie. lawful). As Gold pointed out, "the desirability of a 
concept of conditionality is not usually accepted and the legal necessity for it has been 
constantly q u e s t i o n e d . ' / 123) pr0m the legal point of view, this remark presupposes an 
identification of the nature of the term conditionality, ie. whether conditionality is a 
legal term or has any legal connotation. J. Gold does not think so:
The word conditionality, although attached to what is 
regarded as a fundamental and distinctive aspect of the 
Fund's activities, is not a legal term of a r t /124)
In the Fund, the issue of the legality of conditionality was resolved in the late 
1950's. As discussed earlier, it was under US pressure that Fund officials were urged 
to observe a policy of conditionality. At that time, the Americans argued that the 
necessity for such a concept was implicit in the Fund's Articles. As Gold reported:
When the US urged the Fund to observe a policy of 
conditionality, [they] argued that the necessity for 
co n d itio n a lity  was implicit in the A rticles of
Agreement/125)
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In the context of the Bank, the evolution of the concept of conditionality and its 
recognition as a statutory requirement, is less clear and poses some difficulties in 
tracing it. In the first place, there is nothing convincing in the history of the institution 
which suggests imposing conditionality packages on borrowers. As noted earlier, one 
of the cardinal rules governing access to the Bank's resources, is that such assistance 
must be used efficiently and that the loan must be repaid within a limited period of time. 
The wide interpretation that was subsequently attached to these provisions enabled the 
Bank to develop a set of constraints known as leverage, which the institution exercised 
on its borrowers. As Mason et al explained:
The Bank is predominantly a project lender and the 
leverage it has used has taken the form mainly of 
conditions attached to particular projects or of threats or 
promises either to withhold or to grant project loans or to 
reduce or raise the level of such l e n d i n g / 126)
Leverage in this sense is synonymous with conditions but not conditionality, even 
if some authors see no difference between the two c o n c e p t s / 127) follows from 
Mason et al's statement that leverage was confined only to conditions which were 
directly attached to the loan and which would influence in one way or another the life of 
a specific project. In other words, there is a link between the conditions imposed, and 
the materialisation of a particular project. In that respect, the scope of leverage was 
limited. In 1971, for example, when Jamaica wanted to expand a previous forestry 
loan, the Bank report stated that Jamaican income tax law and regulations did not 
provide incentives for investment in forestry. Therefore, if the government wanted a 
loan extension, it must seriously think of a new investment law in forestry /*28)
Another distinctive feature of leverage is its relative application. A brief survey of 
a few loan agreements shows that the Bank's leverage is strong and persistent 
whenever projects financed are of great importance to the power (western states)
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controlling the Bank such as an open door policy to multinationals. However, leverage 
is weak or even non existent on economically and financially less important projects, 
such as environment or consumer rights projects. It appears, therefore, from the above 
examination that leverage is not, and cannot be, associated with conditionality because, 
unlike leverage, conditionality implies a much wider field of application. As already 
discussed, conditionality focuses primarily on policy and institutional reforms that 
cover the whole structure of the borrower's economy.
If the concept of conditionality has been to some extent justified economically, 
from the legal point of view, its foundation remains unclear. To fill this lacuna, 
officials in the Bank tend to insert SAL and its corollary, the conditionality packages, 
under the broad, and somewhat vague provisions of Article III sec.4{vii). This Article 
refers to the Bank's ability to provide non project lending "in special circumstances". 
However, what special circumstances are, have never been clearly defined by the 
Bank's Executive Board, whose tasks include interpretation of the institution's 
A r t i c l e s / 129) j t seems that it is this exception that the Bank has exploited to give SAL, 
and accordingly conditionality, a legal recognition. As a former Bank economist 
Stanley Please wrote:
It was these special circumstances which the Bank's 
Articles of Agreement required, if non project lending in 
the form of SAL operations was to be legally
ju stified /140)
However this is not the first time the Bank has used this open window to justify 
some of its activities which are not specifically called for by its Statutes. It has been 
formally acknowledged by the Bank's Officials that, in addition to SAL, non project 
lending has been so far used in at least three types of loans where special circumstances 
were invoked:
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• A need for the reconstruction or rehabilitation of an economy after a natural 
disaster (earthquakes, flood, famine), where urgent transfer of resources were 
needed to restore normal development activities.
• The need to import supplies or equipment so that existing production capacity 
can be used more fully.
• In cases of a sudden fall in export earnings in an economy that is critically 
dependent on a single item of export.
Since the Bank's Statutes did not delimit cases of "special circumstances", it 
remains difficult to question the legal nature of both SAL and conditionality. As long 
as such a clause remains open, the Bank can, at any time, introduce changes in its 
lending policy without being accused of acting outside its legal prerogatives.
In the meantime, even if it were accepted that Bank (or Fund) conditionality has 
emerged from statutory interpretation, this is still a weak argument to most LDCs, 
which think unanimously that "conditionality has gone well beyond even what was 
implied in the Articles of both i n s t i t u t i o n s . ' / ^ 1 )  The scale of criticism from LDCs that 
followed the implementation of the first SALs, denote to a large extent their discontent 
and sometimes their rejection of the Bank's conditionality.
a)- Criticism of the Concept of Conditionality
There is considerable hostility amongst LDCs to the use of SALs by the Bank as 
most of them find the Bank's analysis inadequate and the imposition of a conditionality 
package untenable/ ^ 2 )  One decisive factor that contributed to worsen the Bank's 
image, was undoubtedly its close collaboration with the Fund which is well known by 
the LDCs for its severity due precisely to its conditionality requirement. Major 
opposition to the Bank's conditionality may be also explained in large part by LDC 
leaders who tend to give such a conditionality a political colour. That is to say, that
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they associate a request for a SAL as an invitation to trade their s o v e r e i g n t y / 143) 
many LDC leaders, the conditionality requirements imposed on them by the Bank are 
(i) legally unfounded, (ii) economically inefficient and (iii) socially mistargeted.
(i) Legal Criticism of Conditionality.
There is a common agreement between writers that conditionality has never been 
an intrinsic feature of either the Bank or the Fund in their early lending o p e r a t i o n s / *44) 
The absence of well-defined rules on conditionality led many pro-conditionality authors 
to use different subterfuges to legitimise the Bank's and Fund's actions. On the one 
hand, the concept of conditionality, has never ben codified in the Bank's Statutes. On 
the other hand, the use of Article III sec. 4<vii) referring to special circumstances cannot 
on its own justify the use of conditionality. The Bank needs a more convincing legal 
argument to persuade the LDCs for the necessity of such a concept.
But this legal recognition in itself is regarded by many authors as unsatisfactory, 
because it is extremely vague. Conditionality thus conceived was ambiguous and 
conceptually ill defined. As a result, the Fund's conditionality was looked upon by 
some critics as a loose concept, a sort of "mixed-bag" where anything could be 
l e g i t i m i s e d / 1 4 5 )  This lacuna was remarked upon by J .  Gold as he wrote on the Fund:
The content of conditionality has never been defined by 
the Articles or codified beyond a few broad principles by 
decisions of the Fund. The absence of a detached code, 
has enabled the Fund to develop and m odify 
conditionality so as to accord with changes in the world 
economy and the special circumstances of individual 
members or classes of m e m b e rs /^ )
In the same line of thought, Williamson admits that conditionality, has no legal 
basis per se, but what the Fund or the Bank does, is to achieve the purpose set forth in 
their respective Articles of Agreement. For the author, as long as conditionality is not
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in contradiction with the purposes of both institutions, it is not illegal, according to the 
old saying "what is not forbidden, is permissible" He wrote:
Conditionality arises when the Fund (or the Bank) adds 
requirements for access to its resources that are legally 
compatible with the Articles of Agreements but are not 
called for by the Articles. (147)
From the legal point of view, Gold's and W illiam son's analyses are 
unconvincing. Their explanation to justify conditionality is simplistic in comparison 
with the effect which the conditionality package inflicts upon its borrowers as will be 
seen shortly.
(ii) The Economic Inefficiency of Conditionality .
Although it may be not possible in the context of this thesis to attempt a full 
economic evaluation of the conditionality concept, It may be said that the introduction 
of a conditionality package as a mean to improve the economic development of the 
LDCs, has not been a success/148) There are external signs which indicate that SALs 
and the conditionality packages they carry have not met so far, either the Bank's or the 
borrower's expectations. There is in the first place, a large and constantly expanding 
anti-conditionality literature by economists such as J Spraos, for whom:
Conditionality as practiced is conceptually flawed at its 
core. By targeting policy instruments such as the 
volume of credit and the public sector deficit, instead of 
genuine policy targets, conditionality reverses the natural 
priorities and leads to i n e f f i c i e n c i e s / 149)
The second, and probably the best, argument to support this statement, is the 
insignificant number of SALs granted annually by the Bank. From the Adjustment 
loans surveyed during 1980-1990, not many countries were enthusiastic about SALs.
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The number of SALs granted during that decade is not stable. In some years
(e.g. 1983), it has even decreased sharply. Furthermore there is no established
evidence that those countries which have implemented the Bank's conditionality
package have succeeded in their economic development. Despite the setting up of an
independent Operation Evaluation Department (OED), there is no clear data available to
confirm, or refute SALs' s u c c e s s .^ ^
Finally, there are cases where the Bank recognised the difficulties in
implementing the SALs conditionality packages, implicitly thus, admitting its own
failure:
In the early years, little attention was given to the 
possible adverse impact of adjustment programs on the 
poor. This was to a large extent justified by the 
expectation that adjustment programs could facilitate 
growth, and in the process reduce poverty. With the 
passing of time, however, it became evident that the 
economic problems were more severe then expected, that 
adjustment was slower than anticipated, and that many 
countries..., were experiencing prolonged periods of 
economic stagnation and deteriorating social conditions 
for some g r o u p s . O ^ l )
Perhaps more relevant to the economic failure of SALs is the creation of a new 
facility fund within the Bank called Social Dimension A d justm en t.(S D A )^^ The aim 
of SDA is to assist countries undergoing a SAL to alleviate the social effects brought 
upon them by the adjustment. For, it is in the social area that SAL effects are the most 
felt by the LDCs.
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(iii) The Social Effects of Conditionality.
Third World criticism becomes more accentuated when it comes to evaluating the 
social effects or dimensions of the Bank's conditionality programme^ 153)
question often asked about SAL is what social impact do the reforms carried through 
SALs, have on the borrowing countries? A major criticism in this regard is the Bank's
overemphasis on policy reforms, while paying inadequate attention to the social
repercussions on the masses. This is how the Prime Minister of Jamaica described a 
SAL at an IBRD/IMF meeting. He said:
It is as if prevailing wisdom dictates that since there is no 
path of painless change, it matters not how painful the 
process may be. But it does matter. We do not adjust 
economic systems, we adjust the lives of our people who 
make these systems work. It is short-sighted, in the least 
to ignore the human element.(154)
The problem is so acute, that the social cost of SAL is becoming part of the 
agenda of many regional as well as international organisations, including the Bank 
itself. As Ismail Serageldin, the head of the IBRD's Eastern and Central Africa 
Department confessed:
The Bank is increasingly aware of the social costs of 
adjustment and the need to make them bearable... The 
situation has got worst, in spite of twenty five years of 
cooperation^ 1^5)
In the mean time, Third World leaders have come to realise that wherever the 
Bank's SAL and/or Fund's programmes have been implemented, the results were often 
the opposite of those promised to them. Says an ILO report:
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Each month during the first half of the present decade, 
close to one million persons across the world have been 
pushed below the poverty line as a result of measures 
aimed at fighting inflation, recession and the debt 
crisis. (156)
In spite of numerous analytical complexities, the available data indicate that the 
poor are extremely vulnerable during periods of adjustment. Rising unemployment is 
one facet of the general deterioration of the living standards of Third Word populations 
since the beginning of the 1980's. In Sudan for example, the adoption of a Bank's 
SAL led within a few days to the lay off of some 9000 employees of the National 
Railways companies.(1^7) jn MexiC05 after the negotiations of a SAL, 4 million 
people lost their j o b s / I n  Senegal, the implementation of a Bank's SAL in 1984- 
85 of a new industrial policy aimed at increasing productivity and competitiveness led 
to the loss of 5000 jo b s /
The decline in real wages is another aspect of the worsening situation of a large 
section of the working class. In numerous cases, the fall in minimum real wages led to 
an increasing impoverishment of the population. In Kenya, the average wage was 3.5 
times higher than the minimum wage in 1983, compared with only 2.7 times in 
1980/  ^ 0 )  Various reports indicate that workers at the lower end of the wage scale are 
the worst hit. In Brazil, the IMF and the Bank demanded an annual reduction of 20 
percent in wages. ( ^ 1 )  In Zaire, after a SAL took effect in 1983, it was followed by a 
massive 400 percent devaluation of the national currency which led to the wholesale 
removal of so called fictitious and unqualified employees in the public s e c to r /!^ )
Furthermore, the rise in food prices during the period of adjustment had also a 
severe negative effect on the poorest households who have been "forced" to restrain 
their food consumption in quantity and quality. The consequences on the welfare of the 
population are sometimes indescribable. In some countries such as Ghana, child
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mortality has even risen from 100 to 115 per thousand during 1980-84; and in 
neighbouring Ethiopia, from 155 to 175 over the same p e r i o d / 163)
The social effect of SAL has become so crucial that the European Council adopted 
in May 1988 a Resolution on the Particular Concept of Structural Adjustment for the 
ACP which was presented by the Commission. In its preamble, the resolution recalls 
that:
The Commission's approach does not seek to compete 
with that of the IMF and the World Bank. It tries to 
direct the Bretton Woods institutions towards greater 
realism by adding to their concern, that politically and 
socially, as well the process of adjustm ent be 
acceptable/164)
The resolution calls for a more pragmatic approach that would take into account 
the social dimensions of structural adjustment policies as well as certain important 
objectives (eg. food security) which were in danger of being neglected in the structural 
adjustment approach as implemented so far. In that sense, the Commission's approach 
differed substantially from the stereotyped, often dogmatic and too exclusively 
economic and financially based view of the Washington institutions. Among other 
things, the resolution calls for:
• The participation of the governments concerned to the greatest extent in 
analysing the difficulties to be resolved and in preparing reform programmes.
• The integration into SAL of other non economic imperatives such as cultural 
matters or environmental protection.
• Taking into account the social dimension of the implementation of SALs, 
particularly in order to reduce any negative effect they may have on the most 
vulnerable segments of the population and to simultaneously promote the 
objectives of economic growth and social justice.
• To ensure that the rate at which reforms are implemented are compatible with
1 62
the capacities and resources of each country and its development objectives, 
and must be bearable for its people.
• The need for effective coordination between the EEC on the one hand, and the 
World Bank and IMF which play a leading role in the dialogue on structural 
adjustment, on the other.
It was finally agreed in the resolution that "the Council hope that the Commission 
and the member states will impress on (the Bank and the Fund), the Community 
approach defined a b o v e /165) may be seen? this statement is more political than 
practical. Its inclusion in the resolution reflects the EEC’s intention to work closely 
with the Bretton Woods institutions. It only emphasised that the Community does not 
intend to compete or to depart from the Bank and Fund's approach to structural 
adjustment.
The resolution was followed later by an EEC-ACP seminar on structural 
adjustment, debt and c o m m o d i t i e s /166) No formal recommendations or conclusions 
were adopted. Broadly speaking, the seminar's conclusions support to a large extent 
the LDCs criticism that, socially, SALs have been disappointing. There was a general 
feeling within the industrial countries of Europe, that the size of Bank loans and the 
conditionality packages attached to them were not commensurate with the costs and 
risks of the adjustment that they proposed. More importantly, the participants agreed 
that in most cases, SALs have failed to have the anticipated effects and have instead 
produced unexpected detrimental effects as already discussed. After a lengthy debate, 
most of the participants seemed rather sympathetic to Third World grievances; and one 
of them reacted emotionally when he talked about "adjustment with a human face"; 
something, it should be noted in passing, very rare in the merciless world of 
finance/167)
The solutions proposed by the participants may be classified in two diametrically 
opposite solutions. The first one represents what could be called, in political terms, the
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radical view. Its proponents suggest that in a period of adjustment someone has to pay 
the price:
... Experience to date has shown that some groups have 
to accept losses, at least temporary. This is true , for 
example, in case of public sector workers who have 
their wages cut or even lose their jobs because of 
austerity m easures/168)
According to this view, those living at subsistence levels such as unemployed 
households, peasants, small farmers, all have to be patient in the hope of better -but 
unguaranteed- days. This point of view reflects the official position of the World Bank 
for which:
Such results generally do not occur immediately.
However, frequently...policies designed to bring about 
long term structural transformations may entail painful 
adjustment in the short t e r m /169)
The second solution proposed by other participants during the seminar is perhaps 
softer and more humane in many respects. They suggest that, in order to avoid 
jeopardising programmes aimed at structural adjustment, accompanying measures must 
be provided for in good time. To meet such a proposal, there are two kinds of 
measures that the developed world can take in favour of the LDCs. Firstly, the DC 
must accompany any structural adjustment by an additional financial support to help the 
LDCs carry out their purposes successfully. This view is held by the Germans who 
have already embarked on such a path by providing substantial amount of funds from 
their development budget to many LDCs already carrying out SAL p r o g r a m m e s / 170)
The ambiguity of the German proposal is that there is apparently no patent recipe 
for how these funds are to be spent. In practice, however, this is only a lure, since the 
very purpose of that additional contribution, is precisely to help the LDCs implement
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SAL programmes. Apart from its generous aspect, this solution presents a double 
danger for the Third World countries. On the one hand, SAL itself is a loan, therefore 
a debt which by definition has to be repaid at a given time. On the other hand, the 
additional resources, whatever form they may take, (soft loan, loan without interest, or 
simply a grant), may also create some kind of extra financial obligations vis a vis the 
donor country. This brings to the fore front the well known story of tied aid, a story 
which the vast majority of the Third World does not want to hear ab o u t/171)
Secondly, the developed world can indirectly help the LDCs to achieve their SAL 
programmes by taking at its own level a series of internal measures that may have a 
beneficial effect on the LDC economies. Such measures will be discussed in a more 
appropriate context (see infra Chapter Five). It may suffice here to say at this stage, 
that it would help a great deal if the DCs put their house in order before telling the 
LDCs to clean up theirs.
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Conclusion to Chapter Three.
Traditionally, the flow of the Bank's finance has been dependent primarily on 
identification and development of those projects which the Bank believed would 
generate an adequate rate of return. To that end, the economic mission surveys 
permitted discussion about broad economic policies, but the central point remained the 
project to be financed. It must be recalled, project financing was never conditional in 
the past on general policy advice (ie. conditionality) being taken. The conditions (or 
leverage), were generally confined to policies in the particular sector being funded.
The Bank maintains that such conditions are necessary if the loan is to be 
successful, otherwise, it would abstain from financing the project. A lthough 
straightforward in appearance, this statement is not entirely unfounded. For example 
the cases of EPEOR (Algeria) and ONPT (Morocco) dealt with in the foregoing 
Chapter, demonstrate to some extent, that the Bank's action in the LDCs is not always 
futile. The appalling conditions of EPEOR and ONPT before the Bank's intervention, 
denote the utility and indeed the urgency of the agency's action. In that respect, the 
Bank's efforts can only be beneficial and surely no LDC government would dispute 
their veracity or their opportunity. Frictions between the Bank and its borrowers, 
however, arise over the manner in which the loan should be spent to tackle a particular 
economic issue.
The two successive world economic recessions led the Bank to the introduction of 
SAL and with it a conditionality package, which "revolutionised" the lending policy of 
the 1980's. The immediate effect of SAL was tougher and harder conditions being 
imposed on the LDCs. Yet from the legal point of view there is no provision in the 
Articles to suggest such a shift in the Bank's operations. This new generation of 
conditions is sometimes so hard for the LDCs to implement, that quite often the loan
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agreement turns into a major conflict between the Bank and its clients. At the roots of 
such a conflict, is the Bank's insistence on the implementation of a set of measures 
which are not always confined to the initial loan, but which extend well beyond it, to 
cover other major economic areas and sometimes the entire economy of the borrower. 
More irritating for the LDCs is that, the implementation of such measures require 
substantial legislative actions and institutional changes that must be satisfactory to the 
Bank.
As part of the measures, the Bank usually "recommends" to its borrowers certain 
forms of actions. The development of the private sector, or privatisation, is certainly 
the most favoured. The phenomenon has dominated the lending policy of the 1980's 
and all the signs are that it is likely to remain so for the nineties. This will be the main 
theme of discussion of the next Chapter.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE CONTEXT OF INFLUENCE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR.
I- Preliminary.
Since the Bank entered the field of conditionality, one of the most common forms 
of advice it included in its loans to borrowers has been privatisation.^^ For the vast 
majority of the LDCs, this means abandoning their previous public sector policy, for a 
new "modern" private enterprise which, according to the Bank, will help them to 
overcome their economic problems of development. From the legal point of view, the 
passage from state owned ownership to private initiative is not without repercussion on 
the legal as well as institutional aspects of the borrowing countries. However, before 
adressing these repercussions which are the main concern of this Chapter, it may be 
worthwhile to give a brief review on the concept of privatisation in general, and to 
assess the reasons for the Bank's distrust for the public sector and its preference for the 
private initiative.
The word privatisation has been described by a British politician as "an ugly word 
for a beautiful concept."^) in the opinion of C.Veljanovski, "to privatise is to render 
private, or to bring into the private sector."^) In broad terms, it means that the state 
withdraws partly or entirely from the production of goods and services. The process
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has already begun in certain developing countries, and a large number of LDC 
governments have started taking steps "to trim the fat from the public sector". In 
Nigeria, for instance, the military regime in place has unilaterally slashed subsidies to 
public enterprises by fifty percent, and privatisation has become, after education, the 
most pressing issue for government. In Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland, governments 
have already sold some of their interests to the private sector, and high level panels are 
still exploring ways to strengthen the private sector. In Latin American countries such 
as Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela and Mexico, deep economic reforms are under way 
where the role of the private sector is given a prominent position. In the most centrally 
planned states of Africa such as Mozambique, Benin and Tanzania, there is a noticeable 
relaxation over private business activities coupled with a genuine government desire to 
explore further ways to improve public/private sector relationships. Everywhere, the 
debate on the public/private sector is gaining momentum.^) In view of the importance 
of such a debate on the economic development of LDCs, it may be worthwhile to look 
into some aspects of this debate and to ask whether privatisation could enhance LDCs 
development efforts, as is often suggested by the Bretton Woods institutions.
A- The Public / Private Sector Debate
The core of the debate is whether the LDCs should abandon their public sector 
policy for a new private initiative. Before trying to seek any answer, a brief 
background to the evolution of the public sector in these countries is in order. The 
formation and results of the state sector differs from country to country depending on 
various historical as well as socio-economic factors. It is worth noting that many LDCs 
on the threshold of independence were receptive to ideas of state control because of 
many reasons; both external and internal.
• At the external level, it must be recalled that in all the newly independent
countries, key economic activities and much of the countries wealth were owned by 
foreign monopolies and a local bourgeoisie suspected as part of foreign capital. There 
was, hence, the common need for gaining control over the national resources in the first 
place. It was then thought among many LDC leaders, that only a strong public sector 
could fill the gap left by the colonial administration.^) In the vast majority of these 
countries the formation of the state sector has proceeded through the enactment of 
nationalisation laws which were applied indiscriminately to both foreign and domestic 
capital, and through allocations from the state budget. Most LDC politicians and 
economists in the Third World explain the development of the state sector as mainly a 
consequence or a legacy of colonialism:
The historical situation and tasks of the newly 
independent countries which emerged from centuries of 
colonial rule gave rise to the necessity for the state to 
play an active role in socio-economic development.
During the period since the collapse of their colonial 
system of imperialism, we have witnessed the gradual 
development of the economic role of the state in all 
developing countries which faced both common and 
specific tasks.(6)
For 'extremist' governments, there was in fact no better barrier against neo­
imperialism than a highly developed state capitalism. Thus, fear of foreign infiltration, 
coupled with the rise of economic nationalism, led many LDCs to consider any private 
initiative economically parasitical, politically suspicious and socially inequitable. This 
attitude is to some extent understandable especially among those countries (eg. 
Algeria), which have experienced a prolonged and somewhat painful era of colonial 
domination that ended only with a war of liberation. This is why, for instance, 
revolutionary governments think that foreign penetration is still a permanent threat to 
their very existence, and consider the creation and expansion of the state sector as an 
anti-imperialist objective of paramount importance. As Rao emphasised:
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It is an incontrovertible fact that the public sector 
especially in the heavy and key industries in the 
developing countries has been playing an anti-imperialist 
role and helping the preservation and strengthening of 
their independence " O)
• At the internal level, one explanation for the LDCs drive to the public sector is 
the lack of human as well as financial resources. In most new states, there was no 
single class which socially and economically possessed the capital and capability to 
undertake independent economic development. In addition, the task of reconstruction 
was immense and certainly beyond the private sector possibilities. This is particularly 
true since all Third World countries have inherited from their colonisers archaic and 
feudal economic patterns which made them raw material appendages to the mother 
colony. It was then imperative to break up these one-sided arrangements and lay the 
grounds for a new independent economy. It was believed at that particular time, that 
the state alone was in such a position as to regulate, plan and rebuild the economy, by 
making use of the entire national wealth on the basis of state ow nersh ip /^  The public 
sector was thus considered as the motor drive and, as such, it encompassed all 
economic activities, from needles manufacturing to maize crops to chemical plants. As 
the Iraqi Charter of 1952 reads :
The public sector is the corner-stone in the national 
economy with all its branches, be they agriculture, 
industry, trade or services. The State assumes the 
responsibility of guiding economic activity and working 
out the principles of laws, which organise it. A pre­
condition in the economic work is to expand the public 
sector and boost it by all the possibilities that would 
increase its efficiency and ability to achieve the task.(^)
Besides its economic advantages, the public sector has also a social function. 
People are told in endless speeches and official statements that all the country resources
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are theirs and for their benefits. As the Algerian Charter of 1962 recalls:
All principal means of production are owned by the state 
and placed at the disposal of the popular masses which 
exploit them for their benefits.OO)
The aim is to create a classless society, based on the principles of justice and 
equality. To that end the state, through the public sector, takes responsibility for 
regulating every aspect of social life, from employment, to housing, health and 
education. Furthermore, in many countries, the public sector has been instrumental in 
lessening regional imbalance inherited from the colonial era. In Algeria, for instance, 
since independence, considerable efforts have been made in successive development 
plans to revitalise backward parts of the country. This is done through massive 
investment in infrastructure projects as well as industrial and agricultural p ro je c ts .^ )  
In other countries such as India the building of the state sector is said to have played a 
major role in strengthening the efforts of national integration. This is important in a 
federal state such as India which has a multiplicity of languages and religions
Politically too, the LDCs strategy of economic development was felt vital because 
an ever-expanding and strong state sector would lead to an independent economy, 
which would sustain LDCs independent foreign policy, and makes its intervention in 
world politics more effective. In this context Girish Mirsha's statement on India's 
strategic role of the public sector is illustrative:
It is now part of history how the state sector enabled 
India not to yield to the imperialist pressures on the issue 
of Kashmir, and the blackmail by Dulles after the 
liberation of Goa. Had there been no state sector, India 
would not have been able to defend its territorial 
integrity in 1962, 1965, and 1971, nor could it help the 
patriotic forces in Bangladesh in the face of the US threat 
to bring its 7th Fleet.O^)
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Finally, it must be emphasised that in the development by the state sector, a major 
role has been played by economic assistance from the former socialist world in general 
and the ex-Soviet Union in particular. During the 1960's, at the height of the cold war, 
the Soviet Union which was not a colonial power, found a fertile ground in many 
newly created states to expand its ideology. Socialist aid came to LDCs on easier terms 
and c o n d i t i o n s / Q n  many occasions, when LDCs were refused loans from 
international institutions (including the Bank), or Western governments, the Soviets 
were there to the rescue. Referring to the particular case of India, G. Mirsha wrote:
However no Indian can forget how the western countries 
tried to dissuade India from building up a state sector.
The World Bank opposed India's move to have state 
refineries and the USA ditched India on the issue of 
financing and technically aiding the proposed Bokaro 
steel plant. One also remembers the attempts by the 
western oil cartels at preventing India from exploring for 
oil deposits by saying that there were no such deposits in 
India. One also remembers the generous help given by 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in fulfilling 
India's aspirations.(15)
The historic agreement between the Indian government and the USSR to build the 
Bhila steel plant is another illustration of Soviet friendly rescue after the World Bank 
refused to finance the project/ The Aswan dam in Egypt is another example where 
the Soviets supplied the funds after the Bank and Western investors declined to finance 
i t / 17) p  Nelson who studied Soviet aid to LDCs, reveals that 99.3 percent of Soviet 
assistance was directed to the public sector/ ^
The existence of a powerful socialist world system has created favourable 
conditions and provided material help for the development of a heavy state sector in 
many Third World countries. Since the sixties, many socialist countries have also been 
very active in many LDCs in the construction of numerous projects such as mills, oil
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refineries, fertiliser plants and livestock breeding farms. They granted loans to Third 
World governments, providing them with equipment and knowhow, and helping them 
to train the national managerial personnel for the enterprises that were to become part of 
the public sector. And all this assistance was untied to any particularly stringent 
co n d itio n s /^ ) "This", write G. Mirsha:
has strengthened the hands of the newly liberated 
countries in bargaining with im peria lists  and 
withstanding all their pressures to change the pattern or 
strategy of economic development. If the advanced 
capitalist countries have reduced their rates of interest or 
stopped their campaign against the efforts by the 
countries of the Third World to pursue the path of 
independent capitalist development, it is largely because 
of the presence of a powerful socialist world.(20)
In the midst of such a fervour for the public sector, by the vast majority of LDC 
governments, it may be perhaps worth asking what is the Bank's attitude to such a 
debate.
a)- The Bank's Position in the Public / Private Sector Debate.
If the Bank's attitude towards the private sector has been made clear and formally 
recognised in its Statutes, (Art I (ii) ) its position, however, towards the public sector 
has never been defined accurately. It is certainly one of the most puzzling areas when 
looking at the Bank's policy through the years. A great deal of the confusion stems 
from the fact that the Bank's philosophy towards the public sector is not included in its 
statutory objectives; that is to say, the development of the public sector does not stand 
as one of its priorities. Yet, in practice, a large number of requests for loans to finance 
state owned projects have been made, and the Bank has responded favourably/-^) 
Furthermore, which areas of the public sector the Bank was prepared to finance is also
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difficult to answer. It is rather unusual for an international organisation not to have all 
its objectives clearly set out in advance. Ambiguous and often contradictory statements 
regarding the public sector from the Bank's officials do not either contribute to fix a 
proper idea of the whole business of the Bank in that sector. Last, but not least, why 
has the Bank suddenly chosen in recent years only to shift towards the private sector? 
Does this mark the end of its scrambling policy towards the public sector ? Has it been 
unsuccessful ? What are the legal implications on the borrowers' laws; and finally what 
is the prospect of the Bank being followed by its borrowing members in its recent call 
for privatisation ? Before answering these questions, it may be useful to shed some 
light on the general belief that the Bank has been supportive of the public sector in 
many LDCs.
This point is particularly sensitive and has been the subject of many controversies 
in the Institution's literature.^--) Generally speaking, no one can deny the Bank's 
efforts to promote state enterprises in many of its developing member states. The 
stumbling point, however, is that such assistance has always been very selective and 
limited in size and time. For reasons of convenience, the Bank's attitude towards the 
public sector may be clearly traced throughout three different periods of time in the 
history of the institution. Each period is characterised by certain events which have in 
turn led the Bank to increase or decrease its support for the public sector.
(i) Early Lending (1947-1967).
In its early days of operations, the Bank directed its lending mainly towards the 
public sector. The type of projects financed was in infrastructure such as roads, ports, 
electricity power plants, transportation. These so called utility (or hard) projects were 
totally owned by the host state and run by its economic companies. The Bank justified 
such assistance on the ground that the LDCs' public sector was economically weak and 
inefficient and that radical transformations were needed to make it perform more
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efficiently/-3) The reasons for assisting the public sector may be summarised in three 
points:
Firstly, there was a de facto  situation that the public sector was dominant in the 
vast majority of LDCs. The Bank could not change this reality overnight for fear of 
being simply unwanted. It had therefore, to act tactfully in order to show that it was 
there to help. This would be the first step to set foot inside the LDCs and win 
government confidence. Secondly, the Bank was, to some extent, obliged to finance 
such projects in the public sector because there was no one else to do it. In fact, these 
projects were so huge that no private capital, whether foreign or local or both, were 
ready to undertake them. The reason being that the projects were high cost, time 
consuming and above all they did not generate immediate profits. Thirdly, and perhaps 
more importantly, is that all these infrastructure projects were, in the Bank's view, 
necessary for the development of a future private sector.^-^)
(ii) The McNamara era ( 1968 to 1981).
The seventies were probably the best years in terms of public sector financing. 
Not only did the Bank increase its funding to state owned enterprises but, 
unexpectedly, it shifted its funds towards new areas in the public sector such as 
housing, health, water drinking projects, sanitation, education, and even tourism. 
Those so called social (or soft) projects were widely considered to be as fundamental to 
development as were utility projects. Here are a few examples of social projects 
involving income and wealth redistribution to help the poor in Third World countries 
that were undertaken by the Bank under McNamara's leadership:
• A $ 32 million loan to the Philippines to upgrade the homes of about 180.000 
residents of Tondo, one of Manilla's worst slums. One component of the loan was 
also used to finance an urban development project in which health, nutrition and other
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social services were integrated with improvements in water supply, sewerage and 
drainage projects/--^)
• A $ 87 million loan to India where capabilities of the administrative authorities in 
the Calcutta Metropolitan District were expanded and upgraded. About 1.8 million 
poor residents benefited from huge development and slum improvement schemes, and 
some 45.000 people have had improved housing and many other social fac ilitie s /-^ )
• A $ 70 million loan to Brazil to improve the living conditions for the mostly 
poor residents of eight medium sized cities, by providing central food warehouses to 
support retail grocers in poor areas, and stalls for open air m a r k e t s ^ - 7 )
• Another $ 93 million loan to Brazil to improve housing conditions, education 
facilities, and better health for more than 80.000 low income families in two North- 
Eastern states and in Greater Sao-Paulo.(28)
• A $ 71 million (rather unusual) loan to Romania to help the country increase the 
supply of pork available for domestic consumption/-^)
One major event which contributed to the introduction of social projects in the 
Bank's lending, was the arrival of President McNamara at the Head of the institution. 
Since his appointment, McNamara waged a veritable war against poverty and misery in 
the Third World countries. His speeches during various IBRD/IMF meetings raised the 
eyebrows of many Westerners and gave renewed hope and trust within many LDC 
governments/^^)
(iii) Late Development (from 1981- onwards).
At the beginning of the 1980's, the world economic outlook changed dramatically 
for both the DCs which suffered recession and the LDCs which were heavily indebted. 
The euphoria of the seventies elapsed and the prospects for LDCs econom ic 
development were seriously jeopardised. Public official aid (i.e. loans from 
government to government) became rare and very hard to secure because it was tied
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aid. Similarly, private aid 1'rom commercial banks was severely cut because bankers 
were on the verge of bankruptcy as LDC borrowers were unable to repay their debt. In 
all cases, borrowers were told by official donors and private lenders to make 
arrangements with the Bank and the Fund before concluding any private l o a n . ^ l )  
Scarce resources also hit the Bank as it too could not secure borrowing from the 
financial markets. This meant for the Bank less money and more borrowers coming 
i n . ( 3 - )  As a consequence, the Bank's funds became even harder to secure, and the 
institution ultimately responded by introducing SAL in its lending policy. As already 
discussed, one of the main objectives of SAL is public sector reform. So, it is within 
SAL that the role and function of the public sector have been formally r e d u c e d . ^ )
b)- An Evaluation of the Bank's Attitude T ow ards the Public  
Sector .
The Bank's involvement in the public sector drew sharp criticism from both the 
right wing (i.e. liberal tendency), and the left wing (i.e.socialist tendency) of the 
political spectrum. The right wing was discontented because it alleged that by financing 
the private sector, the Bank had departed from its original objectives as set in its 
Articles of Agreement, namely Article I (ii) which explicitly directs the institution to 
work for the promotion and expansion of the private sector. For this category of 
critics, the intention of the framers of the Articles was quite clearly to establish an 
institution that would facilitate the international flow of private portfolio investment. It 
was also clear that, from the very beginning, the primary aim of the Bank was to 
"encourage private capital to go abroad for productive investment, by sharing the risks
of private investors in large v e n t u r e s . " ^ )
Underlying such a criticism is the fear that, by helping the public sector in the
Third World, the Bank is subsidising, supporting and modernising state industries in 
the developing countries. This, claim the critics, is in direct competition with western
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trade and business. This view is strongly supported by the American business 
community which thinks that a rehabilitated public sector in the LDCs would 
considerably reduce the sizeable Third World market for US products and create the 
potential of a major new international supplier. These fears are reported by the Wall 
Street journal in the following terms:
Should this have occurred as a result of a competitive 
environment, there could be no quarrel with the growth 
of (LDC) industry. As part of a wave of subsidies, it is 
outrageous. (35)
From the left wing, there were also many criticisms aimed at the Bank's attitude 
towards the public sector. One permanent claim which looks more like a desirata than a 
criticism is that the Bank has not done enough for the public s e c t o r / ^ 6 )  Without 
under-estimating this point, it may be argued that since the Bank's resources are 
limited, so should its lending capacity be. However, a more serious criticism is of the 
Bank's refusal to finance governments' industrial sectors; namely in the big and heavy 
industry. Unlike infrastructure which involved large sums of money, parastatal 
enterprises in industry were not and still are not eligible for Bank's le n d in g /^ )
The Bank's response was that "it has as a matter of principle always been 
opposed to big industrial projects. "(38) The few projects which were funded were in 
small scale industry and were taken on a selective basis. In fact, the Bank's hostility 
towards public industrial projects was known from the very beginning of the 
Institution's operations.@9) The Bank not only abstained from financing heavy 
industries in the Third World countries, but it formally discouraged the development of 
such a sector. D.W. Subasinghe reports that a mission of the World Bank submitted a 
report in 1951, where it was stated that Sri-Lanka should not em bark on 
i n d u s t r i a l i s a t i o n / ^ )  Similar reproaches were made in the 1970's to the Algerian
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government, which was strongly advised not to invest in big oil and gas refineries 
projects, despite Algeria being the second most important gas producer worldwide. 
The Bank instead advised the Algerian government to concentrate on agriculture, and 
only if necessary, on certain light, small scale industries, as T. Hayter put it, producing 
Biro pens/4^)
In the Bank's opinion, big industrial projects are inappropriate investments by 
virtue of their being too complex to run technologically, too big to manage efficiently, 
too costly to cover and control financially. Moreover, the lack of qualified personnel 
and expertise, the uncertainty of the International market, and competition from western 
industries which are better equipped may hamper seriously the development of a truly 
Third World industry. Instead, the Bank advises many LDCs to concentrate on the 
development of agriculture; implying that the LDCs should rely for their industrial 
needs on the West, according to the nineteenth century Ricardian theory of comparative 
a d v a n t a g e / 4 2 )  jn this context, D. W. Subasinghe wrote:
The industrial sector in most developing countries is 
small and is based more on the employment of machines 
than people; even rapid industrialization can rarely create 
enough jobs to keep pace with the growing labor force.
The most appropriate and direct way to improve living 
standards, therefore, may often be to help countries 
develop their agriculture which provides more for the 
population with their basic needs- foods and jobs- more 
effectively than industrialization.^)
As far as social projects are concerned, the LDCs' hope faded away by the end of 
the seventies when it then became clear to the LDCs, that Me Namara's war against 
poverty was not dictated by human need nor a willingness to re-orient seriously the 
Bank's policy towards the poor LDCs. Me Namara's generosity coincided with the 
1970's which, it may be recalled, was a fast decade in terms of international lending. 
During that period, many LDCs took advantage of the favourable conditions and
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borrowed heavily from the commercial banks (hence their indebtedness). Realising 
competition from private lenders, the Bank extended its loans to social projects in order 
to look attractive and also to keep business going.
With the 1980's, the world economy went into recession, and social projects 
were simply cut, to be replaced by SALs whose basic philosophy is to give priority to 
governments who are willing to develop private initiative, namely by opening their 
markets to foreign capital. But this latter is not always available unless a favourable 
environment exists in the recipient country. Realising the difficulties in installing such 
a favourable climate within the LDCs, the Bank directed its efforts to the creation of its 
own safeguards involving both foreign investors and the LDCs. Before attempting 
such an investigation, it may be useful to state, albeit briefly, the reasons underlying the 
Bank's preference for the private sector as a basis for its privatisation programme.
II- Character of World Bank Privatisation.
Taking advantage of the worsening global economic conditions of the eighties, 
the Bank put much of the blame on those countries which were following a public 
sector policy. Mismanagement, corruption and inefficiency are often the words used 
by the Bank's management to describe the public s e c t o r . I n s t e a d ,  the Bank advises 
its borrowers to open their economies to allow the market to work. Much of the 
Bank's argument for privatisation is based on the supposed gains in efficiency that can 
be gained through the introduction of competition. A great deal of the Bank's policy 
towards the private sector has been laid down in the 1983 World Development 
R eport. (46) j ^ e  Report adresses several issues such as "Management in 
Development", "Research for efficiency", "The Role of the State" which have a more 
political colouration than being a truly economic analysis.(^) In sum, the Report 
strongly advised the LDC governments to give up their support for the public sector,
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and opt for a a new private enterprise, of which the Bank was considered as the main 
catalyst. The question worth asking at this stage is whether the institution is well 
equipped to implement such a programme.
A- Legal Instruments Used by the Bank to Enhance Privatisation.
Since domestic capital is usually missing in most of the LDCs, it is foreign capital 
which plays the predominant role in the privatisation process. It is therefore essential 
for the Bank to provide a satisfactory climate for private investors. In fact the Bank is 
expressly required by its Statutes "to promote private foreign investment by means of 
guarantees or participation in loans and other investments made by private investors..." 
(Art. I (ii)). Through the years, the Bank has spotted the likely obstacles that may halt 
the expansion of foreign flow, and has accordingly responded by setting up a panoply 
of legal instruments. The purpose of these instruments is to provide foreign capital 
with the maximum of safeguards, so it can expand rapidly and safely. In short, to hand 
over the LDC economies to private bankers of the West without whom Bank assisted 
programmes of privatisation become impotent. A brief survey of the institution's 
actions to attract foreign private investors is given below.
a)- The International Finance Corporation.
The first channel which the Bank uses to encourage the How of private investment 
into LDCs is the International Finance Corporation.(IFC). The Corporation was 
established in 1956 as an affiliate of the World Bank. According to Article 1, the 
purpose of the Corporation is to provide and bring together financing, technical 
assistance and management needed to develop private investment opportunities. The 
IFC was created as a result of the Bank's inability to assist the private sector more 
directly by lending to private enterprises without government guarantee. Since many 
LDC governments were reluctant to guarantee private initiatives, the Bank's action in
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that field became very limited. In other words, the IFC was conceived to do what the 
Bank could not statutorily d o .(^ )
b)- Cofinancing.
Since the World Bank is able to provide only a small amount of the external 
resources that the LDCs need, it encourages and helps its borrowers to obtain financing 
for Bank assisted projects from other sources in the form of cofinancing. These 
resources are varied and include multilateral aid, regional development banks, export 
credit agencies and private commercial banks.
The Bank justifies its initiative of cofinancing as necessary to maintain 
commercial Hows at a time of increased restraint of official (public) lending. Since the 
beginning of the 1980's which coincide with the Bank's launching of its privatisation 
programme, cofinancing has been increasing steadily. The 1991 IBRD Annual Report 
states that almost half of the projects approved annually work with other sources of 
f i n a n c i n g . ^ )  Bank projects have become interesting for many private lenders because 
they give cofinancers more security and assurances over repayment than if they had 
acted individually. Through cofinancing, the Bank plays an intermediary role in linking 
the private financial flow with the economic development of the LDCs in order to 
initiate these latter to the techniques of the free market mechanism, while giving the 
opportunity to private investors to widen their scope of investment and naturally their
p r o fit /-^ )
c)- The International Centre for the Settlem ent o f Investm ent 
D isputes.
Foreign investors do not need only laws to operate in their favour, but also a 
reliable judiciary to protect them in case of conflict between them and the host country.
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To that effect, the Bank established in 1965, the International Centre for the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which came into being in October 1966. The ICSID 
provides a forum  for conciliation and/or arbitration of disputes between member states 
and private foreign investors who are nationals of other member states. The 
jurisdiction is based on consent by both parties: the investor and the relevant 
government to an investment d ispu te .^^
The number of cases submitted to the Centre for resolution remains relatively 
low. Since its inception, twenty five years ago, the number has reached thirty two 
cases, most of which were submitted in the past five years, whereas the vast majority 
have been resolved amicably.^-*-) The underlying purpose of the Centre is obviously 
to ensure private lenders that in case of litigation with the LDC borrowers, they will not 
be subject to the national laws of their debtors.
d)- The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency.
The last initiative by the Bank to encourage the flow of private investment to 
LDCs is the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The project for MIGA 
was revived at the World Bank 1981 Annual Meeting in Seoul, (Korea), four years 
after President A. W. Clausen launched the idea of forming such an institution. 
MIGA was created by a Board of Governors' decision on the recommendation of the 
Executive Directors. The new institution is designed to promote the flow of 
international investment to LDCs. The MIGA initiative was seen as particularly timely 
for several reasons:
The LDCs growing needs of private flow from commercial banks.
The decline of lending from private funding sources due to the worsening of 
the international economic environment.
The need to reassure the international financial community about non­
commercial (ie. political) risks surrounding investment in LDCs. The aim of
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MIGA is precisely to reduce the obstacles to the flow of international 
investment, by issuing guarantees of potential existing commercial and non­
commercial risks, some of which are:
The transfer risk resulting from host government restrictions on conversion 
and transfer.
The risk of loss resulting from legislative or administrative action or 
omission of the host government which has the effect of depriving the 
investor of ownership, control, or substantial benefit from his investment, 
(ie. expropriation / nationalisation).
The risk resulting from the repudiation of a contract by the host 
government, when the investor has no access to a competent forum, faces 
unreasonable delays in such a forum, or is unable to enforce a final 
judgement.
The risk of war and civil disturbances.
The Convention took effect on 12 April 1988. The first guarantees for four 
projects were signed in 1990, representing a total of $ 1.04 billion in direct foreign 
investment. As to July 1991, 101 countries had signed the Convention, providing for 
subscription totalling over $ 9.4 b illio n .^ )
B)- Commentary.
Within a relatively short period of time the Bank has produced more institutions 
for the international private financial community than it did for the Third World 
countries. Apart from the long contested IDA, there is no real interest in the deep 
economic problems of the LDCs. The institutions created by the Bank such as the IFC, 
ICSID, and MIGA, serve the West's interest and its bankers better than they do the 
Third W orld governments and their underdeveloped populations. Although
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membership in these institutions is open to all Bank members, there has been, until 
recently, a total indifference from a large number of the Third World countries in 
joining the institutions. For example, ten years after their creation, the IFC and ICSID 
were almost deserted by many LDCs which identified them as further instruments to 
promote capitalist i d e o l o g y . T h e  reason is obvious: none of the newly created 
institutions had specific provisions to protect the LDCs economies from foreign capital 
deficiencies. For instance, the IFC Statutes call for unlimited liberalisation and 
uncontrollable flow of private investment. Again, the MIGA's constitution encourages 
the repatriation of profit made by foreign investors, against any risk, including that of 
war. In sum, all the institutions plead excessive liberalism, regardless of the negative 
effects of this latter on the LDC economies.
The intention here is not to put the Bank's institutions on trial, but it is a fact that 
none of them address the specific problems of the LDCs in relation to private foreign 
investment. On the contrary, the respective Charters of these institutions are designed 
to protect a financially strong minority of individuals who, according to the Bank, 
possess the key to development, against a capital-starved majority of states in search of 
development.
Since the end of the last decade, however, as the process of privatisation has been 
reactivated, so seems to be the role of the IFC, ICSID, MIGA and cofinancing. The 
first three institutions have doubled their membership, whereas cofinancing is now 
present in more than half of the Bank's projects. Whether the increase in LDCs 
membership in the IFC, ICSID, and MIGA, is voluntary or carried out under some sort 
of implied coercive force goes beyond the scope of this study. In all cases, however, 
the spectacular revival of the Bank's institutions coincides with the Bank's launching of 
its programme of privatisation.
1 99
From the cases reviewed, it appears that the Bank's recommendation for 
privatisation to its borrowers take one of two forms. The first and most favoured is to 
require the borrower to go private. That is to say, to hand over his public assets to 
private undertakings, as was exemplified by the Polish experience. This type of 
privatisation is generally patterned on existing economic models found in western 
liberal democracies such as the United Kingdom, which became, in fact, a leading 
school for privatisation during the Thatcher years of g o v e r n m e n t . T h e  LDCs in 
which such a type of privatisation has been recommended by the Bank include those 
countries where an embryo of capitalism is either available or can be created without too 
much resistance. Examples include the Eastern and Central countries of Europe, a few 
Latin American countries (Brazil, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela), and Zaire, Egypt 
and the Ivory Coast in Africa.
The second form of privatisation is more cautious and time consuming. It consists 
in advising borrowers to introduce substantial reforms on state enterprises as a 
preliminary stage for a future wholesale privatisation, as is illustrated by the case of 
Algeria. Through this second type of privatisation, the Bank implicitly recognises that 
the public sector in many LDCs remains "an inevitable concomitant o f economic 
development and it is better to contain this sector within the bounds of usefulness for 
the growth of capitalism".1 Third World countries in which such a "soft" method of 
privatisation has been advised by the Bank include countries like Algeria which have 
followed a rigid socialist ideology in their development. Presently, all Bank 
privatisation programmes in the LDCs follow one of these two approaches.
A)- Comparative Approach.
The purpose of this comparative approach is to demonstrate that, in promoting the 
same economic institution -privatisation- in both Poland and Algeria, the Bank met with
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same economic institution -privatisation- in both Poland and Algeria, the Bank met with 
a set of obstacles relating to the specifities of each country. In both countries the 
process of privatisation, as the Bank wished, seems to be a very difficult enterprise, 
especially in the case of Algeria and to a lesser degree in Poland. The difficulty in 
privatising the Polish and Algerian economies reinforces the view held in this thesis 
that, economic concepts and institutions which are copied on the liberal pattern, may 
not be easily implemented in all the recipient countries.
a- The Polish Approach to Privatisation.
Although Poland is not a member of the Third World caucus, it nonetheless 
shares almost the same economic development problems that most LDCs face 
presently. Furthermore, the choice of Poland presents a model of experiment for the 
Bank (and the West) in persuading former socialist countries to shift from a centrally 
planned economy to a market oriented system. Broadly speaking, the West's interest 
(represented by the Bank) in Poland started at the end of the seventies, when the trade- 
union movement Solidarity, led by L. Walesa, arose as a political force against the 
established communist regime. Poland was then seen in the beginning of the 1980's as 
the first Eastern country to detach itself from the Soviet sphere of influence. It was in 
the interests of the West, headed by the Americans through the Bank, to help Solidarity 
achieve that goal. By late 1989, Poland had formally broken its ties with the former 
Soviet socialist camp and entered the open market eco n o m y .^ )
Both the Bank and its private arm, the IFC, became increasingly active in 
advising the Polish authorities on the design of divestiture strategies, providing 
financing to privatised firms, helping to develop capital markets, and assisting countries 
in solving procedural and legal i s s u e s . A s  soon as the first SAL was made to 
Poland in 1989, plans were drawn to privatise the entire public sector which accounted 
for 90 percent of economic activities. With some simplifications, the initiative to carry
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such a task was delegated to three organs:
a) The enterprise itself can embark on a privatisation through filing a joint 
application by the Director of the state enterprise and the Employee's 
Council.
b) The founding organs of the enterprise may also lodge an application for the 
privatisation of the enterprise with the consent of the Employee's Council.
c ) The Ministry itself may initiate a compulsory privatisation. The ministerial 
decision does not require consent from the enterprise which is to be 
privatised.
The privatisation process may begin after the privatisation decision has been 
made. The government prepares the Articles of incorporation. The new corporation 
gains its legal personality at the moment of registration and the former enterprise is 
deleted from the registrar of state owned e n t e r p r i s e s / ^ * )
b)- The Algerian Approach to Privatisation
Before looking into the economic reforms in Algeria, it is worth noting the 
government's change of attitude towards a certain number of institutions in which it has 
for a long time neglected its role or treated them as contrary to its own view on 
development. One of these changes is the Algerian request for an IMF stand-by 
agreement in 1989, breaking thus an unprecedented record of twenty six years without 
calling on the Fund's resources, since Algeria joined this organisation in 1 9 6 3 /^ )  
The second major change is the recent admission of Algeria into the IFC which, in the 
past, she has never dared to join because of its private policy orientation, which was 
contrary to the Algerian ideology of d e v e l o p m e n t / ^ )  The third move is the formal 
application for membership of Algeria in the GATT system which successive Algerian 
governments refused to join for the same reasons spelled out for the IF C /® ) All these 
"preliminary" measures were intended to put the country in the capitalist orbit, which
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the Bank considered as a sine qua non for the implementation of the re fo rm s/^ )
In Algeria, the reform of the public sector is perhaps simpler but substantially 
slower and longer in terms of time. In order to ensure a smooth transformation of the 
public sector, the Algerian reformers announced a two stage plan, leading to a third 
undeclared but nonetheless predictable stage of privatisation
(i) The Restructuring of National Enterprises.
Following the Bank's recommendation, the Algerian government started under 
the first five year plan (1980-1985), a major restructuring programme of all its public 
companies. It consisted mainly in the breakdown of the previous 350 or so major state 
companies into a plethora of some 4500 small enterprises/^-*) It was the Bank's 
initiative that, instead of having unmanageable and uncontrollable big enterprises, it 
was better to have a larger number of small but, economically and financially, 
governable enterprises. Theoretically, then, the number of state owned enterprises has 
increased; whereas in the Polish example, it has decreased. The newly created 
enterprises were dispersed across the country instead of being located in the major 
urban areas and their vicinity. The aim was to provide a better spread of employment, 
reduce regional disparities, but most important of all to go into areas where the private 
sector was not willing to invest.
On the whole, the restructuring process was more technical than political. That is 
to say, the breaking down of big enterprises into smaller units, did not provoke any 
discontent or reaction from the people. As long as the new units remained in the public 
sector, there was virtually no opposition to the restructuring p r o g r a m m e / ^ )
(ii) The Autonomy of the Enterprises.
After the restructuring process was completed, a new law was passed directing a
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change in the behaviour of the newly created units. It was mainly stressed that the new 
entities, although still attached to the public sector, must be run on a business like 
basis. By the 1990's, more then 350 national companies had become Enterprise 
Publique Economique (EPE), under the government's policy to free companies from 
direct state control. The basic principles laid down by the various laws on the 
autonomy of the enterprise state are in substance, that:
The EPE is a moral person, entirely distinct from the state.
The state does not run the EPE.
The state is a shareholder in the capital of the EPE.
The EPE is a trading ( business-like ) entity.
The EPE is no longer financed by the state only and may call on extra non­
governmental funds such as private investors, or commercial banks.
The EPE is no longer created by governmental decree. (This is very 
important as far as the real independence of the enterprise is c o n c e r n e d .
c)-The Limit to the Privatisation Process in Algerian Law.
The laws on the autonomy of enterprises are not absolute in the sense that the 
enterprise is not completely free to act as it wishes on the economic scene. The 
difference between the Polish and the Algerian experience is that, in Algeria, there is no 
such a plan as privatisation. That is to say, there is no real transfer of ownership from 
the public to the private sector. Algerian officials avoid even using the word 
privatisation, and, when asked, deny the existence of such a project either in the short, 
medium or long term. The official language is rather on the reform of the public sector, 
than the privatisation of the public sector. There is an emphasis on reviving the role of 
the private sector, rather than transferring public assets to the private s e c t o r / ^  
However, if state intervention has been greatly reduced, it has not been entirely and 
definitely phased out. There are two main areas where the state's presence may still be
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felt after the autonomous status of the enterprise has been acquired.
(i) Ownership.
All state assets and equipment remain the property of the state. The issue of 
ownership is crucial to both the enterprise and the state .(^ ) por the former it reflects a 
certain real autonomy and freedom vis-a-vis the central administration. It gives the 
enterprise the opportunity to use its full capabilities without having to be accountable to 
any administrative body or political organ within the government hierarchy. For the 
second (ie the state),to keep control over its assets is to keep a powerful hand over the 
enterprise. In fact it is a strategic stand before anything else. It signals to public 
opinion that, contrary to the belief of some, the state is not selling public assets, which 
belong after all to the tax payers. Moreover, by retaining ownership, the state retains 
also some sort of deterrent over the enterprise. The state can thus be sure that the 
enterprise will still comply with government directives, namely those relating to the 
national development plans which are centrally conceived. In short, if the state gave 
away its assets to the benefit of the enterprise, it will undoubtedly lose all powers over 
it, henceforth putting the whole economic programme of reform into jeopardy. These 
are some of the arguments which demonstrate why the Algerian legislator prefers to 
speak of a mere transfer of ownership rather than a cessation.
(ii) Planning.
It was made clear during the debate on the economic reforms that the Algerian 
economy must continue to be centrally planned. The main objective of the autonomy 
process, it was emphasised, was not to free the enterprise to produce whatever it likes, 
outwith any national development plan. In fact the drafters insisted that the newly 
created enterprise must remain the chief instrument in the realisation of the economic
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objectives fixed in advance by the state. In the Report on the Autonomy of the 
Enterprises presented by the government and adopted by the National Assembly, the 
role of the new public enterprise is defined as follows:
La vraie planification de l'economie nationale ne saurait 
longtemps survivre et imprimer la rigueur et l'efficacite 
attendues d'elle sans etre reellement appuyee par des 
enterprises publiques pleinement responsables de leurs 
activitesX^O)
What seems paradoxical, in the Algerian experience, is that on the one hand, 
Algerian officials want to free public enterprise, which means, inter alia, creating new 
m echanism s which would liberate the enterprise from any form of state 
interventionism. On the other hand, they want the same enterprise to comply with strict 
economic rules which are not always compatible with the meaning of autonomy and all 
which that implies in terms of economic management. To this state of confusion, the 
Algerian reformers reply that it is only the method in reorganising the national economy 
that has changed. The purpose remains the same: to achieve, as usual, the economic 
objectives centrally planned by the government.
The task is to marry the planning system with the techniques of the free market. 
In other words, the state will continue to plan the economy and at the same time ask the 
new enterprise to work "freely" toward the achievement of the planned g o a ls .^ ^  This 
sounds very much like the "capitalisation" of socialism in contrast to the "socialisation" 
of capitalism preached by the Thatcher government in the mid 19 8 0 ' s .  Algerian 
officials, however insist that even their approach to development planning has changed. 
It is rather flexible and efficient planning, far from the cumbersome and heavily 
bureaucratic system that existed in the past. Government's insistence on planning rests 
basically on a set of defendable arguments.
In the first place, it would be politically dangerous to withdraw from the planning
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arena. The national and international economic situations being what they are, ie 
unsatisfactory, it would be unwise to leave an infant economy to the merciless greed of 
the free market. Hence, the need for the state to confirm its presence by orienting, 
regulating and controlling, through appropriate instruments and within the respect of 
decentralisation, the evolution of the national economy through elaborated development 
plans.
Secondly, only the state can decide over most important and strategic economic 
issues, and ensure its independence vis a vis other nations. The state has the means, 
human and material, to protect the economy from unmotivated free enterprise initiative. 
The experience of the Egyptian "open door policy" or Syassat el Injitah, is too near to 
be r e m e m b e r e d . ^ ) instead of manufactured goods, foodstuffs, machinery and 
equipment, the Egyptian economy was flooded within a record time with crisps, soft 
drinks and cosmetics manufactured by the private foreign companies in search of easy 
and quick profit.
Thirdly, there is the crucial question of the satisfaction of the basic needs of the 
population. This is too sensitive an area to be left to private initiative -whether local or 
foreign- and which many LDC leaders fear most. A hungry population is political 
suicide for any Third World regime. In most of these countries "he who controls 
people's bellies, controls their brains."
A significant detail which must be recalled, is that the whole process of the 
economic reforms in general and the autonomy of the enterprise in particular was 
carried out under the supervision of the World Bank. The contradictions that were 
spotted in the process of the implementation of the public sector reflect in reality the arm 
twisting between the Algerian government and the Bank on the speed and extent of the 
r e f o r m s . S i n c e  the Bank has not objected so far, it means that it agrees with the 
progress of the reforms with, perhaps, one reservation. Sooner or later, the Bank 
expects the remaining traces of socialism to disappear and the new enterprise to become
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genuinely autonomous, that is to say, market-oriented. In short, p r i v a t i s e d / " ^ )
IV- Some Common Issues in Privatisation.
Despite divergence in their respective approaches to privatisation, both Poland 
and Algeria share almost the same issues which are in fact characteristic of all LDCs 
engaged in a Bank assisted privatisation programme. The most common issues are of a 
legal and institutional nature.
A) Legal Issues.
The first legal obstacles for Poland and Algeria are constitutional. On the one 
hand, to be legitimate, any privatisation programme must rely on a certain legal basis; 
that is to say on specific provisions setting out clearly the individual's freedom and 
right to own private assets that are constitutionally protected. On the other hand, 
constitutional reforms are needed in order to guarantee that privatised enterprises and 
assets will not be nationalised in the future. In the cases of Poland and Algeria, both 
countries had in the past national constitutions which were heavily impregnated with 
socialist principles that became incompatible with the new economic reforms. 
Therefore, the immediate task for both countries was to introduce radical changes in 
their respective constitutions.
a) Major Changes in Polish Law.
In Poland the previous constitution was replaced straightaway by the enactment of 
a new constitution which espoused almost the opposite principles and ideals held for 
nearly half a century. In the midst of a popular fever, the new constitution was 
overwhelmingly supported by the Polish people, and subsequently adopted by the new 
parliam ent.^) Following the promulgation of the new constitution, a large number of
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certainly the most i m p o r t a n t .  (78) The main features of this law are described below.
(i) The Privatisation Law of 1990.
The intention is not to provide a full examination of the privatisation law, but to 
give a hint at the kind of legal arrangements which the Polish legislator had to introduce 
to give effect to the Bank's assisted economic r e f o r m s .  (79) To be further concise, two 
main characteristics of the privatisation law are selected for analysis. These are:
• The Restructuring of Public Companies.
As far as public companies are concerned, the privatisation law allows for state 
enterprises to be transformed ipso facto  into limited liability companies (Arts. 5-17). 
These are in turn made subject to commercial law, denoting thus their withdrawal from 
public law and their submission to private law.
The ancillary issue of shares and shareholders is also largely regulated by the new 
privatisation law, which provides that shares of up to 10 percent will be sold to private 
parties, domestic and foreign (Arts 29-32). However, foreign investors may acquire 
more than 10 percent with special permission from the Foreign Investment Agency. 
Worth noting, too, in the new law is the employment contract and the provisions 
relating to employment relations. These provisions affect the Executive Directors and 
the rest of the managerial staff o f the former state owned enterprises (ex. 
Nomencklatura) some of which were discontinued ex lege. Also affected are the 
employees and trade union movements who saw their mandatory participation in 
corporation management dissolved.
• The Banking System.
The banking system is the second major area of the new privatisation law where 
noticeable changes have been introduced. With the technical assistance of western
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noticeable changes have been introduced. With the technical assistance of western 
banks, namely the British merchant bankers (Midlands, Rothschild, and BDarclays), 
the entire financial system has been reviewed. In the first move all the state and state 
cooperative banks were transformed into joint stock banking companies, and their role 
was redefined in the light of reforms to respond better to the needs of the private
sector.
b)- Major Legal Changes in Algerian Law.
In Algeria, the legal process has been very active and intensive since the 
beginning of the 1980's. Most of the legislative work carried out by the Popular 
National Assembly (APN), consisted mainly in the revival of the private sector, whose 
role in the economic development of the country was until then completely neglected.
(i) The Rehabilitation of the Private Sector.
For the first time since independence, the existence of the private sector was 
guaranteed and the failure of state ownership openly recognised. The bulk of 
legislation which followed subsequently is considerable and it will be inconvenient to 
seek a thorough examination of such laws here.(81) However, a hint may be made at 
the second five-year plan (1985-1990) as a revolutionary turn in the economic history 
of the country. Under the title of: The Development of the Private Sector and its 
Inclusion in the Planning Process." Section III of the plan pointed out that the private 
sector has for a long time been neglected by government economic decision makers. Its 
expansion has been severely undercut by indiscriminate legislation which looked upon 
the private sector as a parasite rather than a complement to the public sector.(8~)
When details of the plan emerged, there was bitter opposition from some 
conservative members in the one party system at that time. They saw in the recognition
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of the private sector a betrayal of socialist Algeria and, above all, an unconstitutional 
act. Indeed, the 1976 Constitution not only neglected private ownership, but Article 16 
explicitly forbids it.
(ii) Constitutional problems.
Like in Poland, the first major legal obstacle facing the Algerian reformers was 
the existence of a constitution that was far from accommodating to the new economic 
measures. However, unlike Poland, Algeria did not opt for a new constitution. 
Instead, the Chadli government which was determined to push with the reforms, 
proceeded in two steps. In 1986, it called for an "enrichissement" (modification) of 
the constitution in force. This technique does not exist in state practice, but it was 
accepted as a clear device to change some aspects of the Constitution without going into 
the core of its fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . ^ )  Title III, Chapt. 1, of the newly rewritten 
1986 Constitution rehabilitates the role and importance of the private sector in the 
following terms:
The development of the national private sector must be 
integrated and supervised in the framework of the 
developm ent plan and conform to the priorities 
mentioned in it. It will also be necessary to organise the 
rigorous orientation of this sector, its cadres, and its 
control in order to ensure complementarity rather than 
rivalry between the public sector and the private sector.
The second stage was carried two years after the modification of the constitution, 
after ten days of social unrest and street riots in October 1988 forcing the Algerian 
government to the enactment of a new constitution in 1989. On the political front, the 
new constitution recognised for the first time the institution of pluralist society. On the 
economic front, the constitution provides for more liberalisation in order to accelerate 
the reforms started e a r l i e r . ^ )
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(iii) Other Changes.
After the promulgation of the constitution, all the previous restrictions on the 
private sector were lifted, and more liberal laws were introduced, among which the 
most relevant are:
The Law on Monev and Credit.
«/
The Law on Currency Convertibility.
The New Law of Foreign Investment.
In parallel to the newly created laws to enhance the private sector, changes in the 
public sector have made alterations in other areas of the Algerian law i n d i s p e n s a b l e . ^ )  
Thus, many codes have been substantially reformed such as the civil code (contract 
law), penal code, commercial code, and company law to cite only these areas. There 
were also significant adjustments in the administrative law, as the notion of public 
ownership and state enterprise was reviewed. The entire Banking system has been 
entirely reformed, with a dominant role being given to enhanced autonomy to the 
Banks, while further steps were made to put them on a more commercial footing .(86)
B)- Institutional Problems.
Both Poland's and Algeria's legal reforms in the private sector were debated and 
approved by both Parliaments. In both cases there are reports that the political debate 
was long and quite often tu rb u le n t/^ )  On the institutional front, the privatisation 
drive in the two countries has brought into being new institutions which are peculiar to 
each country.
a) Poland.
In Poland, the Parliament enacted the so called "Main Directives" of privatisation. 
These directives deal with the scope of privatisation and the distribution of revenues
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collected from the sale of state enterprises. Two executive bodies were entrusted with 
the enforcement of the privatisation programme.
(i) The Council of Ministers.
The Council comprises all members of government. Its task is to prepare all 
privatisation plans before tendering them to parliament for acceptance. It lists a special 
group of enterprises for privatisation. This provision is intended to give the 
government the last say in privatisation of important public sector enterprises such as 
radio, television, or railways, as well as those producing for the military s e c to r .(8 8 )
(ii) The Ministry of Ownership Transformation.
This is a new office which was created on the insistence of the Bank. It is a 
policy making body as well as an executive organ which deals with the day to day 
privatisation process. All decisions as to whether or not to privatise an enterprise must 
be approved by the Minister (except those enterprises on the government special
list).(89)
b) Algeria.
In Algeria, no major institutional changes on the Polish pattern were involved, as 
there was no real transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector. The 
reforms were carried out within the existing institutional framework. Perhaps the only 
originality of the bulk of the Algerian reforms is the establishment of the Conseil de la 
Monnaie et du Credit.(CMC) (The Money and Credit Council). The Council is 
considered by most observers as the cornerstone of the Algerian reforms in general and 
the privatisation programme in particular.(^)
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(i) Le Conseil de la Monnaie et du Credit (CMC)
Following the approval in March 1990, of the Money and Credit Law, the CMC 
was established. The Council is intended to control the free movement of capital flow, 
to promote foreign investment and more importantly to open the way for private 
(national) companies to establish international ventures. The CMC is seen by most 
financial analysts as a sign of the government commitment to radical overhaul, offering 
an unprecedented opening of the Algerian market to foreign investment.^!)
(ii) Le Delcgue des Reformes Economiques.
Another, but relatively less important institution, which was established in the 
midst of the Algerian reforms, is the post of "Delegue des Reformes Economiques". It 
is not a ministerial function with substantial powers like in the Polish experience. 
Instead the role of the Delegate is to coordinate the work of various ministries directly 
involved in implementing the economic reforms, and to report their progress to the 
Prime M in iste r.^ )
From the foregoing comparison of the Polish and Algerian experiences, it appears 
that, in addition to its economic impact, privatisation affects also major facets of the 
legal and institutional aspects of the borrower. These changes are necessary, says the 
Bank, for without them, the economic reforms cannot be implemented, and the whole 
process of development will be d i s t u r b e d . ^ )  But does privatisation really enhance 
the development process of the LDCs? In other words, will its successful 
implementation be The solution to the Third World's poverty and economic retardation?
V- The Impact of Privatisation on Development.
It has been discussed in this chapter that the Bank in its capacity as a development 
agency has been the main actor in advocating the LDCs to go private. Does this
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statement mean that the development of the Third World economies can be achieved 
through massive privatisation programmes ? The question is worth exploring at least 
theoretically, since it represents a review of the general theory of development. So far, 
the LDC governments have relied on the public sector as the only way to get out of their 
underdevelopment for the reasons explained earlier. This theory was developed in the 
late 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's in the aftermath of the decolonisation 
process. It was academically reinforced in the 1970's by the emergence of a new Third 
World elite which elaborated the idea of a Right to D e v e l o p m e n t / ^ )  The UN became 
suddenly the focus of the LDC grievances, especially during the seventies when great 
emphasis was placed in official statements and international documents on the virtues of 
the public sector in the process of the LDCs economic d e v e l o p m e n t / ^ )  In a relatively 
short period of time, the number of state owned enterprises took on considerable 
p ro p o rtio n s/^ )
The radical shift from the public to the private sector that started in the early 
eighties is far from being completed, and it may be too premature to rely on any given 
experience since results are difficult to assess. Therefore, one can only speculate or 
elevate the debate to a purely theoretical level.
A)- Conceptual Approach.
To begin with, privatisation and development seem in the particular context of 
Third World economic problems, to constitute two words that are conceptually 
opposite. On the one hand, privatisation means, among other things, doing business in 
the capitalist sense of the word. It includes such concepts as share, shareholder, 
dividend, and profit. Customarily private ownership equals individual property, 
individual fortune, and above all individual welfare. There is a notion of individuality 
which is often connected with selfishness, greed and vocabulary of the like which
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excludes de facto  any notion of group or collectivity. In a general manner, 
privatisation is a concept proper to a certain type of society which relies on private 
ownership to meet its basic economic needs. A private owner would not think in terms 
of developing, prima facie , the welfare of a society. In the United Kingdom, the 
Thatcher government's view of the mid 1980's was that once some individuals are well 
off, they create jobs and welfare for the others.
In the legal sphere, a liberal society is characterised by a strong and ramified 
private law, heavily influenced by the principle of individual freedom in many of its 
aspects such as commercial law, competition law, business law. Accordingly, much of 
the laws on manufacturing, pricing, and selling are dictated by the market, rather than 
by sterile and bureaucratic government decrees.
Development, on the other hand, in its economic sense and Third World context, 
refers to a certain unsatisfactory level of economic welfare. Broadly, development is 
synonymous with poverty, hunger, poor housing, and unemployment. Unlike 
privatisation, development implies the notion of community or collectivity. Some LDC 
leaders, namely in Africa, tend to give development an ethical meaning. President J. 
Nyerere of Tanzania for example, talks of the moral duty of the industrial world to help 
the poor c o u n tr ie s /^ )  In a wider sense, development is ensured by the collective 
management of the national resources which are put at the disposal of the state organs. 
In backward economies, people do not believe in individuals bringing wealth to other 
individuals unless the state intervenes. In such economic systems, the predominant 
view, is that it is the peoples who own and run the country's national resources. Since 
the public sector is perceived as a fundamentally non-profit making sector, it offers 
certain guarantees such as employment, housing facilities, a free health service and 
education.
It is unthinkable for many LDCs that such policies could be promoted by any 
private ownership. For, it is difficult to see how any government can achieve any
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socio-economic development by sitting idly while the country's resources and capital 
are drained away by private individuals, be they national or expatriate, in the aristocratic 
words of the late Lord Stockton (H. McMillan):
First all the the Georgian silver goes and then all the nice 
furniture that used to be in the saloon. Then the 
Canalettos go.(98)
In the LDCs, the Bank's objective is even wider, since it is the very essence of 
socialist thinking and behaviour, which the institution seeks to replace through its 
assisted programmes of privatisation. Such an attitude is translated into legal form by a 
highly developed corpus of public law where most economic decisions are taken by 
massive government legislation. To enforce such laws, a heavy bureaucracy is usually 
set up supported by an extensive and elaborate administrative law. Furthermore, 
privatisation is not just an economic concept which would transform a state economy 
through a public sector substitution. Take for example Algeria, whose people have 
held for more than thirty years, since independence, that res publica  is sacred. It 
belongs to everyone. The civil code regulates it, the penal code punishes he who 
violates it. So, it is just not conceivable to tell the same people overnight that what used 
to be theirs, is now the property of one person who may be one of them or an 
expatriate.
In addition to its economic and legal impact, the political cost of privatisation may 
also be high to pay for many LDC leaders. How can previously socialist governments 
justify, after so many years of public ownership, a sudden shift to private property? 
This raises the question of trust between government and citizens. The whole reform 
may become jeopardised if governments which carry them out are not trusted by their 
people. Privatisation, thus, does not need only a government which is committed to it 
as the Bank's officials often insist/^9) It also needs a given public mentality which is 
ready to accept it, and a given economic environment which is able to sustain it. This is
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why, for instance, the Algerian reformers did not want to hurry things up, but they 
preferred to proceed by steps. In most LDCs where social commitment is lacking, 
privatisation programmes have little chance of succeeding, and with them the entire 
economic development is at risk. Therefore, any privatisation programme which does 
not take into account the degree of social readiness may not achieve its objectives. The 
dilemma, however, is the time factor. Economic development in essence, calls for 
rapidity and confidence, i.e. the quicker the economy progresses, the better off the 
masses will be. But a change in people's mentality needs strenuous efforts and a long 
period.
Similarly, privatisation involves a change of attitude in peoples' mentality, by 
imposing on them a new style and economic way of life. Unless these psycho- 
sociological obstacles are overcome, privatisation may not achieve its socio-economic 
targets. In Algeria, eg., after five years of SAL implementation supposed to lead to a 
privatisation of the national economy, a large segment of the population from various 
backgrounds, do not hide their regrets over the loss of "the old golden days of 
socialism"^ !®0) whether this is only a temporary transitional period as the Bank and 
government officials claim, remains to be seen. In sum, privatisation programmes 
advised and supported by the Bank are not always as perfect as the institution claims. 
They too, have their loopholes and shortcomings.
a) The Side Effects of Privatisation.
All privatisation programmes rely to a large extent on the sacrosanct economic 
principle of price l i b e r a l i s a t i o n / A n  application of this principle implies a removal 
of state subsidies, which are an essential ingredient in the economic structure of many 
LDCs. From the Bank's point of view, price liberalisation and state subsidies are 
conceptually contradictory, and as such cannot work effectively side by side within the
218
same economic system. According to the Bank's economists, the purpose of price 
liberalisation is precisely to restore the real value of the market which may be distorted 
by a policy of state s u b s i d i e s / F o r  the less privileged part of the population, 
which cannot bear the high cost of living, the Bank has developed a policy of 
targeting/103) As will be seen, despite its good intentions, this policy was not always 
welcomed by recipient countries.
a) Targeting, or the Food Coupon Policy.
Since the implementation of the Bank's first assisted programme of privatisation, 
it became apparent that such a programme cannot function in a society where the vast 
majority is sometimes below the breadline. To ease the tension, the Bank has devised a 
policy which consists of "targeting" the less privileged segments of the population and 
providing them with extra help in the form of food coupons, which the beneficiary can 
use in any shop to buy certain basic consumption foods. While such policies seem to 
have succeeded in some countries of Latin America (Chile) and South A s ia /1® )^ it has 
been less attractive not to say unpopular, in many other LDCs. In Algeria, the 
introduction of the food coupon was severely critisised by the press as "humiliating and 
morally degrading for the Algerian's self-esteem and d ignity"/^ 5 )  The coupon story 
became later an issue of strategic importance for opposition political parties during the 
legislative elections of December 1991. Under the pressure of the street, the Algerian 
governement abunded the coupon policy and replaced it by a system of (financial) 
allowances on the westen model. The new formulae was accepted in the form but not 
in substance as the amount of money allocated was significantly below people's 
expectations. In many other countries, for example, Egypt, Morocco, or Tunisia, such 
a policy is regarded by left wing activists who oppose privatisation, as increasing social 
disparities and perpetuating the domination of those who have against those who have 
n o t /106) Bank's view is that such a policy is temporary and the trends will be
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reversed, once the economy is back on its feet/ !07)
b) Subsidiary Shortcomings.
Despite the Bank's praise and drive for privatisation, the implementing of this 
latter has been seriously hampered by a series of loopholes which may be summarised 
in a single word: malpreparation.
• In the first place, there is a problem of management. For example, the 
transformation of many state companies into private businesses in Poland and the 
reform of the public sector in Algeria was carried out by the previous managerial staff, 
who were not prepared for such an enterprise. The former managers not only lacked 
the skill, experience, and techniques of a liberal economy, but they were also 
sometimes unconvinced and unmotivated. In Algeria, for instance, the former managers 
of the public sector have gathered in a "Groupement" to show their discontent at the 
reforms and their manifesto claims openly to resist and prevent p r i v a t i s a t i o n / ^ 8 )
• The second problem relates to the issue of subsidies. It is not possible to 
convince a population seriously hit by the removal of subsidies to support an austerity 
programme. As a Russian anti economic reformist said in an interview to the BBC 
"Why should we support reforms which cannot feed people and which make life 
harder."^109)
• Thirdly, and perhaps more importantly is the weighting of the losses due to 
parastatal insufficiency and the costs of the LDCs continuing to rely on foreign 
investors given the predilection of these latter for repatriating profits.
• Finally, there is a question of legal transplant where comparative lawyers may 
be of some h e lp /^ ^ )  ^or, what the Bank is doing simply boils down to transplanting 
an economic concept or institution (privatisation) into a totally new socio-economic 
environment/ * * Free enterprise may be acceptable in western democracies, but may 
not prove successful in other parts of the world. The reasons are various and relate to a
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multitude of factors such as the structure of the economy the type of society; or even to 
metaphysical factors such as religion. These are, naturally, conditions which are 
inherent to each society and which cannot be overruled by the implementation of (an 
alien) privatisation type of economic development.
In the Bank, senior officials admit that the privatisation programme is not easy, 
and that the management is well aware of the difficulties that the LDCs face in the 
implementation of such a program m e/! !-) j f e  Bank argues that all it does, it does it 
for the benefit of the L D C s / ^ 3 )  But, are there not other "hidden" long term 
objectives behind the Bank's drive for privatisation ?
B)- The Political and Ideological Objectives Underlying the Bank's 
Privatisation Programme.
According to the neo-classical view, government spending in the public sector 
diverts funds from developm ent/! !^) On the basis of that view, the Bank requires 
from its borrower either to go private (as it is the case in Poland) or to run the public 
sector on business like enterprise before a wholesale privatisation (e.g. Algeria). In 
both cases, the immediate purpose is to create an environment where capital and profit 
are dominant. The ultimate goal being eventually the development, expansion and 
promotion of the capitalist system.
a) The Expansion of the Capitalist Ideology.
The Bank has been in fact nourishing such a project since the early days of its 
inception, as it was reported in its third Annual Report:
One of the principal objectives of the Bank... is to help 
to create conditions which will encourage a steady and 
substantial stream of private investment... flowing into
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its underdeveloped member c o u n t r i e s / *  15)
Needless to say that this view reflects the US policy in the aftermath of World 
War II, for which the Bank was looked upon as the future instrument and porte parole 
of American expansionist policy. As President Eisenhower said in his address to the 
first Annual Meeting of the IBRD Board of Governors:
The well being of the free world can only be achieved 
through the sacred trinity of free trade, sound monetary 
policy and currency convertibility. Once the above 
conditions are realized, a great deal of flow of private 
investment can take place and presumably, the Bank 
needs guide only the direction of the flow.(l 16)
It was seen in the experiences of Poland and Algeria that privatisation 
programmes cannot be conceived as a purely internal process, confined within the 
limits of the state's boundaries. When the Polish government embarked on its 
privatisation programme, it made it clear that it counted on foreign investors for the 
successful completion of its programme/ * ^ )  Similarly for Algeria which had to pass 
laws on private foreign investment to sustain its private sector reforms. Thus, it 
appears as if all privatisation programmes initiated by the Bank cannot be achieved 
domestically without external assistance. The Bank's long term objective is precisely to 
establish a link between national private ownership and its foreign counterpart, with a 
view to perpetuating free capital movement. As Parakal et al wrote :
Besides its profit motive, this [privatisation] policy 
enables the Bank to strengthen its foothold in the young 
states and to perpetuate the economic dependence of the 
latter on the capitalist states ... as such, the aim of the 
Bank is to develop a dependent capitalism/
To help LDC countries adopt a supportive environment for the private sector, the 
Bank research programme has been actively involved in devising different initiatives to
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increase the effectiveness of the Bank's activities in that sector. In early 1989, it 
suggested the creation of two major institutions:
(i) The Private Sector Development (PSD)
The Private Sector Development (PSD) is the first initiative which was launched 
by the Bank's research programme in January 1989 to enhance privatisation.
According to the Bank's own manual, the PSD was designed:
To fill in the gaps in the Bank's Group activities in 
private sector development, integrate private sector 
development into Bank operation, identify areas in which 
efforts should be intensified, and focus on ways to
improve coordination among the Bank, IFC and
MIGA.(119)
PSD's priority areas are the business environment, enterprise restructuring, and 
financial intermediation. A subsequent review of the implementation of the PSD in 
fiscal 1991 concluded that cooperation within the World Bank Group was essential, 
and re-emphasised the need to strengthen the role of the IFC through additional 
resources to meet the demand of an expanding private s e c t o r / *~®) If such a trend 
continues, all the odds are that the IFC will overtake the mother institution as the main 
lending agency of the Bank Group. This will depend obviously on how successful the 
implementation of the Bank's privatisation scheme will be. In sum, the more the 
programme is successful, the more the Corporation will become involved and the less 
the Bank's role will be important.
(ii) The Socialist Economies Reform Unit.
The main task of the unit is to help address the problems involved in transforming
socialist economies into market-based systems, in the former communist block.* 7
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Through the Unit, the Bank seeks to strengthen and encourage research in socialist 
reform program m es/*^1) Although the country coverage of the Unit was initially set 
up for Eastern and Central Europe, it was later extended to China, and a number of 
other countries in Asia and Africa/*"")
b) The Redefinition of the Role and Function of the State.
Since the last decade which coincides with the introduction of Bank SALs, 
remarkable changes seem to have occurred in the thinking about the role of government 
in economic development. Under SAL programmes, an increasing number of LDCs of 
all political colours have been moving towards policies that favour a reduced role for 
the public sector, and greater reliance on the private sector. But the will for change has 
not always been matched by the ability to effect a change.
For many LDC governments, the implementation of the Bank's privatisation 
programme has drained away the state's authority over its economic agents. Under the 
Bank's recommendation, many LDCs found themselves left with a set of corporations 
upon which they did not have any power or control, "liberalisation obliges." This has 
upset many LDC governments for which, as H. Fox wrote:
As a sovereign state, a developing state enjoys reserve 
public powers which entitle it to regulate its activities by 
reference to the needs of its country, rather than to be 
treated as a contracting party to a com m ercial 
transaction. (123)
Another factor which seems worrying for many LDC governments future in 
economic activities, is the size and volume of foreign investment penetration. The issue 
of expatriate capital is seen by most LDC leaders as a double edged weapon. On the one 
hand, they are aware that their privatisation programmes cannot be carried out without 
an extra How of capital from abroad. On the other hand, unlimited cash flow may pose
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a threat to the state's control over its economy, bringing thus to the fore front the crucial 
issue of outside interference and decision making in key economic activities.
Generally speaking, fear from foreign investment take over is not peculiar to 
Third World governments only. Even in the most liberal economies such as the United 
Kingdom and the United States, there are sectors which are closed to private foreign 
capital (eg. the military), and sectors where this capital is limited by law s/*"^) The 
problem of being taken over by foreign capital is, however, felt more acutely in the 
Third World because of their economic vulnerability. In many LDCs the principle of 
economic independence is closely linked to political independence. This is clearly 
recalled in the UN resolution on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
adopted in 1962 on the Third World initiative/*-5)
For many LDCs a wholesale liberalisation of the economy is simply losing 
control over the country's political destiny. Furthermore, many LDCs have learnt that 
foreign investment is not always the right answer to their economic problems. 
Experience today shows that it often creates additional problems for many LDCs of 
which the most common are:
• Foreign investment is unstable and uncertain, and as such it cannot be a reliable 
source of financing, because it is largely open to unpredictable political factors. The 
slightest diplomatic row between the recipient country and the government to which the 
private investors belong, may lead to a standstill in part or the whole of the national 
economy. For example the dispute between the US and Libya in 1986 led the White 
House to call on all American companies to quit Libya. Later on the US made several 
efforts to influence their western allies, namely the EEC, to take similar action, because 
of the alleged Libyan leader's involvement in state sponsored terrorism.
• Too much involvement of foreign investment may also be detrimental to the 
national economy of the borrower which then becomes heavily dependent on it.
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• Another important issue is the repatriation of profits, which means hard 
currencies going abroad as most of the time foreign investors are not interested in 
reinvesting in the recipient country.
These are some of the issues that the Bank seems to underestimate, for the simple 
reason that privatisation is conceived as a merely economic phenomenon, whereas its 
political and social aspects are equally important. Unless these issues are properly 
addressed by the Bank, the chances for implementing its privatisation programmes may 
well continue to be seriously obstructed in the future.
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Conclusion to Chapter Four.
Under the Bank's pressure, development strategies in most LDCs have been 
changing over the past decade, moving toward a greater emphasis on private activity 
and competitive markets. From the 1940's into the 1970's, economic policy in much 
of the developing world was characterised by confidence in the capacity of the 
government to spur growth and bring about economic welfare.
The beginning of the 1980's saw a sweeping wave of the privatisation 
phenomenon in many LDCs and Central and Eastern European countries. Several 
factors contributed to this event. One of them is the appalling state of the Third World 
planned economies. Another factor, is the failure of centrally planned economies which 
had a negative effect on the LDCs which were following the socialist patter of economic 
developmen. For the Bank, there was no other better time to implement at last one of 
its cardinal objectves set out in its Articles of Agreement, which is the support of the 
private sector. As a result, the public sector in many Third World, Central and Eastern 
countries has been subject to radical transformations, leading sometimes to its 
disappearance from the economic scene.
These economic reforms were preceded from the legal point of view, by massive 
legislative action in almost every aspect of the borrowers' legal systems, ranging from 
their constitutions, down to the ordinary custom laws. The bulk of this legislation was 
intended to lower the state's interference in economic life. As a result, the role of the 
state became increasingly aleatory both at the internal as well as external level. 
Internally, the divestiture of key economic enterprises signified an end to the state's 
authority and monopoly over key economic sectors, and accordingly a lower role in the 
conduct and control of many aspects of the national economy. Externally, the 
increasing flow of foreign capital investment made the borrower's sovereignty open to 
bargaining in the market place.
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As the 1980's drew to a close, it appeared to the Bank that its economic reforms 
in general and its privatisation programme in particular were well below its 
expectations. The Bank blamed low economic performance on the LDCs' political 
structure which, according to the institution, prevented the successful implementation 
of the reforms.
To remedy the situation, the Bank announced in the early 1990's that its future 
lending would be conditional on the LDCs' readiness to introduce, in anticipation of 
any loan request, major reforms in their political system. In short the Bank has in 
addition to its economic conditionality subjected its clients to a second type of 
conditionality, this time of a political nature.
In the following Chapter, an attempt will be made to examine the major features 
of this new lending policy and to assess the legal implications of this dual 
conditionality on borrowers.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SPECIFIC IMPACT OF BANK ACTIVITIES 
ON THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF BORROWERS.
In the recent past, the Bank has moved away from its traditional economic 
conditionality, and started requiring its LDC borrowers to introduce, beside the 
economic criteria, political changes in their system of governance. The Bank change in 
attitude is not the result of an internal planned policy or resolution, but seems rather 
dictated by a combination of external as well as internal factors. It is therefore essential 
to look, albeit briefly, at the nature of these factors.
I- Recent Change in the International Environment.
At the end of the 1980's, the world economic and political outlook changed 
dramatically. On the economic front, Third World economies were on the verge of 
bankruptcy as their foreign debt reached alarming proportions. The flow of capital 
became reversed, and more money was fleeing from the developed rich North to the 
underdeveloped poor South in debt repayment. The confrontation between debtors and 
creditors increased, thus reducing sharply the flow of private investment to the LDCs. 
And all that at a time when the LDCs themselves required net resources inflow to 
sustain their development efforts.
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On the political front, the end of the 1980's saw also their upheavals with the 
spectacular and rapid disintegration of the communist regimes, and the emergence of 
new democracies in Eastern and Central Europe. The dismantling of the Soviet Union 
and later on its replacement by the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 
remains, from a geopolitical point of view, amongst the most salient feature of the end 
of this century.
In the midst of these changes,the Western world emerged as a politically and 
economically reliable system to which the newly democratised states turned for 
assistance. Knowing in advance their economic superiority, Western leaders expressed 
their readiness to help the former communist regimes on condition that these latter 
undertake major political reform in their system of governance, and opt for an open 
market economy. Opening an OECD conference on the economic problems of Eastern 
and Central Europe, the Chairman of the DAC stated that:
There is a vital connection between open , democratic 
and accountable political systems, individual rights and 
the effective and equitable operation of economic 
systems with substantial reductions in poverty.(-)
The consequences of such a (Western) policy have a double effect on the 
economic development of most of the LDCs. On the one hand, Western donors 
attention to Eastern European aid needs and their introduction of democratisation as a 
condition for further support is troubling many LDCs who fear similar treatment, or a 
possible aid disengagement from the South to East.(3) Despite assurance from Western 
donors trying to convince LDC leaders that the flow of international resources toward 
Eastern Europe will not be at the expense of assistance for the Third World countries, 
this does not seem to be the the case.(4) Doubts about these assurances were hardened 
when Western countries extended their conditionality of democratisation to Third World 
countries and linked their financial aid to political reform.(^) On the other hand, this
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new shift in official aid policy has also extended to the World Bank which seems to 
follow its main suppliers' path by requiring from its borrowers good governance as a 
new criteria for its future loans. It is therefore essential to look first at the reasons 
behind the DCs shift in aid policy, before considering at some length the Bank's new 
attitude.
A)- New Trends in Western Aid Policy.
In the past, the West has always tied its aid, whether concessional or non­
concessional, to the Third World.(^) This tied aid was basically justified on three main 
grounds:economic, political and ideological (or strategic). Economically, the West 
granted aid to LDCs on condition that the loan be spent on the purchase of goods and 
equipment from the donor country. This was by far the most common type of tied aid. 
Examples of this type are countless and the literature is abundant.(^) Politically, 
Western countries gave financial aid to LDCs in order to gain some extra votes on 
crucial issues in international fora such as the UN. For instance, US aid to Morocco to 
back America's stand against the admission of China (before 1980) to the UN fits 
perfectly in this category of aid. Ideologically, the West was specially generous 
towards some LDCs because they were vital to counter what the US used to call "the 
communist threat". On the grounds of such a policy, the Americans financed projects 
as far apart as Africa (Kenya, Liberia), South Asia (The Philippines), and Latin 
America (Honduras, El Salvador, Panama), on condition that the loans should be used 
to develop capitalist oriented economies (and therefore stop the spread of social ism).1(®)
By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, none of the reasons 
justifying Western aid to LDCs remained. The democratisation of Eastern Europe and 
especially the crumbling of the "hobbled giant", the Soviet Union, marked a new turn 
in East-West relations. The Cold War which pushed the superpowers to gain some 
Third World friends in every corner of the planet has ended. The Eastern countries
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headed by the Soviet Union, emerged completely devastated by more than forty years 
of communism. Financially bankrupt, they turned to the West for assistance, while 
knocking at the door of the IMF and the World Bank; some asking for more money 
(Yugoslavia, Romania), others applying for membership (former USSR, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia).(9) For the West, the economies of the East presented an enormous 
market for its goods, technology and services. It was only a question of time and 
money. These latter will be taken from the LDCs and reoriented to the newly 
democratic states of Eastern Europe as will be discussed in the forthcoming section. In 
the meantime, the process of disengagement has already started both at regional and 
national levels of the Western countries.
a) Collective Western Action.
Regionally, the tone was officially given in 1989/90, when the OECD was 
approached informally by the governments of several Central and Eastern European 
countries which were embarking on the transition from centrally planned to more 
market oriented economies, and which were seeking advice on a wide range of possible 
economic reform s/10) The OECD responded by setting up the Centre for Cooperation 
with European Economies in Transition, which specialises in problems of transition 
from a centrally planned economy to a market oriented system /11) Further steps were 
taken at the Houston economic summit in July 1990 when the heads of states of the 
seven major industrial countries (G7), requested the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD, 
and the President designate of the EBRD, to undertake a detailed study of the Soviet 
economy, to make recommendations for its reforms, and to establish the conditions for 
western economic assistance to support such reforms effectively. The study was 
carried out collectively and submitted as planned at the end of 1 9 9 0 /1-) In the 
following Western economic summit's of the G7 in London, July 1991, the aid
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deliberations focussed once again on the Eastern bloc and notably the Soviet Union. 
This expected move was followed by a series of packages of aid from the EEC, 
including food and medicines to countries such as Poland, Romania, East Germany and 
the USSR. In short, what used to be the lot for Ethiopia, Sudan and Bangladesh, has 
simply been diverted to Warsaw, Bucharest and M o s c o w / 13)
The West extended its generosity to the East when it announced the first ever debt 
write off for a group of Eastern countries including P o l a n d / ^ )  Western solidarity 
reached its peak in April 1991 when the DCs leaders gathered in London for the 
inauguration of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), 
which many observers regard as a new Marshall Plan for the Eastern and Central 
European c o u n t r i e s / 15) [n SL!m, the political detente between East and West has 
overshadowed the economic problems of the LDCs who have been since then accorded
a lower p riority /15)
b) Individual State Action.
At the level of individual countries, the process of withdrawal has also started in 
the main Western capitals as DCs launched an unprecedented attack on LDCs economic 
failure/ 17) Senior officials as well the media have been regularly focussing on LDC 
policies and a lack of democratisation as the pnncipal causes for the Third World crisis, 
without acknowledging its severely disadvantaged position in the global economy. 
Slowly but gradually Western countries started to withdraw their official aid to LDCs 
on the ground that their political regimes were undemocratic.
France, once one of the most outspoken nations on Third World grievances has 
suddenly started to alter its line by pulling out its investments from many countries in 
Africa. According to statistics, in the space of two years almost one-third of French 
private and public businesses in Africa have closed dow n/ 18) At a recent meeting with 
Francophone heads of states, French President, F. Mitterand said that in the future, the
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country would be far more enthusiastic about extending financial assistance to countries 
which embarked on programmes of democratisation than those which did n o t / 1 9 )
In the UK, the British government is sending out similar s i g n a l s / 3 0 )  At a recent 
conference in London entitled "The Prospects for Africa in the 1990s", British foreign 
secretary Mr.D.Hurd told participants that:
Governments which persist with repressive policies with 
corrupt management, or with wasteful and discredited 
economic systems should not expect us to support their 
folly with scarce aid r e s o u r c e s / 3 1 )
Other donors have made pronouncements in surprisingly similar vein. The 
German economic cooperation Minister Jurgen Warnke told the Bundestag on May 
10th 1990 of the tying of aid by his country to political c o n d i t i o n a l i t y .(32) a  few 
months later, the new aid German policy was confirmed by Federal Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl. In his government statement on January 30th 1991, the Chancellor stressed that 
for an efficient use of the funds Germany will provide there would be some 
prerequisites, namely:
Respect for Human Rights.
Democratic government.
Economic development instead of piling up armaments.
Priority to the development of the private s e c t o r / 33)
In 1990, the Japanese Foreign Ministry's white papers for the first time linked aid 
to political value. Without determining the content or the nature of the political 
conditions envisaged, the papers specified in a general fashion that "countries efforts to 
democratise will be taken into account more than b e f o r e . "(34)
Even the Scandinavian countries which are known for their sympathy towards the 
LDCs, have changed their position. Traditionally the most generous donors in terms of 
untied aid to the Third World countries, they have recently announced substantial
245
changes in the form of development a s s i s t a n c e . ( - 5 )
a) The Kenyan Experiment.
The government of Kenya represents the first concrete western action in tying aid 
to political reform. It is seen by most observers as a test for both the DCs and the 
LDCs for any future development assistance from the former to the l a t t e r / - ^ )  \n 
November 1991, the EEC and the USA launched a virulent campaign against the 
regime of Arap Moi of Kenya, accusing the President of kleptocracy, tribalism, 
mismanagement, and of stifling the press and spurning demands for multiparty 
elections, and threatening to "brush his opponents aside like r a t s . "(-7) During the 
meeting of the Paris Club, a group of rich western governments, to which Kenya owes 
$6 billion as foreign debt, it was made clear by the donors that they would lend no 
money to a government rendered unstable by corruption and authoritarian rule. The 
Paris Club put off for six months a decision on Kenya's debt, hoping for progress in 
economic and social reforms, which, according to the Economist, meant "ending 
extortion and autocracy. "(28)
What is more relevant in the context of this thesis is the Bank's attendance at the 
Paris Club meeting. The Bank representative joined the Club's aid boycott, and 
warned that the institution would not continue to lend to Kenya unless economic and 
social (understand political) changes were introduced. Yet, not so long ago, the same 
institution praised the same government for its economic reforms, and described Kenya 
as a "successful story of structural adjustment strategies."(29) The government of 
Kenya responded by referring to an international plot to destabilise its country. The 
President accused Western countries and particularly the US of undue interference and 
provocation and said that Kenya had the right to choose its own political system and not 
engage in copying alien models.(30) However, under continuous international 
pressure President Arap Moi announced a month later, in December 1991, the
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introduction of multipartism and promised free elections in the near fu tu re .^  1)
How successful western policy in tying aid to political reform will be, and how 
often Western governments and international institutions such as the Bank, are prepared 
to repeat the Kenyan experiment, remains to be seen. For the time being, it seems that 
the West's attempt to tie aid to democratic reform has been overshadowed by more 
important events taking place within Europe. On the one hand, the Yugoslavian civil 
war, the confusing situation that still prevails in the former USSR and the pending 
issue of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal, are more important issues for western 
security than the fate of the Third World undemocratic regimes.
The Kenyan experiment and the Harare Declaration are still in their debut, and it 
may be premature, to draw any conclusion. Probably the question worth asking at this 
stage is whether political change could be the solution to the economic problems of the 
developing countries.
C)- The Opportunity of Political Conditionality.
The question which is raised and debated in the media, in policy discussion with 
Western governments and in public documents by international economic institutions is 
whether aid should be linked to political reform. A corollary to this question is whether 
democratisation in LDCs is a solution to their economic d iff icu ltie s .^ ) The question 
has been raised as a result of the recent changes in Eastern and Central Europe and the 
West's response for economic help by providing some money and promising more on 
condition of their help in continuing political liberalisation. No definite answer can be 
given for lack of past experience. However, from current experiences in some LDCs 
who are presently trying a combination of Glasnost and Perestroika, it may be possible 
to draw at least some general -and very limited- observations.(32a)
As attractive as it may be, the idea of democratic reform has not been without
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problems in many Third World countries. First of all, there are potential dangers, that 
in most cases, the introduction of democracy may centre on ethnic, regional or religious 
cleavages. In Algeria, for instance, religious leaders took advantage of open 
competition to envisage an Islamic state based on Sharia' law. The street violence and 
social unrest that followed, in preparation for the general elections, prompted the army 
to intervene and declare martial law for a period of four months. At the same time, the 
Islamic Front leaders and many of their followers were arrested and tried before courts 
martial.(33) Further attempts were made to put the democratic process on the right 
footing, but in vain. By January 1992, Algeria was left without a parliament 
(constitutionally dissolved at the eve of the general elections), without a President (who 
resigned following his party defeat in the December 1991 general elections), and only a 
transitional government (which was set up temporarily in July 1991 to prepare for the 
general elections). A five member Council of State , heavily backed by the army was 
sworn in to take in charge the country's affairs until the end of 1993.(34)
In the newly democratised states of the former communist regimes, the early 
euphoria when these countries opened for democracy soon evaporated, leaving room 
for public disillusion and resentment. In some of these countries, the democratic 
process seems to have fallen short of meeting peoples'expectations. In Poland, nearly 
half of the population were disappointed at Lech Walesa's economic promises.(35) in 
the first free election in Albania, the communists defeated the new democratic reformers 
and remained in p o w e r . ( 3 6 )  in Bulgaria, the reformers were nearly beaten at the first 
free general elections by the previous communist p a r t y . (37) in Russia, Boris Yeltsin 
was disavowed by a certain section of the population, after only few months in
o f f i c e .  ( 3 8 )
In others countries, the transition from a single to a multiparty system has been 
accompanied with violence and internal civil war. In Yugoslavia, the Slovenian and 
Croatian republics took the opportunity of an open democratic system to desert the
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Federation and proclaim themselves independent entities from the central government of 
Belgrade. There too, the federal army had to intervene "to protect and preserve the 
unity of the F e d e r a t i o n " . (39) The conflict took an international dimension with the 
involvement of the United Nations and the Security Council. It became even more 
complex when the twelve members of the EEC decided to recognise Slovenia and 
Croatia as separate and independent states.(40) In the newly created republic of 
Georgia, the newly elected President Gamsakhurdia was forced out by an armed 
opposition. (41)
In most African countries open democracy is synonymous with ethnic and tribal 
rivalries which lead to violence and bloodshed, as happened in Nigeria, Gabon and 
K e n y a . (42) Realising the danger of such an undertaking President R. Mugabe said that 
a multiparty system is not necessarily what the majority of Africans want, staking his 
argument on the fact that tradition extols a strong centralised leadership and that a 
multiparty system will only fuel ethnic dissent. Fie was supported by many African 
leaders such as Arap Moi of Kenya and Keneth Kauanda of Z a m b ia .(4 3 )  These two 
Presidents were particularly active and mounted personal crusades against the 
multiparty system, calling its supporters names like tribalists, subversives and 
terrorists, manipulated from a b ro a d .(4 4 )
For most Third World countries, it was in fact the fear of such ethnically based 
politics which were the justifications of the one party system at independence. To 
Professor T. Bamesa (Zaire), the single party corresponds to an essential feature of the 
African society, namely the search for unanimity in a community arrangement.(45) 
Professor B. Olofio goes even further and asks whether the single party has not played 
a positive role in the shaping of many African modem states.(46)
In sum in most of the LDCs and to some extent the Eastern European countries, 
undertaking political reforms at the West's request and on the western model of 
democracy, there is a growing concern at the potential use of force. This point has
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been officially debated during the World Bank/OECD conference, when some of the 
participants raised the possibility that certain governments may soon have the 
unavoidable choice of facing being swept aside, or having to resort to force to maintain 
power and perhaps law and o r d e r . (47) "The stark choice facing Western governments 
and international economic organisation", says one participant, "is Marshall Plan or 
martial law. "(48)
In the light of the foregoing experiences, it seems that the population of the 
countries concerned took the opportunity of political openness to rebel against the 
economic reforms, which the West and the Bank made concessional on good 
governance. Whether it is a problem of political immaturity is outside the scope of the 
present study. What seems clear, however, at least for the present, is that the Western 
linking of financial assistance to political reform is misplaced. By so doing, Western 
donors are deliberately adding to the economic crisis of LDCs another crisis of a 
political dimension this time. What seems, however, more disturbing for many LDCs, 
is that the World Bank is heading in the same direction as Western donors; something 
quite normal since they are its main capital suppliers.
II- The World Bank's Political Conditionality.
Before considering the reasons for the Bank's new shift in its lending policy, it 
may be necessary to clarify the concept of political conditionality.
A- Meaning and Scope.
In the Bank's understanding, the criterion of political conditionality is closely 
linked to the notion of good governance, which one senior Bank official describes as " 
the exercise of political power to manage a nation's a f f a i r s . "(49) in the recent past, the 
notion of good governance has been increasingly identified by the Bank's management
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as a critical determinant of the economic performance of developing countries. The 
upsurge of the Bank's interest in governance is reflected by two main reasons:
a) SAL Failure.
After a decade of the structural adjustment policy, the Bank realised that in the 
vast majority of LDCs in which SALs have been implemented success has been very 
limited. This verdict was recalled recently by the Zambian Minister of State, who was 
talking on behalf of the African Community at a meeting of the UNECA. He said:
It is now widely accepted that the 1980's generation of 
structural adjustments have been deficient, because they 
were very short term in character...(50)
Indeed, in many of these countries, investment remained among the lowest in the 
world and disinvestment in industry increased, as inefficient firms collapsed in the face 
of import competition facilitated by the open market laws directed by the SALs policy. 
For example, in Africa, between 1980 and 1990 over thirty countries had a structural 
adjustment programme with the Bank; only two countries are cited by the institution as 
being successful.(31) In fact, the Bank already knew in 1985, when its staff carried 
out the first report on the evolution and evaluation of early SALs, that these 
programmes were meeting considerable difficulties in their implementation. The 
introduction in 1987 of SAPs is clear evidence of such difficulties.(32)
This failure has also been been recognised by a Bank report "From Crisis to 
sustainable Growth in Sub Sahara Africa" which encompassed a wide range of 
concerns such as the effectiveness of the state's institutional arrangements, decision 
making process, policy formulation, and the relationship between rulers and the 
ruled.(33) After having put all the blame for economic failure on the governments, the 
report concluded that "Africa stands little chance in the 1990s if there is no move 
towards an accountable and participatory form of government'1 .(34)
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Thus for the Bank the failure of the SALs was due mainly to problems of 
governance. That is to say the existence of inappropriate politics at the domestic level. 
To adequately address the question of economic development, the Bank made it 
necessary to consider an additional dimension to its lending, namely political reform to 
ensure good governance. In so doing the Bank has been considerably influenced by 
events taking place in the former communist regimes.
b) The Eastern Syndrome.
In its 1990 annual report, the World Bank confirmed LDCs fears indirectly by 
rejecting any responsibility in the present East-West "warming" relationship. The 
report stated:
A central concern of the developing economies has been 
the degree to which their needs for external financing 
investment and trade will be "crowded out" by Eastern 
and Central European demand. While the World Bank 
has emphasised that its assistance to Eastern and Central 
Europe will not be provided at the expense of other 
developing countries, it is likely that some private capital 
flows will be diverted to Eastern and Central
Europe. (35)
The whole process that was taking place in Eastern and Central Europe was not 
alien to the recent change in the Bank's attitude. Under the pressure of its main capital 
suppliers, the Bank was under an obligation to accord its lending policy with that of its 
Western donors. Under no circumstances, could the Bank have taken a different step 
from the rich industrial countries. The Bank seems to have been particularly seduced 
by the view held by many western economists and politicians that economic reforms 
cannot succeed without radical political changes.
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B- The Conditionality of Governance in the Bank Practice.
In the Bank's view, economic criteria alone cannot improve the development of 
LDCs without an improvement in governance. For the Bank's officials, behind 
problems of economic mismanagement and corruption, there are problems of political 
leadership. It is therefore, essential that these problems should be dealt with adequately 
and simultaneously with the traditional economic criteria. In practice, the conditionality 
of governance means that if, for instance, Algeria, requested a loan from the Bank to 
build a dam, she would first of all agree to introduce political reform before getting the 
funds. The content of this new form of conditionality of governance has not been 
defined with precision nor has it been formally adopted by formal provisions (Statutes/ 
BOG interpretation). It seems to have been left for the time being to the discretion of 
the Bank's officials.
a) The Abuja Declaration.
The first formal evidence of the Bank's "linkage" between politics and its loans 
has been prompted in a recent address by the institution's President B. Conable to the 
African heads of states and governments gathered in Abuja (Nigeria) for a meeting of 
the O A U . ( 3 6 )  While emphasising an increased level in the Bank's lending to help the 
continent, Conable said that "all will be to no avail unless the quality of governance in 
Africa i m p r o v e " . (37) He went on to elaborate on the need to allow the African people 
to participate freely and openly in economic life. Referring to Eastern Europe, he noted 
that people all over the world were demanding such participation. In the context of 
Africa, he argued that the founding fathers of the continent's independence had also 
fought for this kind of freedom. He said:
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Freedom of speech, of thought, of association; freedom 
from arbitrary arrest and oppression; freedom to 
participate in the development of their nations. The 
voices of freedom are once again being heard in Africa; 
and I urge you as Africa's leaders not to ignore 
them.(38)
In concluding his speech, Conable eloquently stated that he did not come to the 
OAU summit to give African leaders a lesson in politics, and that the World Bank had 
no intention of introducing political conditionalities in its work. However, he did 
underline that:
The Bank would be intensifying its scrutiny of those 
aspects of governance which directly affect development, 
accountability, transparency and adherence to the rule of
l a w . ( 3 9 )
b) Institutional Implications for LDC Borrowers.
The recent call by the Bank for radical political reforms in exchange for economic 
assistance has far reaching consequences on the borrowers' institutions. The main 
purpose for the Bank is to create the right political environment which is, in the Bank's 
opinion, essential for the implementation if not the success of the economic reforms.
In his Abuja speech, former President B. Conable did not elaborate on any 
specific kind of political system, but it was clear from his address that the Bank would 
eventually favour a democratic system on the western model, where people can 
participate in the political and economic decision making of the nation. Further details 
on the kind of institutional changes that the Bank wished to promote have been 
discussed by L. Noel and I. Serageldine in the semi official publication of the World 
Bank- Finance and Development.(30) While recognising the complexities in 
identifying what constitute good governance, the authors refer to certain characteristics
2 5 4
which according to them are "generally agreed upon". One of these characteristics is 
political accountability.In the authors' opinion:
the classic mechanism s for ensuring political 
accountability is to subject the political leadership at all 
levels of government (national, provincial, local), to a 
credible electoral process, with lim ited period in 
office.(61)
For the LDCs, the task is not merely to dismantle the discarded political system, 
but to fashion -virtually from scratch- the overall structure and core component of a 
modern democratic society. These massive reforms often must be carried out at the 
same time as countries huge economic problems, and heavy debt burden. This raises 
serious questions about how to best set up the necessary institutions which would 
manage the transition. At issue are the speed, the combination and the adequacy of the 
measures that could lead to a strong political system. The ultimate goal of these 
institutional changes is not to fulfill specific popular demands, or install a genuine 
democracy, but to respond to the Bank's requirement in building a market oriented 
economy. It is only then, that the long term development issues- the prime concern of 
the Bank- will be tackled.
C)- Criticism of the Bank's Conditionality of Governance.
After having preached for a decade that the answer to the economic problems of 
the LDCs is structural adjustment, the World Bank has discovered recently that more is 
necessary to achieve sustainable development, namely that economic and political 
reforms go hand in hand. The Bank's argument that political reform should be tied to 
its lending policy is open to criticism from two sides: one statutory or theoretical, the 
other practical.
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a) Statutory Limitations.
Theoretically, the Bank is not allowed by its Statutes to interfere in the politics of 
the borrowing countries. Article IV section 10 is very clear on this point:
The Bank and its Officers should not interfere in the 
political affairs of any member, nor shall they be 
influenced in their decision by the political character of 
the member or members concerned. Only economic 
considerations shall be relevant to their decisions...
Yet, the new criteria of governance introduced recently by the Bank fall expressly 
into the category of politics. The Bank claims that its motivation is economic in 
essence; namely, that good governance implies good economic management. The issue 
of political interference has been raised countlessly in the past and the Bank has always 
managed to escape c r i t i c i s m . ^ )  However, in its recent call for political reform, it may 
be hard for the Bank's officials to deny political interference. From the legal point of 
view, the Bank's meddling with its borrowers politics is tantamount to a violation of its 
Statutes. Whatever justification the Bank's officials may give, they are simply acting 
outside the institution's legal framework.
It was seen, for example, in the case of privatisation that the Bank defended its 
action on the grounds of statutory provisions, namely Article 1, which directed the 
Bank to enhance the private sector. Again, when the Bank introduced in its early years 
of operations the fact-finding missions, it said that it was part of its Articles to act with 
care and due diligence in the use of its monies. In these and other similar situations the 
Bank has stretched the interpretation of its Articles beyond their legal limits, and has 
thus avoided touching on the political boundaries of its borrowers. In the present case 
of political conditionality, such an extensive interpretation is not only irrelevant, but it is 
expressly prohibited unless the Bank's management has decided to amend the Bank's 
Statutes, so as to allow explicitly the Bank to indulge in politics. This hypothesis
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seems, however, unlikely in view of the opposition by the Western members of the 
Bank to amending the Institution's Statutes, on the ground that "it may open the 
floodgates to a cataract of proposed amendments. "(63) The Bank management cannot 
certainly continue to carry out its business on improvisation, or as in the case of 
political conditionality, by reacting to specific conjunctural events.
Finally, although the problem of governance exists in many LDCs, it is not the 
role of the Bank to address such an important issue. The Bank was not established for 
that purpose. Its main objective is development assistance. It is not equipped for such 
an undertaking, for its main think tank is composed of economists and financial 
experts. It is not prepared to venture in such an area, because its overall structure and 
institutional framework has nothing to do with politics per se.Lasl but not least, using 
loans for political change is meddling in LDC politics: It could damage the already 
fragile stance of the political neutrality and, to be successful, it would require political 
skills which the Bank does not possess.
b) Practical Limitations.
In practice, the Bank's conditionality of democratisation is also disputable. For 
the implementation of the Bank's economic reforms in general, and SAL in particular, 
most of the time generate variable degrees of public resentment. Depending on 
individual countries, this may start from minor street skirmishes to major social 
upheavals leading to political instability because of the unpopularity of the measures 
that structural adjustments carry with them. The question which arises here is how it is 
possible to ask governments to carry out painful IMF/World Bank programmes -which 
are by definition unpopular- in a democratic fashion. In the logic of democracy, 
unpopular actions have greater chances of being removed by democratic means (vote of 
no confidence in the government, anticipated general elections, demonstrations, or 
strikes.). "Indeed", wrote the Indian economist A. Sen:
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there is even a basic contradiction in seeing both 
(economic and political reforms) as fundamental 
requirements. If there is democracy, then it is up to the 
people to determine whether or not (and to what extent), 
to use markets. It would be contradictory to leave the 
choice of institutions to the people and at the same time 
to pre-close that choice by insisting that the market form 
of organisation be in fact chosen.(64)
Yet, in the recent past the Bank has been helping many LDCs whose regimes 
were "undemocratic" in the Western sense of the term, and quite often these regimes 
have eventually succeeded in bringing about noticeable economic changes. South 
Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia and Hong Kong are often cited as nations which have 
experienced decades of sustained economic expansion under highly authoritarian 
systems which allowed them to graduate eventually to the status of New Industrialised 
Countries ( N I C s ) . ( 6 5 )  This does not mean that a dictator or a military regime must be 
appointed in each country undertaking comprehensive economic reforms. But the 
NICs experience may be worthwhile trying as an economic model of development, 
because of the similarities that exist between the LDCs and the NICs. In fact such an 
option is not alien to the Bank. It has been largely debated during the OECD/World 
Bank conference referred to e a r l i e r . ( 6 6 )  Some of the participants did indeed refer to the 
NICs success story as a possible formula for the Third World economic development 
instead of imposing political changes on the western model, in order to set in motion 
economic r e f o r m s ( 6 7 )
c) What Form of Democracy for the LDCs ?
As it was asked previously what kind of liberal system (especially in the case of 
privatisation), the LDCs should adopt, it may be equally important to raise the same 
concern in relation to political changes. Generally speaking, there seems to be no
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evidence that the democratisation rules of Western Europe fit all kinds of society. The 
type of society in Western countries is different from those in Asia and Africa. Almost 
all recent experiences in democracy building in the LDCs have run into some sort of 
inextricable problems. For example in Togo, only a few months after the establishment 
of a democratic system, there were three attempted coups in the first week of October 
1991. According to the Economist, "each {coup) designed to restore the ancien  
(undemocratic ?) regime" (68) \n Venezuela, the failed coup d'etat (February 1992), 
against a democratically elected government, was seen by many observers as a reaction 
to economic discontent, rather than a classical overthrow of a political d i c t a t o r . ( 6 9 )  
Again, recent events in Russia show that President Yeltsin is under severe opposition 
from former nostalgic communists and from his own entourage.(70) Less than one 
year after the economic reforms, the Institute of World Economy and International 
Relations (formerly part of the Russian Academy of Sciences), sent a report to B. 
Yeltsin. It calls for a "softly-softly" approach to the economic reforms and more 
particularly privatisation. The report advised the Russian leader to "retain a strong 
executive (ie. governmental) role and a relatively high level of centralism during the 
process of warring the country on to a market economy." "This", adds the report, 
"should involve postponing privatisation until well after next year, and that Russia must 
avoid copying traditional privatisation methods used by Western countries."(71) 
Should one conclude from this that open democracy is a threat to open economy?
Algeria is perhaps the best illustration which shows that the concept of democracy 
that the Bank and the West try to promote is not always the one they liked. Thus, the 
rise of Islamic fundamentalism through democratic means in Algeria has paradoxically 
upset many western democracies such as the US, UK, and France which welcomed the 
disguised coup d'etat to prevent the Islamic Front from taking power which, it must be 
recalled, it was almost certain to win through the ballot box i.e democratically. The 
massive arrests of Islamic leaders and their followers passed almost unnoticed in the
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Western world, which customarily react vigorously by accusing the newly set up 
regime of human rights violations.
In similar situations of blatant undemocratic behaviour, the West usually reacts by 
taking action against the accused regime. The most common sanctions are either 
diplomatic or economic sanctions, or both. As was the case in the’ Kenya, the West 
started by cutting all diplomatic links, before suspending its economic aid at a later 
stage. It should be also recalled, that in most cases, regional and international 
organisations follow suit by applying the apprropriate sanctions on the incriminated 
state. Nothing of that sort happened in Algeria and the new army backed Council of 
State, still enjoyed financial support from the Bretton Institutions in particular, and the 
West in general, which has exceptionally stepped up its financial assistance to rescue 
the new regim e.^-)
The Algerian democratic experience demonstrates clearly that the Western World 
is sometimes mistaken in its judgements on Third World specificities. It is a relevant 
story of the risk of copying foreign models, and a clear signal to the the Bank's 
adventure into the field of the internal politics of its borrowers, and the kind of potential 
problems that may arise as a result of such action. For what is good for Europe will 
not necessarily work for Asia and Africa. This is a very fundamental issue in which 
sociology may be of valuable guidance and which, at the present time, the West in 
general and the Bank in particular seems to underestimate. Furthermore, this new 
conditionality of democratisation, although necessary, is not an urgent necessity. It 
does not seem appropriate - at least for the time being -in many Third World countries, 
namely those of Sub Sahara Africa and South Asia. In these parts of the world, there 
are more urgent priorities for governments to tackle such as poverty, deseases and 
above all, illiteracy, which is probably the cornestone of any democratic culture.
Addressing the UN conference on Third World debt, the Deputy General 
Secretary of the Organisation of African States (OAE) Mr. Bronson Dede, said "La
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democratic ne pousse pas sur un desert de pierres", meaning that democracy does not 
grow in a desert of s t o n e s . (^3) In the same context C.L. Morna said "Democracy is a 
luxury. "(74) The sa(j reality is that at present many LDCs cannot offer such a luxury. 
For his part, Richard Joseph does not seem to be convinced that democracy will 
necessarily entail economic welfare. He writes on Africa saying:
Nevertheless, we must avoid the seductive notion that 
democracy or "multipartism" will rescue Africa from its 
distress. Democracy while a prerequisite for Africa's 
economic revival, will not by itself guarantee such an 
outcome. (75)
The concept of democracy is non quantifiable. It cannot be measured by 
economic indicators alone. It is a long process which depends on a variety of factors 
among which intellectual consciousness is the most important. Democratic values, 
notes President Nyerere, form an inherent part of the cultural heritage of modern 
society. It is not a spontaneous movement, or a foreseeable social phenomenon. It 
may be possible for economists to predict, on the basis of scientific data and various 
indicators, certain economic events such as for example the rate of inflation,or the GNP 
growth. But no government can predict, for the reasons stated earlier, that by next year 
its country will be a democratic nation by the mere signature of a governmental decree, 
or upon the recommendation of an international organisation. Democracy needs time. 
It is a long process. At the extreme, people will be more ready to support undemocratic 
regimes then starvation. In that respect, democracy may be described as a long term 
socio-political demand, whereas starvation is -a biological need which cannot be 
postponed indefinitely. In hungry Russia, people reacted angrily to the price rises, and 
called for the resignation of their leader and democratic promoter B. Yeltsin.(76) The 
current experiences in democracy building that are taking place in Eastern Europe and 
many parts of Africa and Asia demonstrate that democracy is a relative concept whose
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contours are not precisely shaped. Even in a country such as the United Kingdom 
where democratic foundations were laid centuries ago, there are still today in Britain 
voices which claim that the UK. is not a democratic country.
The other side of the coin is also true, namely that good governance implies 
eventually good economic performance. But the problem with many LDCs is that the 
issue of governance is limited to one or a handful of persons. And it is precisely that 
governing minority which the Bank makes responsible for the mismanagement of the 
country. The Bank now insists that this kind of regime must be removed, so the people 
can participate in the economic decision making (participatory development). The 
question, however, which the Bank seems to ignore or to underestimate is whether all 
people in the Third World are ready and able to participate in the decision making 
process, whether political or economic. This is not sure for the time being. What 
seems to motivate the Bank, at least on the surface, is the existence of an urban elite in 
many LDCs which very often looks "westernised" and which the Bank wants to use to 
foster its dynamic of market oriented philosophy.
By moving into an area as sensitive as domestic politics, the Bank is undoubtedly 
venturing into the unknown. For political governance cannot be "recommended" from 
outside, especially by a group of states or a particular institution which have not been 
so helpful in the past. For most LDC governments are not ready to forget the fierce 
opposition by the developed world to the establishment of a New International 
Economic Order (N IEO ).(^) Similarly, the Bank has never taken into account Third 
World conceptions of development and has always taken a negative attitude in refusing 
to lend in order to promote certain principles and policies favoured by the L D C s.(^ ) 
On the contrary, every step the Bank took was in favour of the developed world. The 
creation of the IFC, the ICSID and the MIGA as discussed previously, were more 
valuable to the First than to the Third world. From this aspect, neither the developed 
western world, nor the World Bank are in a good position to advise changes as
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important as internal political reforms. But, if the West and the Bank link their 
economic assistance to political reforms, as seems to be the case, than the whole issue 
becomes a matter of outside pressure, in short, an issue of sovereignty.
I l l-  The Position o f International Law on O utside Pressure (or 
Domestic Interference)
In the previous Chapters, it was pointed out that the Bank has always made its 
lending conditional on certain economic criteria whose implementation had a substantial 
effect on the legal and institutional structure of the borrowing countries. For many 
LDC governments, in so doing, the Bank was exceeding its statutory powers and 
unduly interfering in their domestic affairs. This is by far the most common and 
frequent claim that the LDCs have been raising for decades. Thus, the conflict between 
the Bank and its mam clients is essentially one of national sovereignty.
A- The Issue of Sovereignty in General
Text books refer to sovereignty as the very basis of international law.(79) a s 
opposed to other subjects, the concept of sovereignty is not static, in the sense that it 
has been open to many alterations since its enunciation in Article 2 § 1 of the UN 
Charter in 1 9 4 5 . ( 8 0 )  As enshrined in the Charter, sovereignty is traditionally defined 
through its political rather than its economic aspects. But as ICJ Judge, M. Bedjaoui 
remarked:
The inadequacy of this definition is plain. The Charter 
was only able to condemn breeches of the political 
sovereignty of States, and the sanctions it prescribed are 
linked only to the transgression of political obligations, 
not of economic duties.(81)
However, since the sixties, especially with the accession of many Third World
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countries to independence, the concept of sovereignty has been closely linked with 
economic considerations. Perhaps the best illustrations in this context are the Law of 
the Sea and the principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, where 
econom ic interests and national sovereignty proved sometimes difficult to
r e c o n c i l e . ( 8 2 )
a) Economic Sovereignty.
In the field of economics, the issue of sovereignty has a different meaning for the 
developed and the developing world. For the former, there is no such an absolute 
sovereignty in the conduct of the economic affairs between countries. To the concept of 
national economic sovereignty, the West proposes the notion of economic 
interdependence, i.e. that no country can live in isolation and that economic cooperation 
between states is an essential ingredient to the survival of n a t i o n s . ( 8 3 )
For the LDCs, the principle of economic sovereignty is closely linked to that of 
political sovereignty. They equate interdependence with the opening up of economies 
to international trade and private capital flow. Instead the LDCs suggest that in the 
economic field, priority should be given to self reliance as the only way of preserving 
their real sovereignty. The principle of self reliance was developed in the early 
seventies, at the height of the discussions on the NIEO that were taking place between 
the North and the S o u th . ( 8 4 )  Because of such a divergency of views on the concept of 
sovereignty, clashes between the DCs and LDCs occurred frequently and led many 
times to an impasse in negotiations between the developed and the developing world. 
The same clashes came to light in the LDCs dealing with international economic 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank, which by imposing political and 
economic changes were accused by the Third World members of interfering with their 
domestic affairs and thus infringing their national sovereignty.
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B) The Bank's Arguments on Domestic Interference.
The issue of interference by the Bank in the internal affairs of its borrowers is 
usually met by a set of four arguments. The first one is that by adhering to an 
international organisation, states hand over, de facto, some aspects of their sovereignty 
to the i n s t i t u t i o n . (85) Proponents of this theory, such as J .  Gold, argue in the 
particular context of the Bretton Woods institutions, that as states have willingly 
accepted to join the Bank and the IMF, they have implicitly committed themselves to 
relinquish some of their sovereign rights to the benefit of these institutions. For the 
author, it seems that there is no limit to the degree of interference and that:
members cannot refuse to furnish information on their 
economies to the Bank and the IMF, even on reliance on 
the ground that such information would be incompatible 
with their national s e c u r i t y . (86)
The classical argument is that international law is perceived as consisting of rules 
of ins dispositivium, from which states can depart at w i l l . ( 8 7 )  There is no provision 
in international law which forces states to join an international organisation against their 
will. Likewise, nothing in international law prevents states from withdrawing from an 
institution if they do not agree with its policy. Put crudely, this principle means that if 
the LDCs do not like the Bretton Woods institutions, nothing prevents them from 
quitting them.
The second argument is the so called complementarity of goals between the Bank 
and its borrowing members. The core of the argument is that the borrowers and the 
Bank share the same objectives, therefore there is no conflict of interest but 
"cooperation" between the two parties. Action by the Bank in the borrowing country is 
a manifestation of such a cooperation.
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The third argument is that Bank action would have not been possible without the 
consent of the borrowing state. As A Fatouros writes:
No action by a state, or any other entity, could be 
deemed unlawful, if the state affected had consented to
i t .  ( 8 8 )
In other words, since the borrowing government has agreed to the conditions set 
up in the loan agreement, that accord suffices to remove any taint of improper or 
unlawful interference.
The fourth argument is that the Bank activities are mainly technical. They are 
limited to providing, in addition to funds, a wide range of expertise to borrowers in 
order to make better use of scarce resources.
a) The Irrelevance of the Bank's Arguments.
Bank justifications for its policy of domestic interference are open to criticism in 
many respects. To begin with, the argument that adherence to an international 
organisation implies relinquishing some degree of sovereignty to the institution is, in 
the case in hand, a one sided argument. For it applies only to the LDC members who 
are the main users of the Bank funds. More importantly, the minority of the developed 
countries, which are not concerned by such concessions, exercise a great control over 
the institution to the point where this latter has to "trade" its own internal sovereignty, 
to please the desirata of such a minority.
Furthermore, the argument that state consent nullifies, therefore legitimises, Bank 
interference in the domestic affairs of the borrower is irrelevant, because of the "special 
circumstances" under which the consenting party ,ie the state, a c t e d . ( 8 9 )  This situation 
is to some extent, comparable to the notion of duress in private law, where the party 
acting under duress is generally said to be irresponsible for his acts. That is to say, he
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does not have a free choice, as seems the case in hand, where the borrower is left with 
two alternatives: either he accepts the loan, and surrender part of his sovereignty, or 
loses the loan and accordingly reduces his development capacity. This element of 
coercion is also recognised by A Fatouros who considers that in such circumstances:
there are various kinds of pressure short of the use of 
"force", whose presence vitiates any expression of 
consent. (90)
Furthermore, the vigorous denunciations of the Bank policies by many LDC 
governments, and the unpopularity of such policies within the LDC population are also 
relevant indications that state consent to the Bank policy was not always "cogent."
Finally, to say that the Bank's efforts are not political is no longer a sustainable 
argument. Although such an argument has been refuted by the LDCs in the past, the 
Bank has constantly refused the LDCs view for the reasons discussed previously. 
With the recent introduction of political conditionality, the non political characteristic of 
the Bank has not only became obsolete but also controversial. Since the issue of 
political conditionality seems to be on the agenda of the current debate on development 
assistance to the LDCs, it may be appropriate to explore the position of present 
international law on that particular issue.
C) The Ambiguity of International Law on Political Conditionality.
The recommendation of political conditionality raises in international law the 
following question: Is support for political reforms from outside legitimate politically 
and in terms of international law? In short, should one interfere? Whereas recipient 
countries had already refused in the past to accept economic interference in their internal 
affairs -in the framework of structural adjustment- it remains improbable that they 
would accept it on the political level. Formally, political and economic conditions are
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no problem in terms of international law if the recipient country accepts them. In cases 
where conditions are enforced with inadmissible pressure, or through violence,the 
country concerned can invoke the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which 
declares such unequal treaties between states null and v o i d . ( 9 1 )  The question which 
arises here is whether political conditionality falls in any of the categories of treaties 
foreseen by the Vienna convention. The Convention leaves open what conditions 
encroach on sovereignty and from what point is pressure from outside so severe that it 
invalidates the treaty. For a long time any interference from outside -even if it aimed to 
benefit the country- was branded in academic discussions as imperialism. The principle 
of non-interference has been until very recently one of the most rigid concepts in 
contemporary international law.(^“)
In the case of the Bank, Western interference through political conditionality has 
been legitimised on the ground that most regimes in the Third World do not derive their 
legitimacy from the approval of their own people. The Bank and the West justify their 
support for political reforms from outside on the following arguments:
The political regimes in most of the Third World countries are a hindrance to 
socio-economic development.
In most of these countries there is no respect for basic human rights,or the 
rule of law.
- Transformation of these regimes requires both economic policy reforms and 
political reforms.
- These economic and political reforms can only succeed if they are supported 
from outside.
- The personalisation of power around a military leader and the presumption 
that such authoritarian regimes are economically inefficient because of 
corruption, favouritism, clientelism, and patronage.
Although the present thesis does not dispute the veracity of such claims,
268
nonetheless any state action on the ground of such claims has no justification 
whatsoever in present international law. In fact such intervention contravene the UN 
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States and more specifically the provisions 
of Article 1 which reads:
Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to 
choose its economic system as well as its political, social 
and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its 
people, without outside interference, coerciion or threat 
in any form whatsoever.
Therefore any attempt by a state to interfere, or influence, directly or indirectly, 
the course of events, and a fortiori, political events of another sovereign state, is an 
inadmissible act.
D) Some Attempted Suggestions.
There are still some questions which are left unanswered. Is it really important 
that the Bank should impose stringent conditions on the ground that it does not want to 
sign a blank cheque? Why should borrowers make concessions by altering their legal, 
institutional economic and political systems "for a handful of Dollars"? Finally who is 
the real beneficiary from the whole business of the Bank lending policy? Certainly not 
the LDC borrowers, since the Bank never guarantees the success of the project, which 
it has approved, but which does insist on the loan being repaid in order to keep its 
credibility vis a vis its creditors intact.
Yet, there are other reasonable and realistic options, that the Bank and the rich 
western countries can accept, without having to interfere with the LDCs sovereignty, or 
impose undue conditions whose results are hypothetical. The following are some 
suggestions which, although unpopular amidst the rich countries, are certainly within 
their reach and material possibilities. The first suggestion is of a general nature and is
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directed more to the Western developed world than to the Bank. It has already been 
voiced by many Western leaders, but it applies fully to the LDCs reality in the present 
world economic circumstances. This suggestion consists in telling the Western 
countries to start "cleaning their houses", before telling LDCs to clean theirs. As Hans 
W. Singer wrote:
With proper adjustment in the developed countries, the 
mutual interest will prevail, and hence the developed 
countries should support the developing countries.(93)
In the first place, DCs must refrain from indirectly impairing LDCs economic 
development through irresponsible behaviour in the conduct of the international 
economy. Quite often, economic distortions in the European continent, or across the 
Atlantic, such as inflation, exchange rates or devaluation of the US Dollar have serious 
repercussions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. To paraphrase an eminent US 
politician, "When America sneezes, the rest of the world catches cold". Despite 
rhetoric from certain western capitals "to do something", the various recommendations 
made in that sense have never been put into effect. As this call from the Managing 
Director of the IMF witnesses:
What is needed now is the political will on the part of the 
membership to carry forward their commitments into 
policy decisions and concrete actions. This applies of 
course with particular force to the major industrialised 
countries who have been outside the reach of 
conditionality, yet whose policy actions have such a 
decisive influence in shaping the world economic 
environment. (94)
So far the DCs have avoided adjustment which they perceive as a difficult and 
conflicting process which may threaten their internal stability.(95)
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Secondly, the developed world must remove existing barriers to allow Third 
World economies to expand. In trade for instance, more supple and flexible rules 
would certainly increase LDCs penetration to Western m a r k e t s . ( 9 6 )  i n finance, a 
solution (eg. cancelling) of the Third World external debt may also inject a breathing 
space in LDCs e c o n o m i e s . (97) Similarly, a new code of investment, which would 
protect investors and recipient countries alike, is necessary to build trust and confidence 
among the LDC borrowers and the international financial community at l a r g e . ( 9 8 )  
Again, a fairer and more just commodity price agreement may also be an effective 
stimulant to enhance LDCs hard currency reserves to sustain their development 
e f f o r t s . ( 9 9 )
The third and equally important suggestion is directed to the World Bank and 
more precisely to its role in development as a development agency. As an international 
actor , with explicit law making capacity, the Bank is well placed to play a key role in 
the shaping of rules of an international law that would be oriented to issues of 
d e v e l o p m e n t ^  190) T h j s  COuld be eventually achieved through the drafting of, and 
participation in, international conventions as it did in its early practice with the 
establishment of the IFC, ICSID, and MIGA. But instead of being too attentive to its 
main suppliers' concern, the Bank should give more consideration to the Third world 
propositions and suggestions on development issues and how to tackle them.(191)
To say that the LDCs are looking for blank cheques, and accordingly overload 
them with stringent conditions is a misleading judgement. The Third World countries 
oppose the present form of assistance that is channeled to them for solid reasons, which 
may be summarised in the stringency of economic and political conditionalities. For 
these countries, the conditions that the Bank (and the West) impose on them are, as 
they stand, inappropriate and in blatant contradiction with Article 5 of the UN Charter 
which calls for:
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[T]he promotion of higher standards of living, full 
employment and condition of economic progress and 
development.
At the same time, the Third World countries have proposed through various UN 
channels (UNCTAD, UNGA), intersting proposals such as the New International 
Economic Order, as it is embodied in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States, to help them out of their present state of underdevelopment/102)
In one of his writings Professor M. Bedjaoui said, had the West consented to an 
application of a third of the NIEO Charter, a third of the LDCs problems could be 
r e s o l v e d / 103) it may be then said, by extension to Bedjaoui's remark, that if all the 
NIEO proposals are taken into account, a large portion of Third World economic 
problems may perhaps find adequate solutions. Then the Bank will hardly have to 
force changes nor would it have to sign blank cheques.
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Conclusion to Chapter Five.
In spite of the move towards democracy, the political systems of the Third World 
countries are not well developed for managing simultaneously economic crisis. Reform 
programmes on the Bank pattern generally call for hardship and economic austerity. 
For the Bank to call for open democracy at this particular time is somehow "putting the 
cart before the horse".
It is an undisputed fact that, in a democratic society economic and political 
decision making is subject to a greater transparency than in a close undemocratic system 
of governance. The issue at stake is not whether or not to introduce political reforms. 
What is argued in the foregoing Chapter is the timing and the "linkeage" of 
development and democracy, especially by making the latter a sine qua non for the 
acquisition of public international aid. Western donors and the international financial 
institutions, both public and private, must devise another less burdening formula for the 
LDCs. One such a devise could be postponing democratic reforms, while keeping 
LDCs political regimes under a close surveillance in sensitive areas such as human 
rights violations for example. As discussed in the case of the NICs experiences, 
economic austerity may have greater chances of yielding to conclusive results if 
accompanied by "political austerity". For as it has been shown, in all transitional 
economies there is a lack of public understanding of the unavoidable costs of systemic 
changes. More generally, there is a deep unwillingness on the part of the population to 
accept too much pain. This underlying lack of well founded consensus endangers the 
positions of many reformed governments and may threaten the longevity and 
sustainbility of reform. At the same time, it is important to point out that many new 
governments were thrust into their position without having had time to prepare for the 
immense task ahead and without the benefit of experience.
273
The current concerted action (World Bank-Western world), to tie aid to political 
conditions does not seem at least for the time being attractive for many LDC 
governments. It looks in the eyes of these latter like a return to neo-colonialism, rather 
than a way of rejuvenating development assistance, or as the Egyptian economist, F. 
Ramzi, put it "colonisation without force. "They are conscious of the already high cost 
benefit so far achieved by tied aid to economic policy conditionality, and are worried 
about western influence in their political life as the only way to obtain aid for 
development. Furthermore, by imposing a certain model of governance, the Bank and 
the West take a double risk, of which the LDCs alone will eventually pay the 
consequences.
In the first place, there is a serious problem of rejection of transplantation which 
may arise as a result of copying from alien types of democracies. In that respect, the 
Algerian experience is among many others relevant to the danger of any blind 
borrowing.
Secondly, by imposing democratic systems from outside there is a clear problem 
of direct interference in the domestic affairs of the LDCs. An issue where present 
international Law does not seem to provide adequate answer(s). For the present 
Thesis, it is precisely this vacuum of legal norms specific to development issues that are 
at the origin of the Bank's obstinacy in "learning by improvising" on Third World 
misery.
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CONCLUDING REMARKS.
The vehicles which the Bank chooses as means of changing the legal and 
institutional aspects of LDC governments are new neither in international finance nor in 
human relations more generally. It has always been the lender's concern to recover his 
money, and eventually, some extra money "for service rendered." Fear of default on 
repayment from the borrowers leads the lender to resort to various devices or threats to 
discourage this. The threat usually required from the private lender is to require the 
borrower, as a condition of the loan, to pledge a capital asset such as a house or a piece 
of land called collateral, to the lender. If repayment falls into arrears, or become 
impossible, the lender has the right to claim and the borrower is under an obligation to 
hand over the asset to the lender.
In international finance, and more precisely in the case of the World Bank, the 
motives for lending are different, and the range of threats available to the institution is 
limited, due to the status of the Bank as an international institution, and the quality of its 
customers who are sovereign states. On the one hand, the Bank cannot, by 
"international courtesy", treat its members in the same manner as a private banker treats 
his client by requiring security for its loans. In fact the Bank has considered this 
possibility in the past, but has formally ruled it out. On the other hand, an international 
institution cannot sue one of its members in an international court for failure to repay, 
not by courtesy this time, but simply because such a judicial body does not exist.
To contour the problem of physical security, the Bank has instead used different 
methods at different stages of its lending history. In its earlier loans, for instance, the
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Bank linked the financing of a project to the implementation of particular measures, 
usually tied to the project. Thus in almost all water supply and electricity loans the 
Bank financed, there was a special provision in the agreement requiring the borrower to 
undertake a review of his tariffs and implement new legislation to that effect. On other 
occasions, the borrower was required to set up an autonomous entity to run the project 
which the Bank financed.
In the relatively recent past, the Bank has moved towards more stringent 
conditions, by making its lending conditional on the implementation of a certain policy 
under a structural adjustment programme. Unlike in the past, the Bank's funds were 
not tied to a specific project, but encompassed all the economic sectors of the borrower. 
At the heart of such a policy, public sector restructuring and the wholesale privatisation 
of the economy were the most common policies recommended by the institution.
More recently, however, the bank has moved further by making its loans, which 
are, by definition, legal and financial transactions, conditional on radical political - 
therefore non economic- reforms. According to this new policy, LDC governments 
would be eligible for Bank's funding only if they satisfy the institution that they are 
ready to implement democratic rules in their system of governance. Quite often the 
measures, whether economic or political, required by the Bank do not fit the 
borrowers' overall structure. Hence, the necessity for these latter to introduce some 
legal and institutional changes in order to accommodate the Bank's measures.
On the legal side, the implementation of most of the Bank's recommendations led 
to the modification, rewriting, or introduction of laws in the recipient countries. The 
legal areas involved vary in accordance with the importance of the loan. In an 
electricity project, for instance, the legal implications of the loan may be restricted to the 
enactment of new tariff law. In contrast, if the borrower opted for the implementation 
of a SAL programme, then the legal and institutional changes may be much wider, and 
in many cases involve reshaping several sectors of the economy simultaneously.
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At the level of the national institutions of the borrower, the same phenomenon 
occurs, as governments are often required by the Bank to remove cumbersome and 
obsolete institutions and replace them with new and modern ones. In many instances, 
this policy has led to the emergence of new forms of ownership (autonomous/private 
entities), which were until then alien to the borrower's institutional arrangements. New 
forms of dealing have also appeared as a result of price liberalisation, privatisation and 
the open market economy in general.
In the political sphere, the debate is on the establishment of a multiparty system to 
replace the old one party formula of governance. New institutions such as multipartism 
and various elected bodies at different levels of the government are characteristic of the 
kind of institutional changes that Third World governments are being pressed for by the 
Bank. For the Bank's management, these changes, whether legal or institutional, are 
necessary for the successful implementation of the Bank's programmes, and, 
accordingly, the economic development of the borrowers.
For the recipient borrowers, the laws and institutions introduced as a result of 
Bank recommendations have not always met the LDCs expectations. On several 
occasions, a loan agreement has turned to a sour disagreement between the borrower 
and the Bank, especially since this latter became, like its sister the IMF, involved in the 
policy based lending business, through the unpopular SALs. Witness: the food riots as 
a result of SAL conditionality, government opposition to the Bank's measures on the 
ground of sovereignty infringement, the unexpected trends that democracy is taking in 
countries undertaking political reforms, to cite only these few examples. Several 
factors contributed to this amalgam.
In the first place, all measures recommended by the Bank and the subsequent 
changes that followed in the borrowing country are carried out by the borrower with a 
mixture of enthusiasm, hesitation and sometimes anxiety. In other words, the 
borrower is called upon to behave in a manner which he would have never chosen, had
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it not been for the loan. There is therefore in the borrower's attitude an impression of 
external pressure, or a pseudo coercion, "short of the use of force", to paraphrase A. 
Fatouros, and D. Carreau.
In such circumstances, experience has proved that conditions, or any other 
measures imposed from outside, usually do more harm than good. The Bank's 
measures are not an exception to this rule. Moreover, action taken by borrowers 
primarily because of externally imposed conditions rather than domestic conviction are 
unlikely to be sustained. This raises a fundamental issue in the present debate, which is 
that of transplantation, viz, borrowing different sets of laws and institutions from one 
country and implementing them in another one. The issue is equally valid for economic 
as well as political borrowings. For in both situations, the rejection has been 
sometimes brutal (food riots and civil disturbances as a result of moves towards 
democracy in many LDCs and Central and Eastern European countries).
It may be true that the legal and institutional arrangements have been successful in 
a particular environment, but this does not necessarily imply that the same arrangements 
will have the same result in a different surrounding. The domestic political, economic, 
social and cultural environment are fundamentally different. It is therefore more likely 
that the result will be different, and in many cases it has been so.
Several factors, some directly, others indirectly linked to the Bank, explain to a 
large extent the institution's hesitant policy in development issues. Firstly, there is a 
structural problem in the Articles of Agreement. Since their inception, nearly half a 
century ago, the Bank's Articles have remained practically untouched. Yet the 
circumstances surrounding their establishment have drastically changed. The Articles 
were set up at a time when the world was divided into two diametrically opposite 
systems: capitalism and socialism. Later on, the division increased to three worlds with 
the emergence in the late fifties of the Non Aligned Movement. The division then fell 
down to one system in the nineties, with the collapse of the socialist regimes, and the
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uncertain future of Third World Non Aligned Movement.
Another characteristic of the Bank's Articles is their rigidity and hostility towards 
any significant change. Despite being in a majority in the Bank, the LDCs have so far 
been unsuccessful in persuading the DCs minority to introduce some major changes in 
a few areas such as voting and decision making. A compromise on such vital issues, 
would have certainly given the Bank's efforts a different direction in the area of 
development assistance to the LDCs. Moreover, as they stand, the Articles do not 
even provide for proper legal means (amendment /revision) for the LDCs to use to 
bring about the desired changes in the institution's functioning. Like the US 
constitution, the Bank's Statutes were drafted on very broad principles whose 
interpretation and amendment was left to the Board of management. In view of the 
Western predominance over the Board, it is unlikely for the LDCs to have any 
substantial effect on the amendment or interpretation of the Bank's Articles.
Secondly, the Bank's reliance on western monies, determines the management 
conduct of the institution's business on the selection and implementation of western 
types of laws and institutions in the borrowing countries. The dilemma for the Bank is 
that without western capital especially the US contribution, the institution will not 
survive. Similarly, a Bank perceived to be nothing but an extension of the treasury of 
Western governments, loses its influence amongst its other (LDC) members. In such 
circumstances, it can only be expected that a "tied" Bank can make but only "tied" 
loans, as is explained below.
Thirdly, there are diverging views on the interpretation and conception of the 
notion of development between the Bank and its Third World members who are the 
major beneficiary of the loans. This factor is in fact a consequence of the previous one, 
if not its natural continuation. By placing their money in the Bank, Western donors are 
implicitly selling their economic ideology, including their economic model of 
development to the Third World borrowing countries. Therefore, it is only to be
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expected that all laws and institutions that are "recommended" by the Bank to the 
borrowers, should be on the Western, ie. capital oriented model.
Fourthly, there is a noticeable lack of dialogue between the Bank and its member 
borrowers. Although the Bank claims that it always deals with its members as 
partners, in reality it has developed instead a "take it or leave it" attitude, which has 
negated from the very beginning the establishment of a genuine partnership, based on 
reciprocal exchange and acceptance of views on development issues. The only 
dialogue possible was the one that the Bank imposed, conducted and required the 
borrower to implement the outcome of, if he wanted to benefit from the loan. The 
absence of a dialogue in sensitive areas such as the economic and political future of a 
nation cannot be decided by an injection of foreign patterns, without taking into account 
the views of the recipient country. Yet, there have been numerous proposals by the 
LDCs to fill the legal vacuum on development at the international level through the 
elaboration of a corpus of international law of development. By being full partners with 
the West (and the Bank) on such a "joint venture", the LDCs would certainly arrive at 
an original economic and political system, free from any outside pressure, interference 
or any particular taint.
In short, to say that the World Bank' efforts have been unfruitful is, with some 
reservations, a false statement.
It is false because it would be incorrect to underestimate the gigantic task of the 
Bank which is to address the economic problems of more than three quarters of the 
international community, some of which are in a desperate situation. To address such 
huge problems, the Bank has built through the years an immense reservoir of 
knowledge, skill, and expertise that cannot be ignored and which can be put to the 
benefit of the less privileged nations. In many respects, the Bank's diagnosis of the 
LDC economies revealed major loopholes and irregularities such as mismanagement, 
waste and blatant inefficiency that were at the origin of the borrowers' economic
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retardation. In that respect, it may be said that the Bank is more than indispensable for 
the economic development of its unfortunate members.
But, and this is the other side of the coin, the instruments used by the Bank, the 
method in approaching and dealing with the problems, the policies it has advocated and 
the legal and institutional arrangements that it has recommended, have not always been 
to the advantage of the borrowing countries. In that respect, it may be said that the 
Bank has fallen short in its mission. In sum, if the Bank has been able to discover the 
flaws of underdevelopment, it has so far been unable to address them properly.
For the time being, the Bank continues "to scratch where it does not itch" as the 
popular Algerian saying goes.
It would be difficult to summarise the message of this thesis more succinctly.
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ANNEX {A}
The following Annex is an extract from the original copy of a World Bank 
structural adjustment to a developing country. The name of the country has been 
deliberately hidden to preserve the confidentiality of the report.
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The Second Industr ia l  and Trade Pol icy  Adjustment Program (ITPA II)
1. The economic policy measures of the ITPA II program cover three main
areas: continued export promotion and reform of protection, rationalization
of the public investment program and public enterprises, and financial sector 
reform. We are convinced that these measures will permit to improve
the efficiency of resource allocation and utilization in the economy, and 
realize the substantial existing potential for the development of exports, as 
well as for the growth of domestic savings, public and private.
1 . Export Promotion and Reform of Protection
2. Export promotion is of special importance for generating foreign 
exchange to meet the needs of the economy and to service international debt, 
developing new industrial activities, and creating a significant source of 
employment.
3. Exchange R ate. We confirm that a flexible exchange rate policy will 
continue to be pursued in conformity with the agreement with the IMF, and with 
the objectives of maintaining and enhancing the competitivity of
exports and supporting the program of import liberalization.
4. Export Certificates. In order to simplify export procedures, export 
certificates will be eliminated before end-1985 for hides and leather, and for 
mining products with the exception of barytine, unrefined lead, lead minerals 
and charcoal.
5. Food Products. The study of exports of fresh vegetables is expected 
to be completed by September 1985. This study is expected to yield 
recommendations aiming at increasing fresh vegetable exports; the agreed 
measures will be implemented after discussions with the World Bank during the 
last quarter of 1985.
6. Customs Regimes. In 1985, the temporary admission procedure (which 
permits exporters to import inputs free of tax and duties, without prior 
authorization), will be expended through modifying the negative list which was 
retained under the ITPA I program. This will be effected through the 
elimination from this list, before June 1985, of all products other than glass 
used for packaging and agricultural and fisheries products; the latter will be 
eliminated from the list immediately on their transfer from List B to List A. 
In addition, the Customs Directorate will decentralize the management of the 
procedure of "exportation prealable" (pre-exporting). As regards guarantees 
for customs duties payable by exporters, the Customs Directorate will accept 
global annual guarantees (bank guarantees or mutual guarantees of 
industries). A procedure will also be established to permit settlement a 
posteriori of customs claims, without blockage of customs clearance of
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merchandise. In order Co improve the access of industries to customs 
legislation, the Customs Code and the tariff list will be up-dated regularly. 
The average period between filing a customs declaration and the delivery of 
permission to lift the goods will be reduced in 1985 by 6 days from the time 
estimated at the beginning of the year of 12 days.
7. Global Approach to Simplification of Foreign Trade Procedures. Afte
implementing a number of measures under the ITPA I program to simplify 
administrative procedures for foreign trade, the Government intends to 
complete and amplify these measures. It has realized that the complexity of 
administrative procedures and the slowness of movement of merchandise require 
a global and continuing approach over the medium-term to address the problem 
by successive stages of analysis and action. A Committee for Simplification 
of Foreign Trade Procedures will be established by end-1985, with 
respresentatives of different agencies concerned: the Customs Directorate,
the agencies responsible for foreign trade, exchange control, and transport, 
the port authorities, the commercial banks, transit and maritime agents, 
importers and exporters, etc. This Committee will be responsible for the 
conception and follow-up of programs of analysis and folow-up of the 
implementation of specific measures resulting from these analyses concerning:
(i) the rationalization of all international trade documentation; (ii) 
identification and elimination of delays due to procedures; and (iii) the 
preparation and publication of an annual compendium of foreign trade and 
exchange control rules. During 1985, an itinerary of export and import 
transactions will be prepared to provide a clear set of documentation on 
current foreign trade procedures. This would permit preparation of the first 
phase of their reform before June 1986.
8. Exchange Allocation to Exporters. From January 1985, an automatic
allocation of foreign exchange is granted to exporters, up to a ceiling of 3% 
of annual export value, with the possibility of cumulating the allocation, in 
order to assist exporters to cover the expenses of export operations such as 
business trips and other incidental expenses.
9. Elimination of the Statistical Export T a x . The statistical export
tax is currently levied on all exports at the rate of 0.5Z of each 
transaction. In order to simplify the operating framework for exporters, thi 
tax will be eliminated with effect from January 1986.
10. Export Code. So as to permit exporters to work in a clear and
defined framework and confirm incentives for investment in export production, 
while recognizing the obligation of exporters to contribute to the Government 
an appropriate portion of the income from their activities, the Government is 
preparing a new Export Code.
11. Tariff Protection Policy. As it has already stated, the Government'
objective is to encourage increased corapetitivity, improve the efficiency of 
investment and labor productivity. This objective will be realized through a 
gradual reduction of the level and dispersion of customs tariffs, so as to 
ensure by end-1988 a maximum rate of protection no greater than 25%.
12. Special Import T a x . To achieve Che above-mentioned objective, the 
Government has reduced the Special Import Tax from 10 to 7.5% in January 
1985. Subsequently, the Government will reduce the Special Import Tax from 
7.5 to 5% in January 1986 and intends to eliminate it with effect from January 
1987. No customs duty will be increased with a purely fiscal objective to 
compensate for the reduction of the special import tax and the elimination of 
the statistical export tax.
13. Maximum Rate of Customs Duty. The maximum rate of customs duty will 
be reduced to 45% by January 1986.
14. Rationalization of Tariff Structure and Customs Nomenclature. The 
Customs Directorate and the Ministry of Commerce and Industry have carried out 
preparatory work of rationalization to ensure that: i) similar products are 
taxed at the same rate; ii) the dispersion of customs duties is reduced; iii) 
the level of protection does not exceed 25% by end-1988; iv) the system is 
rendered simpler and clearer, including through the suppression of the stamp 
duty and/or its integration into customs duties. The new harmonized 
nomenclature will be introduced at the latest within a year after the 
definitive clarifications from the Customs Cooperation Council are received. 
This will be preceded by a restructuring, sector by sector, of the
customs nomenclature, with duty rates to permit a definitive ceiling on the 
rate of protection of 25%, the whole system to become operational at the 
latest by January 1, 1989. A provisional structure of duty rates permitting a 
rate of protection not exceeding 25%, to be used in preparing the definitive 
structure, will be prepared in 1985, 86, and 87 according to a calendar and 
framework explained to the World Bank.
15. Non-Tariff Protection. The Government will continue to pursue the 
policy of import liberalization in the future so as to open up the economy 
further to increased foreign competition. Already in 1984 a large number of 
products were transferred from List B (requiring import licenses) to List A 
(free list). This process has been continued in 1985, and will be pursued 
according to a timetable explained to the World Bank. In addition, most 
products previously in List C (banned from imports) have been transferred from 
this list, either to List B, as an interim stage before their transfer to List 
A, or directly to List A. These import interdictions will be eliminated by 
stages by 1988. The timetable of this process has also been explained to the 
World Bank.
16. As regards protection policy for new investments, the Government has
already explained in paragraph 16 of the letter of December 29, 1984 to the 
Bank in the context of the ITPA I loan the principles of granting special 
protection in an initial period (maximum of 3 years after completion of the 
project); the Government does not propose to grant such protection in the form 
of quantitative restrictions, except in exceptional, duly justified cases.
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I I .  Public Investment Program and Public E n te r p r i s e s
17. The main objective of policies and actions in this area is the 
improvement of the efficiency ,of resource utilization in the public sector.
In order to harmonize budget expenditures with resource availability, the 
Government accords priority to the rationalization of public investments, 
increasing the return on these investments, and addressing the issue of 
Government and public enterprise arrears.
Public Investment Program
18. In the face of the continuing scarcity of financial resources, the
public investment program was substantially reduced in 1983 and 1984 on the 
basis of a detailed analysis of investment priorities carried out in 
cooperation with the World Bank. Within the framework of the objectives of 
developing national resources and employment promotion, the criteria for 
project analysis have been: (i) the economic rate of return; (ii) the stage
of physical execution of the project; (iii) the project gestation period; (iv) 
the project's contribution to export promotion and efficient import 
substitution; (v) the need for budgetary allocations. In function of this 
analysis and considerations of sectoral and inter-sectoral balance, public 
investment projects have been classified in three categories: ( i) highest
priority projects whose rapid completion would be desirable; (ii) projects 
whose implementation could be slowed down; (iii) projects to be postponed or 
cancelled. Following from this analysis, the Government cancelled DH 4.6 
billion of credits in 1983 and DH 6 billion in 1984.
19. The rationalization of the public investment program is continuing in 
1985. The global envelope of the investment budget was about DH 26.8 billion 
at the beginning of this year. After detailed analysis, the Government 
intends to cancel DH 4 billion. The control of the budget implies a 
practically total avoidance of inscriptions of new projects except if they 
would benefit from concessional financing. The Government proposes to use a 
significant portion of exceptional bilateral grant aid to reduce payment 
arrears. The Government also proposes to review with the World Bank in 
October/November 1985 the investment program for 1986 and subsequent years, so 
as to continue rationalization of the program with the application of the 
criteria mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
20. In addition to specific actions and increased control, as regards 
public investments, the Government is in the process of effecting a 
fundamental reform of the budgeting and planning system. This new planning 
system will involve an annually modifiable plan, with strict prior control by 
the Ministries of Finance and the Plan to ensure that only high priority 
projects in keeping with realistic global budget resource envelopes would be 
inscribed. Measures will also be taken to computerize project data, including 
estimates of total annual expenditure, amounts of credits available, 
commitments and payments, in order to improve follow-up of the financial 
implementation of projects and control of expenditures on the investment 
budget. The Government will request technical assistance from the World Bank 
to design and implement the new system of budgeting and planning investments,
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according to a timetable discussed with the World Bank. The preparation of a 
program has already been initiated, and the functional design of the new 
system will be prepared during the second half of 1985. The implementation of 
the new system is expected before June 30, 1986.
Public Enterprises
21. The growing importance of public enterprises in the last decade has 
led the Government to consider carefully the financial and structural problems 
of this sector. After a major, in-depth study in 1979-80 which served as the 
basis for a series of actions and programs in this area, in 1984 the 
Government analyzed in detail the payables and receivables of the Government 
vis-a-vis public enterprises, in order to ascertain the magnitude of arrears.
A program of measures has been prepared sector by sector, to resolve the 
structural causes of these arrears. The matrix of arrears as of December 31, 
1983 has been completed for some 60 enterprises. Detailed analyses and 
sectoral action plans have also been developed for most sectors: energy, 
transport, water-supply, trade, mines, sugar, and agriculture. A study of 
local collectivities is in progress. An action plan has been designed and is 
being implemented to improve the situation of the enterprises and halt growth 
of arrears. Several decisions and specifications have been taken in the 
context of the sectoral rehabilitation programs. An Interministerial 
Committee chaired by the Prime Minister has been created to define a strategy 
for the public enterprise sector. A Vigilance Committee has also been created 
to propose reform measures, settle disputes, etc. and follow-up on their 
implementation.
22. The matrix of debts and receivables covering 80 enterprises shows a 
net deficit of the State to public enterprises of about DH 3.8 billion as of 
December 31, 1984. The Government expects to allocate in 1985 and 1986 a 
substantial sum to reduce arrears in the shortest possible period. While 
respecting the performance criteria of the IMF, the Government expects to 
reduce its net arrears to public enterprises by DH 1 billion by the end of 
1985, and by DH 0.5 billion by June 30, 1986 (the arrears defined according to 
the methodology already established). The Government will furnish to the Bank 
in 1985 a detailed breakdown and timetable of settlement of the arrears. The 
Vigilance Committee will continue to be responsible for the implementation of 
the measures adopted (including revision of prices). The Government will 
avoide any fresh increase of these arrears in the future.
23. The Government also confirms its objective of reducing the overall 
amount of transfers to public enterprises. The amount of credits to public 
enterprises in the Finance Law has been limited (excluding operating 
subsidies) to DH 3.3 billion for investment subsidies and payments for 
services of public enterprises to the Government. The actual overall payments 
in these categories will be about DH 2.1 billion in 1985. In 1986, the 
Government expects to intensify the efforts undertaken in 1984 and 1985 to 
improve the performance of public enterprises so as to reduce their financial 
dependence on the Government, and to discuss with the Bank the measures to 
take in this connection.
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2^. The Government renews its request to the World Bank for assistance in
introducing basic structural reforms in the sector of public enterprises, so 
as to improve the efficiency of these enterprises and achieve financial and 
structural rationalization of their relations with the State, collectivities, 
and the private sector. With this objective, the Government will prepare, in 
cooperation with the World Bank, a program to carry out: (i) structural
reform of price, subsidy, and financing policies of the enterprises; (ii) 
administrative reforms permitting a better control of the efficiency of 
enterprise operations and greater enterpise autonomy; and (iii) financial or 
physical restructuring of a few key enterprises playing a vital role in the 
economy, which can serve as test-cases for the implementation of policy and 
administrative reforms in the sector. The Government has named a liaison and 
coordination group for these activities. The Government is endeavouring to 
progressively increase the proportion of self-financing by public enterprises 
of their investments.
25. Given the great importance throughout the economy of energy and power 
tariffs, the Government and the Bank have agreed to initiate a study in this 
area which will assist the preparation of a proposed Bank public enterprise 
sector loan.
III. Financial Sector Reform
26. The Government has prepared, in collaboration with the World Bank, a
major reform of the financial sector, in order to promote domestic savings and 
improve the efficiency of resource allocation. This reform includes a series 
of measures aiming at simplifying and easing the regulatory framework, 
increased reliance on market mechanisms, encouragement of increased 
competition in the sector, progressive elimination of subsidies, reduction of 
fragmentation of the financial market and resulting distortions, strengthening 
the institutional system, and developing the money market. An important 
aspect of this reform, which supports the Government's overall adjustment 
policy, is increased recourse by the Treasury to the financial market. The 
most important measures of thius reform are summarized in the following 
paragraphs.
27. Interest Rate Policy. The Government is committed to greater 
flexibility of interest rates than in the past. With the exception of certain 
preferential rates, notably for export credits and cereal production, the 
Government recognizes the objective of maintaining interest rates at levels 
which are positive in real terms. Certain interest rates (notably, on 
deposits of maturity greater than 12 months) will be freed with effect from 
April 1, 1985. The other rates have been transformed into minima (in the case 
of deposit rates) and maxima (in the case of lending rates), and the system 
has been simplified through a reduction in the number of rates set by the 
authorities. The changes in interest rates effective April 1, 1985 are 
detailed in the table below.
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Term Deposits Former Change New
  Rate   Rate-'
3 months 6.5 +2 8.5
6 months 8.5 +2 10.5
12 months 10.0 +2 12.0
Savings Deposits
Caisse d'Epargne pass book accounts 8.0 +1 9.0
Other pass book accounts 7.0 +1 8.0
Lending Rates
Overdraft 13.0 +1 14.0
Rediscountable overdraft 10.0 +2 12.0
Discount Rate 7.0 +1.5 8.5
Medium-Term
Rediscountable Loans 12.0 +1 13.0
Long-Term Rediscountable Loans 14.0 +1 15.0
Minima/ 
Maxima
Min.
Min
Min
Min
Min
Max
Max
Max
Max
Max
a / From April 1, 1985.
28. The Government has created a Permanent Committee for Interest Rates, 
consisting of representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of "
and the Professional Association of banks, to follow up the evolution
of rates and to ensure that, overall, the rates in force reflect the 
conclusions of an analysis of relevant factors, in particular, the current 
inflation rate, the liquidity situation, movements in exchange rates and the 
balance of payments, international inflation, etc. Each semester this 
Commission will prepare a report presenting its conclusions regarding this 
objective, and recommending, to the Minister of Finance, if need be, 
modification of the rates.
29. It is to be noted that the interest rates indicated in the table 
above, are considered net of taxes. In view of the proposed fiscal reform, 
and the introduction of a value added tax (see para. 38 below), lending rates 
will be increased by the amount of the value added tax deductible by borrowers
30. In parallel with the freeing of deposit rates, we have examined the 
freeing of lending rates, which also constitutes an objective of the 
Government's policy. The need for regulating credit through ceilings in 1985 
will not permit us to free before the end of the year lending rates beyond the 
ceilings mentioned above. We would like to emphasize our intention to 
gradually liberalize lending rates at the same time as credit regulation is 
eased. Measures for deregulating credit allocation and liberalizing lending 
rates will be reviewed with the World Bank and the IMF before end-1985.
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31. Gradual Elimination of Interest Rate Rebates. The Government intends
,to eliminate over the medium-term interest rate rebates on medium- and 
long-term credits in different sectors. As these rebates are granted under 
investment codes, their elimination will require passage of a law. The 
Government will study, in collaboration with the World Bank by end-1985 the 
measures to reach this objective, with a view to preparing in 1986, a program
to apply the nominal rates to these different sectors benefiting from rebates.
32. Foreign Exchange Risk Coverage. Medium- and long-term loans of
specialized financial institutions (BNDE, CNCA and CIH) are critical to ensure 
access to term resources for priority investments. A large part of these 
resources is mobilized abroad in foreign exchange, and the Government has 
assumed responsibility for covering the foreign exchange risks of these three 
institutions. The burden of this coverage weighs more and more heavily on the 
Treasury, and the Government has therefore decided to transfer a larger 
portion of the costs to ultimate borrrowers and the specialized institutions
in order to lighten the burden on the Treasury. It would, however, be
premature to transfer the entire risk to the ultimate borrowers. In function 
of these conclusions, the Government has decided to strengthen from June I, 
1985, the system of coverage of foreign exchange risks for foreign currency 
loans contracted by the specialized financial institutions, as follows.
(i) The specialized institutions will pay into a Foreign Exchange 
Risk Fund for credit of the Treasury at each of the 
institutions concerned, the difference between their lending 
rate, and the interest rate on new foreign borrowings, less a 
margin sufficient to assure them an adequate profitability;
(ii) The Foreign Exchange Risk Fund will receive funds from a
commission of 1% on disbursements of new medium- and long-term 
credits of the specialized financial institutions, with the 
exception of loans for low-cost housing (HBM) and credits to 
small farmers (CLCA).
(iii) The specialized financial institutions will assume 2% (instead
of 1.5%, till now) of all exchange losses on their foreign
resources acquired after June I, 1985. (In the case of 
exchange gains, the institutions will be credited with 2%).
These measures will be reviewed every six months, and may be modified by the
Ministry of Finance. The Government will periodically consult with the World
Bank to study the results of these measures, and propose, if need be, their 
improvement - the long-term objective being to reduce gradually, with a view 
to its eventual elimination, the charge to the Government of exchange-risk 
coverage.
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>33. The propositions mentioned above only deal with the foreign exchange 
risk on lending operations of the specialized financial institutions. The 
distortions which would arise from the implicit exchange risk on local 
currency loans of commercial banks to importers of equipment and investment 
goods have not been considered in the Government's program, for lack of a 
complete analysis of the situation. However, the possible impact of this 
distortion on public finances remains to be examined. The Government has 
therefore decided to initiate a study, by the end of 1985, with Bank support, 
on the importance of the implicit exchange risk for public finances, in order 
to specify the measures and the possible recommendations to transfer all or a  
part of the risk to importers benefiting from such loans.
34. Obligatory Placement Requirements and Reserve Requirements for 
Commercial Banks. In order to increase the margins of commercial banks on 
term-deposits, and hence encourage them to mobilize term-deposits with greater 
dynamism, the ratio for obligatory placements by the banks in Treasury bonds 
has been modified. The deposit base on which the rate of obligatory placement 
is applied was reduced in 1984 through the elimination, from the calculation 
of this base, of deposits with a term greater'than 12 months. From April 1, 
1985, all term deposits and certificates of deposit have been eliminated from 
the base of calculation of the obligatory placement requirement; the 
obligatory placement rate on sight deposits has been increased from 30 to 
35%. In addition term deposits have also been excluded for purposes of 
calculation of the reserve requirements of commercial banks.
35. Allocation of Credit Ceilings to Commercial Banks. With the 
objective of encouraging commercial banks to mobilize savings, the system of 
determining credit ceilings will be modified effective June 1, 1985, to take 
account of the effort by the banks to mobilize savings.
36. Bank Commissions. The monetary authorities have set themselves the
objective of simplifying, clarifying and up-dating bank commissions which have 
been in effect since 1975. A detailed study of commissions will be carried 
out, in collaboration with concerned institutions, by September 30, 1985, and 
communicated to the Bank for analysis and comments; this study would have as 
an objective the selection of commissions which would be expressed as maxima; 
it will take into account, as much as possible, the cost of operations. The 
reform of bank commissions will be effected, at the latest, by January, 1986.
37. Specific Measures to Encourage Competition Between Specialized 
Financial Institutions and the Commercial Banks. In order to strengthen 
competition between the banks and the specialized financial institutions, it 
would seem appropriate to permit the latter to receive deposits from the 
public. The Government's General Secretary has been requested to provide a 
legal opinion on whether it would be necessary to amend the laws to achieve 
this objective. This opinion will be furnished by end-September 1985. If CIH 
and BNDE can be authorized to receive deposits through administrative 
measures, the Government will take steps to effect this authorization, at
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the latest by January 1986. In any case, the monetary authorities will take 
all appropriate steps to permit the specialized financial institutions to 
receive funds from the public through the issue of certificates of deposit.
In case the law governing specialized financial institutions needs to be
modified, the Bank will be informed before end-1985 of the next steps which 
could be expected. Besides, in order to grant the banks a greater degree of 
responsibility and a more important role in medium-term lending, the monetary 
authorities have already granted BMCE the right to affix the third signature
on credits. The monetary authorities are also studying the possibility of
permitting other banks to provide the third signature necessary for 
rediscounting medium-term loans at the Bank of This study will be
reviewed with the World Bank with a view to its implementation effective 
January, 1986.
38. Reform of Taxation Affecting the Financial Sector. There has already
been a clarification of the conditions under which provisions for risk can be 
established by commercial banks, and a reduction of the registration fee on 
capital increases of companies whose shares are traded on the stock exchange. 
The fiscal reform, whose presentation to Parliament is expected by mid-1985, 
includes important measures concerning the financial sector: (i) the tax on
banking services will be replaced by a value added tax, with, as a result, the 
possibility for a commercial enterprise to deduct this tax from its expenses;
(ii) enterprises will have the possibility of re-valuing their assets, which 
could lighten their tax burden and increase their self-financing.
39. Development of the Money Market. Since 1983, a growing proportion of 
the Treasury's financing needs have been met through borrowing on the money 
market at market rates. Also, the proportion of refinancing by the Banque du
at flexible interest rates has continued to increase. In the future, 
these trends will be strengthened, in order to develop the money market and 
increase the participation of the Treasury in this market. In addition, the 
Treasury is seeking to mobilize supplementing resources on the financial 
market through the issue of bonds to the general public. In this regard, an 
issue in March 1985 for a sum of DH 100 million resulted in subscriptions of 
over DH 400 million, and the Treasury intends to repeat this experiment in
1985.
40. Reform of the Caisse Centrale de Garantie (CCG). To strengthen the 
credit guarantee system, there is need to redefine the role of CCG, and for a 
fundamental reform of its financial and organizational structure, including 
the procedures and principles of risk coverage by this organization. The 
Government is committed to study these issues by end-1985. A consultant will 
be appointed by the Government to carry out this study by September 1, 1985, 
and the study will be completed and its recommendations implemented during
1986, after discussions with the World Bank.
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M onitoring and Progress R eporting
41. Progress in implementing the program described above will be
monitored by the interministerial committee, established in the context of the 
ITPA I program, which will meet regularly to review progress and decide on 
appropriate actions to ensure timely implementation of the program. Two 
progress reports, summarizing the status of implementation of the program will 
be prepared and furnished to the World Bank, the first in early January 1986 
and the second in early June 1986.
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